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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this dissertation I argue that the framework under which epistemology operates 
should be broadened to account for developments in cognitive science that indicate that a 
good deal of cognition and reasoning involves the use of non-linguistic representations. 
 In chapter 1, I argue that, although epistemology is the theory of knowledge, 
epistemologists generally operate as though their field is simply the theory of 
propositional knowledge. Epistemologists generally assume that knowledge is a certain 
type of belief relation to a true proposition. However, cognitive science indicates that 
many of our mental representations are not belief-like at all, and thereby, not belief 
relations to propositions. Rather, the mind employs representations that take the form of 
images, scale models, activation patterns, and so on. I call this claim representational 
pluralism. If some of these non-linguistic representations are constitutive of knowledge, 
as I argue that they are in later chapters, then this requires a substantial revision of the 
traditional epistemological framework. I proceed to introduce some potential 
consequences of departing from the propositional knowledge tradition in epistemology. 
These consequences pertain most directly to two issues, namely, philosophical 
methodology and our understanding of normative standards of rationality.  
 My discussion of methodological issues begins with the introduction of what I 
call the analysis problem. The analysis problem is the problem of developing a 
conceptual analysis of propositional knowledge and justified belief. I argue that this 
problem emerged from concerns with skeptical regress arguments and the Gettier 
problem. The traditional methodology for analyzing these concepts, and hence, for 
addressing the 
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attributions of knowledge and justified beliefs. To determine these truth conditions, 
epistemologists develop thought experiments designed to elicit our semantic intuitions 
regarding the use of “knowledge,” “justified belief,” and their respective cognates. After 
enough intuitions are elicited, we formulate a theory of knowledge or justification. 
 While this methodology is problematic in its own right, as I argue in chapters 2 
and 3, it has also lead to the embrace of an understanding of rationality that is limited and 
narrow in its application. Rationality amounts to epistemic constraint satisfaction and 
epistemic constraints provide criteria that allow us to assess an agent’s behavior for good 
or correct performance. Good, or correct, performance must be understood relative to a 
specific goal or problem. Since epistemology assumes that knowledge is a certain belief 
relation to a true proposition, the goal or problem of concern in epistemology is that of 
forming true beliefs. So, when epistemologists think about rationality, they think of 
behaving in a way that is conducive to forming true beliefs. In other words, the standards 
of rationality that epistemologists use to evaluate agents for rationality apply only to 
agents who exhibit behavior that is aimed at forming true beliefs. So, one reason that the 
traditional understanding of rationality in epistemology is problematic is because it is 
inapplicable to agents who have other goals, both epistemic and practical. 
 The second problem I discuss for epistemology’s traditional understanding of 
rationality is that the standards of rationality are formulated in abstract conditions that 
idealize away from various practical constraints to which we are constantly subject. It is 
important to keep in mind that this second problem is, in some sense orthogonal to the 
first, although it arrives, at least at times, from the standard epistemological methodology. 
Nevertheless, even if the traditional epistemological framework is correct in holding that 
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all knowledge is belief-like, epistemology’s traditional standards of rationality are 
inapplicable to any actual individuals because actual individuals are finite creatures with 
fixed cognitive architectures. Since epistemology’s traditional standards of rationality are 
formulated in idealized conditions that abstract away from these limitations, they should 
be understood as guiding the behavior of agents who exist in those sorts of environments. 
But agents who exists in those sorts of environments will be subject to more demanding 
standards than actual agents. Actual agents, of course, cannot meet these standards, and, 
since ought implies can, cannot be held to them.  
 In short, chapter 1 argues that we need to depart from the epistemological status 
quo in order to accommodate the possibility of non-belief-like, that is, non-propositional 
knowledge. The dissertation proceeds to explore some of the consequences of this 
departure, specifically the consequences for philosophical methodology and our 
understanding of rationality in epistemology.  
 In chapter 2 I discuss knowledge-how, a type of knowledge that many have 
argued is non-propositional. In the first part of the chapter I discuss two intellectualist 
positions, that is, positions that hold that know-how is propositional. Stanley and 
Williamson argue that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for 
know-how, while Bengson and Moffett argue that propositional knowledge is not 
sufficient, but is necessary, for know-how.  
 Stanley and Williamson’s position is that knowing how to X amounts to knowing, 
under a practical mode of presentation, that some way is a way for one to X. Against their 
position, I argue that if practical modes of presentation do the work that is required of 
them, then positing them amounts to granting that non-propositional knowledge is 
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necessary for know-how. According to Stanley and Williamson, practical modes of 
presentation explain the connection between know-how, dispositions, and actions. 
However, these dispositions are presumably those that enable performance, and in order 
to have these dispositions, I argue that we need to practice the activity in question. 
Through this practice, we acquire the content that gives rise to the relevant dispositions. 
Following representational pluralism, it is highly implausible that this content is always 
linguistic or propositional. Hence, positing practical modes of presentation amounts to 
positing non-propositional content.   
 Bengson and Moffett concede that there is a non-propositional element that is 
necessary for know-how. Specifically, they argue that in order to know how to X, one has 
to stand in a non-propositional knowledge relation to a way of X-ing. However, they also 
argue that knowing how to X requires propositional knowledge because one can stand in 
a non-propositional relation to a way of X-ing without knowing that it is a way of X-ing, 
and thereby fail to know how to X. As I argue, their position entails that many clear-cut 
cases of knowing how are not cases of knowing how because the relevant agents do not 
know that the way in which they X is the way in which they X. Taken together, my 
discussion of Stanley and Williamson and Bengson and Moffett shows that propositional 
knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for know-how.  
 The second half of chapter 2 discusses the origins of the contemporary know-how 
debate going back to Gilbert Ryle. I argue that, since Ryle’s time, two debates have been 
taking place in the know-how literature: one regarding the semantic analysis of know-
how ascriptions and another regarding how we ought to explain various skills or abilities. 
The first debate is concerned with truth conditions for sentences such as, “Hannah knows 
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how to ride a bicycle,” while the latter debate is concerned with determining whether 
skills are the result of applying a “theory” or stored propositional knowledge, or are the 
result of the processing of non-linguistic information.  
 Unfortunately, these debates have been entangled in the literature. For instance, 
some philosophers, including Stanley and Williamson, Bengson and Moffett, and Ryle, 
have made inferences about how we ought to explain skills or abilities on the basis of 
semantic analyses of know-how ascriptions or appeals to ordinary language. Both of 
these strategies assume that language gives us the correct truth conditions for sentences 
that use mental terminology and that scientific accounts of the mind are beholden to 
language. In other words, these strategies amount to what Martin Roth and Robert 
Cummins call epistemological poaching.  
 As an alternative approach that disentangles these debates, I argue that the 
representational pluralist thesis needs to be taken seriously. The use of epistemological 
poaching tacitly assumes that the thesis is false and that cognition is structured around a 
language of thought that has a similar structure to natural language. Taking 
representational pluralism seriously can allow epistemology to develop a broader, yet 
more specialized, framework that bridges the longstanding gap between the field and 
empirical approaches to understanding knowledge.  
 In chapter 3 I argue that epistemology’s failure to take representational pluralism 
seriously has skewed the field’s understanding of normative standards of rationality. I 
discuss two ways in which epistemology’s normative standards of rationality are limited. 
First, they apply only to agents with purely linguistic or belief-like cognitive systems. 
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Second, they apply only to cognitive systems that are capable of meeting them, due to 
what I call the ought-can principle.  
 But before discussing these limits on epistemology’s normative standards of 
rationality, I consider one way in which a proponent of traditional epistemology might try 
to argue that representational pluralism does not require substantial revision of 
epistemology’s framework. I label this type of argument the doxastification strategy. 
More specifically the doxastification strategy constitutes an attempt to argue that 
apparent cases of non-propositional knowledge can be accommodated within 
epistemology’s propositional framework.   
 Before discussing the doxastification strategy in depth, I present prima facie 
evidence for what I call epistemological pluralism, the thesis that there are many types of 
knowledge, many of which are non-propositional. The first type of prima facie evidence 
for epistemological pluralism comes from representational pluralism. If representational 
pluralism is true, there appears to be no reason to hold that only linguistic representations 
can be constitutive of knowledge.  
 The second type of prima facie evidence comes from semantics. We often make 
knowledge attributions in which it appears the thing known is not a proposition. For 
instance, we say things like, “Jones knows how the New York subway system is laid 
out,” or “Jones knows what “God Only Knows” sounds like. In the first case, the thing 
known appears to be, not a proposition, but the layout of a subway system. In the second 
case the thing known appears to be, not a proposition, but the sound of a song. 
 Taken together, we can take semantic data to give us an indication as to what sorts 
of things qualify as objects of knowledge. Meanwhile, the psychological evidence 
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provides us with insight regarding how these objects are mentally represented. The layout 
of a subway system is naturally represented by a map, while the tune to a song is 
naturally represented in auditory memory or in a score. Hence, it appears, at least prima 
facie, that we have knowledge that is, in part, comprised of non-linguistic mental 
representations.  
 One might, however, employ the doxastification strategy to argue that we can 
understand these cases of apparent non-propositional knowledge in terms of propositional 
knowledge. When one knows, for instance, how the New York subway system is laid out, 
what one knows is a proposition, namely, the proposition that the New York subway 
system is laid out like this, where “this” refers to a map of the subway system.  
 However, the doxastification strategy divorces the content that does the genuine 
evidential work from the content of what is known. Certainly knowing how the New 
York subway system is laid out allows one to know that the subway system is laid out 
like this (again, where “this” refers to a map of the subway system). But the problem is 
that one can know this proposition without having any idea how the New York subway 
system is laid out. One can be reliably informed that the map in question accurately 
represents the subway system’s layout without ever taking a look at the map and thereby 
know that the subway system is laid out like that. But in order to know how the subway 
system is laid out, one needs access to an actual representation of the system, that is a 
map (mental or otherwise).  
 After discussing doxastification, I argue the problems with epistemology’s 
standards of rationality can be resolved by reconciling the field with the relevant findings 
in cognitive science, that is, findings that support representational pluralism. . I argue that 
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the current standards of rationality in epistemology apply neither to individuals nor to 
collectives or institutional cognitive systems. These standards cannot be applied to the 
individual because doing so violates the principle that ought implies can. In other words, 
these standards require that individuals exceed their capacities. These standards cannot be 
applied to institutions, such as the institution of science, because they are not equipped to 
evaluate the use of non-linguistic representations that is ubiquitous in scientific 
reasoning. 
 Next, I discuss several problems with traditional methodology in epistemology, 
and motivate an alternative approach. The first problem is that it is not clear what the 
target of a conceptual analysis of knowledge is. If one thinks we need an analysis that is 
correct in all possible worlds, then it is not clear what could possibly constrain such a 
project. Though appealing to intuition is a standard approach, there does not appear to be 
any reason to think that intuitions are equipped to provide any evidential support for a 
theory of knowledge. I argue that, instead of pursuing an analysis of knowledge in the 
traditional manner, we should ask what role knowledge plays in the various domains in 
which it is employed.   
 In chapter 4, I examine the role that knowledge plays in two domains: everyday 
life and the institution of science. In everyday contexts, I argue that knowledge plays a 
warrant-granting role for action. This way of thinking about knowledge has drawn some 
attention in the epistemology literature from Keith DeRose, Jason Stanley, John 
Hawthorne, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, amongst others. However, I argue 
that none of these “pragmatic encroachment” approaches draw the correct connection 
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between knowledge and practical affairs. In particular, many of these accounts are 
designed to be supplements to more traditional, independent accounts of knowledge.  
 Rather, I suggest, that in order to take pragmatic encroachment seriously, 
knowledge needs to be understood as that which plays the role of making an action 
rational under realistic conditions in which time and memory are limited. That which 
makes an action rational is often different than that which makes a belief rational. 
Forming beliefs is generally low risk, that is, there is little cost that comes with being 
wrong. The cost of being wrong comes into play only when we act on beliefs. But when 
we are simply concerned with the formation of beliefs, and not how we ought to act on 
beliefs, the risks we undertake are generally minimal. Because of these differences, the 
formation of beliefs is subject to different standards of rationality than is acting on 
beliefs.   
 When we are genuinely concerned with determining how to act, standards of 
rationality must be sensitive to limits of time, memory, information, and other resources. 
Hence, I argue, drawing on work by Gigerenzer and Goldstein, that what makes an action 
rational in everyday contexts is not a proposition that is known in the traditional 
philosophical sense, but rather the use of an effective algorithm or set of heuristics.  
 If this is correct, then knowledge, as understood in traditional epistemology, 
cannot fill the role that knowledge plays in everyday contexts. Though propositions can 
serve as inputs into a decision-making procedure, it is effective use of the procedure itself 
that makes an action rational. In other words, it is an algorithm or decision procedure that 
fills the role that knowledge plays in everyday contexts.  
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 It is true, of course, that in everyday circumstances, knowledge is often used or 
discussed in a way that is much closer to the way it is understood in standard 
epistemology. It does not seem out place in everyday contexts to say, for instance, that I 
know that Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri. I take this to suggest that wee need to 
understand knowledge in a pluralistic way. While I do think knowledge is often used in 
everyday contexts to justify or criticize action, it is unlikely that this captures all uses. 
Ultimately, the issue of what role knowledge plays in commonsense is an empirical 
question, and so it would be most desirable to accumulate a set of linguistic data to give 
us a clearer sense of the different roles the concept plays in ordinary usage.  
 In scientific contexts, I argue that, because science aims to provide us with an 
understanding of the world, the role that knowledge plays in science is an explanatory 
role. However, it is possible to have an explanation for a phenomenon that is not correct 
or accurate. Such an explanation demonstrates, not how actually a phenomenon occurs, 
but rather how possibly or how plausibly the phenomenon occurs. Since science aims to 
provide theories that are not only explanatory, but also correct or accurate, the role of 
knowledge in science is that of an accurate explanatory role.  
 I begin by noting that Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological account of explanation 
and some subsequent accounts assume explanations are sentence-like in structure. But 
more recently, many philosophers of science have taken a mechanistic approach to 
explanation. Machamer, Darden, and Craver, for instance, hold that representations of 
mechanisms for phenomena explain those phenomena. They note that we use diagrams to 
represent features of mechanisms, and these diagrams allow us to more easily apprehend 
the phenomena than linguistic descriptions. 
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 While some philosophers of science, such as Carl Craver and J.D. Trout, deny 
that explanations have to render their target happenings intelligible, Waskan e al. present 
compelling empirical evidence that this view is not shared by practicing scientists. 
Rather, it appears that both scientists and laypersons have a concept of explanation in 
which intelligibility plays a central role. This supports Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s 
claim that representations of mechanisms render their target happenings intelligible.  
 There is still a good deal of work to be done to determine the psychological nature 
of intelligibility or understanding. However, Stephen Grimm suggests that understanding 
a phenomenon requires having a grasp of the relevant scientific principles and the ability 
to apply these principles to specific cases. If knowing how entails possessing content that 
gives rise to dispositions that enable us to perform various abilities, as I argue in chapter 
2, then Grimm provides some reason for thinking that know-how is a central component 
to understanding.  
 So if knowledge plays the role of explaining the world, and explanations must 
render the world intelligible, then it appears that the role of knowledge in science is filled 
by that which enables us to have a correct or accurate understanding of the world. If this 
is correct, then the role that knowledge plays in science is clearly different than the role it 
plays in everyday contexts. In everyday contexts, knowledge provides warrant for action. 
In science, knowledge explains the world by rendering it intelligible.  This difference 
should be unsurprising given that individuals have different goals, resources, and 
limitations than practicing scientists, or even scientific institutions.  
 However, one common feature that knowledge in science and everyday life 
appear to have in common is that they are both related to abilities or skills. In some 
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everyday contexts, knowledge takes the form of a decision procedure of algorithm.  
Having propositional information that can serve as an input to an algorithm alone does 
not provide sufficient warrant or assurance that a certain course of action is rational. To 
have a sufficient degree of warranty, one also needs an effective procedure for processing 
or utilizing that information. To put it in somewhat more standard terms, it would seem 
that knowing how to put the information at one’s disposal to practical use is essential for 
making a course of action practically rational. In scientific contexts, knowledge plays the 
role of enabling us to understand the world, and if Grimm is correct, then understanding 
consists, at least in part, of a kind of knowledge-how.  
 There is one final complication that I discuss at the end of the chapter. The 
complication is that science is generally an institutional or collective endeavor. At the 
individual level, it appears that the cognitive state that plays the role of knowledge in 
science will be that of a state of understanding, which Grimm suggests entails having 
certain skills or abilities. But since science is generally a collective enterprise, following 
the present proposal will require developing an account of understanding, ability, and 
skill that makes sense when applied to collective cognitive systems. At present, I am not 
sure what such an account will look like. However, there are at least two obvious 
possibilities.  
 One possibility is that at the collective or institutional level, understanding, skill, 
and ability are to be understood in roughly the same manner as they are understood as the 
individual level. For example, we might understand the utterance, “Science understands 
how planes fly” as serving as shorthand for the claim that a sufficient number of 
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individual scientists, or a sufficient number of members of a subset of scientists, 
understand how planes fly.  
 A second possibility would be that in order for science to understand a 
phenomenon, it could be the case that different scientists, or collections of scientists, 
understand different components of that phenomenon. Perhaps none of the scientists, or 
groups of scientists, understands the phenomenon in full, but if we sum together the 
individual components that they do separately understand, we will arrive at a full 
understanding of the phenomenon under consideration.  
 If the suggestions offered in this section are correct, then they constitute further 
support for the claim that epistemology stands in need of revision. The traditional 
epistemological framework is not equipped to evaluate knowledge under the role it plays 
in science and this role is distinct from the role that it plays in common sense. Hence, we 
have further need for epistemological specialization and fragmentation.  
 In chapter 5, I present summaries of the preceding chapters. I then conclude that 
epistemology, in order to be the theory of knowledge, rather than the theory of 
propositional knowledge, must become more pluralistic. This is not to say that we need 
to abandon studies of propositional knowledge. But rather, epistemology as a field should 
become more fragmented, specialized, and connected to scientific accounts of the mind 
and cognition.  
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CHAPTER 1 
EPISTEMOLOGY: A THEORY OF PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The aim of this dissertation is to argue that the framework under which 
epistemology operates should be broadened to account for developments in cognitive 
science that indicate that a good deal of cognition and reasoning involves the use of non-
belief like, that is, non-linguistic representations. In short, we need an epistemology that 
is a theory of knowledge in a broad sense, not simply a theory of propositional 
knowledge. In this chapter, my goal is to motivate the need for such a project.  
 Epistemologists generally assume that knowledge is a certain type of belief 
relation to a true proposition. However, cognitive science indicates that many of our 
mental representations are not belief-like at all, and thereby, not belief relations to 
propositions. Rather, the mind employs representations that take the form of images, 
scale models, activation patterns, and so on.  
 I will be understanding propositional content to be content that can be represented 
linguistically. This, of course, leaves open the possibility that propositional content can 
also be represented in non-linguistic formats. It is possible that a system that uses 
imagery or models can realize, with the addition of extra-representational processes, a 
truth-evaluable state, that is, propositional content. However, as argue later in the 
dissertation, although non-linguistic modes of representation, such as imagery and 
models, can bear propositional content, linguistic modes of representation cannot bear 
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knowledge that can be linguistically represented. Non-propositional knowledge, on the 
other hand, is knowledge that cannot be linguistically represented. In light of these 
considerations, I will be using the terms “propositional representation” and “linguistic 
representation” interchangeably. I will also be using “non-propositional” representation 
and “non-linguistic representation” interchangeably. 
 By focusing on propositional knowledge, and the justification of belief, 
epistemology has ignored the epistemic role that is played by non-propositional, that is, 
non-linguistic representations. If epistemology’s framework is compatible at all with the 
use of non-linguistic representations, it is only in cases where these representations, with 
the aid of extra-representational processes, realize propositional content. But in general, 
non-linguistic representations bear content that cannot be rendered linguistically. If there 
are cases of the latter sort that are constitutive of knowledge, as I argue that they are in 
later chapters, then this requires a substantial revision of the traditional epistemological 
framework. In this chapter my goal is to explain why such revision is required. I begin by 
offering an account of why epistemology has focused so narrowly on propositional 
knowledge. I then give a brief account of the methodology that has come to accompany 
this focus. Next, I argue that this methodology has led to a very narrow understanding of 
rationality that is limited in its applicability, and offer two reasons in support of this 
claim. 
  
1.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 
Traditionally, mainstream epistemology has focused on the conceptual analysis of 
core epistemic concepts, namely, propositional knowledge and justification. The apparent 
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need to develop these analyses has emerged from anxieties over two standing issues: 
skepticism and the Gettier problem. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the problem of 
developing these analyses as the analysis problem. While there are epistemologists who 
do not work directly on this problem, they still presuppose the propositional background 
inherited from discussions of the analysis problem. In this section, I offer brief 
discussions of skeptical regress of reasons arguments and the Gettier problem as well as 
some attempts at addressing these issues. Then, I explain the methodology that has been 
used in this work. 
 
1.2.1 SKEPTICISM 
 Skepticism is often motivated by appeal to regress of reasons arguments. The 
following is a representative formulation: 
Regress of Reasons Argument for Skepticism 
 (R1) In order to know that p, I must have reasons for believing that p. 
(R2) If I have reasons for believing that p, then they either form an infinite chain, 
a circular chain, or a terminating chain.   
(R3) My reasons for believing p cannot form an infinite chain.1 
(R4) If my reasons for believing p form a circular chain, then I do not know that 
p. 
(R5) If my reasons for believing p form a terminating chain, then I do not know 
that p. 
(R6) Therefore, I do not know that p. 
 
Since the argument concludes, “I do not know p,” and since ‘p’ can take as its 
value any proposition, it may seem that the argument leads to global skepticism, that is, 
the conclusion that we cannot have any knowledge.  While such an inference may be 
tempting, it would also be mistaken. Because ‘p’ can take propositions, and only 
                                                
1 Alternatively, one might hold “If my reasons for believing p form an infinite chain, then I do not know 
that p.” 
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propositions, as its value, the regress argument, at best, establishes skepticism about 
propositional knowledge, and only about propositional knowledge.  
Skeptical regress arguments of this sort have led many epistemologists to offer 
accounts of the structure of knowledge and justification that allows us to avoid the 
conclusion that we can know no propositions. Foundationalists hold that some beliefs are 
justified, but not in virtue of standing in a certain relationship to other beliefs, thereby 
denying (R5) (Chisholm 1977; Annis 1977; Audi 1993; McGrew 1999; Audi 1983; 
Pollock 2001; K. Lehrer and Paxson 1969; Hobson 2008; Fumerton 1995)2. Rather, these 
foundational beliefs serve as a source of justification for other beliefs, without needing 
further beliefs to be themselves justified. Coherentists hold that beliefs are justified in 
virtue of belonging to a coherent web or network of beliefs, thereby denying a modified 
version of (R4) (BonJour 1985; Davidson 1989; Kvanvig and Riggs 1992; Lehrer 1999; 
Quine and Ullian 1978). Less commonly, Infinitists hold that the structure of justificatory 
reasons is infinite and non-repeating, thereby denying (R3) (P. Klein 1998; P. Klein 
1998; P. Klein 2003; P. Klein 2007; P. D. Klein 1999; P. D. Klein 2010). 
Skeptical regress arguments lead, at best, to a limited form of skepticism, that is. 
propositional knowledge skepticism. Foundationalists, coherentists, and infinitists offer 
different attempts at blocking the inference to propositional knowledge skepticism, 
thereby offering accounts as to how we can “know that p.”  Since these are accounts of 
how we can have a justified belief or knowledge that p, and since ‘p’ can take as its value 
                                                
2 Notably there are some foundationalists who hold that perceptions, or perceptual experiences can justify 
beliefs but are not themselves propositions. Still, these foundationalists can be taken to deny (R5) of the 
regress argument because they hold that some beliefs are justified in virtue of being a part of a terminating 
chain that terminates in a perceptual experience. However, it unclear how these perceptual experiences can 
stand in an inferential, or truth-preserving, relation to propositions since they do not seem to have 
propositional contents. One can, in some sense, infer propositions from perceptual experiences (or e.g., 
from pictures or models), but this is not logical inference, and leaves the nature of such inferences unclear, 
precisely because they have no account of the cognitive content of non-propositional representations. 
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all and only propositions, foundationalism, coherentism, and the like should be 
understood as accounts of the justificatory status of propositional knowledge, and only of 
propositional knowledge. 
One exception to the focus on propositional knowledge is found in reliabilist 
accounts of knowledge (Bergmann 2006; Goldman 1979; Goldman 1976; Goldman 1988; 
Heller 1995; Nozick 1981; Goldman 1967). On a standard formulation, reliabilists hold 
that S knows that p if and only if S’s belief that p was formed by a reliable process, that 
is, a belief forming process that, at least more often than not, leads to true beliefs. Under 
this formulation, reliabilism may appear to be restricted to propositional knowledge, just 
as the other views under discussion.  But while reliabilism is typically stated in this 
manner, it needn’t be. 
Suppose that Bill knows what the Mona Lisa looks like, and that this knowledge 
consists in Bill’s having a visual mental representation that corresponds to the appearance 
of the actual painting. While Bill may have certain beliefs about the Mona Lisa, in this 
example we are not concerned with explaining the epistemic status of Bill’s beliefs. 
Rather, we are interested in accounting for Bill’s knowledge of what the Mona Lisa looks 
like.3  Here, there is room for a reliabilist to hold that Bill’s visual mental representation 
amounts to knowledge of what the Mona Lisa looks like because his visual representation 
was formed by a reliable process (viz. his visual system). Reliabilism does not require 
that Bill believe that a reliable process formed the representation, but only that the 
representation is the result of a reliable process. 
                                                
3 “What the Mona Lisa looks like” may strike some as ambiguous. Are we concerned with what it looks 
like for an average human, to Bill, or something else? While these are interesting issues, the concern here is 
not with phenomenology. For present purposes, we could test whether Bill knows what the Mona Lisa 
looks like in the relevant sense by subjecting him to a recognition test. 
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Skeptical regress of reasons arguments, if they succeed, only establish that we 
have no propositional knowledge. Since these arguments attack the possibility of 
propositional knowledge, responses to these arguments generally amount to defenses of 
the possibility of propositional knowledge. Generally, these responses to skepticism 
amount to theories of what makes a belief justified (e.g. foundationalism, coherentism, 
infinitism, reliabilism, and so on).  
 
1.2.2 THE GETTIER PROBLEM  
 Edmund Gettier’s famous paper (1963) offers a counterexample to the traditional 
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB).  This in itself should establish that 
the Gettier problem is a problem for the traditional account of propositional knowledge, 
but has nothing to say about other possible forms of knowing. Gettier presents cases in 
which subjects have a justified true belief, but intuitively, do not seem to have knowledge 
of the proposition in question. These “Gettier-intuitions” lend support to the following 
argument against the JTB analysis: 
Gettier Argument 
 (G1) If knowledge is JTB, then subjects in Gettier cases have knowledge. 
 (G2) Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge (Getttier-intuition). 
 (G3) Therefore, knowledge is not JTB. 
 While little has been made of it explicitly, perhaps because it is so obvious, the 
JTB analysis is clearly an account of propositional knowledge. This comes across clearly 
in terms of the truth component. Since propositions, and only propositions, are the sorts 
  7 
of things that can be true4, any account of knowledge with a truth requirement will be 
intrinsically limited to being an account of under what conditions we know propositions. 
 There have been two standard types of response to the Gettier problem.  Some 
have proposed adding a fourth condition to the standard JTB analysis that prevents 
justified belief from being “gettierized.”  Others have proposed strengthening the 
justification condition so as to maintain the JTB analysis without falling prey to Gettier’s 
counterexamples.  The second option is committed to the highly unorthodox claim that 
justification entails certainty, that is, that we cannot have any justified false beliefs, and 
so subjects in Gettier cases do not have justified beliefs to begin with.  
 In response to these efforts, Linda Zagzebski has argued for “The inescapability 
of Gettier problems” (1994). Specifically, Zagzebski’s thesis is that no analysis of 
knowledge that is similar to the JTB account can avoid “gettierization,” so long as one 
allows justification and truth to come apart. For illustrative purposes, consider Alvin 
Plantiga’s (1996) attempt to avoid the Gettier problem by adding to the JTB analysis a 
fourth condition requiring that the subject’s faculties be working properly in an 
appropriate environment. Zagzebski in effect offers a recipe for constructing Gettier 
counterexamples to any JTB+X proposal, where X is offered as a means around these 
counterexamples. This recipe consists in two steps: 
 1. Start with a case where a subject has a justified false belief that also meets 
 condition X.  
 2. Modify the case so that the belief is true merely by luck.  
                                                
4 There is, of course, a sense in which beliefs and sentences have truth-values. But their truth-values are 
derivative on the relevant propositions. A belief is true if the believed proposition is true. A sentence is true 
if the proposition it expresses is true. 
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Against Plantiga’s proposal, Zagzebski offers a case in which we imagine that Mary has 
eyesight that is good enough for her cognitive faculties to generally yield knowledge that 
her husband is sitting in the living room.  But because these faculties are not infallible, 
we can imagine a case in which Mary’s brother-in-law, who looks a good deal like her 
husband, is in the living room, and Mary concludes on the basis of her visual experience 
that her husband is in the room. Here, while Mary’s belief is false, it appears to be 
justified. However, to create a Gettier case, we only need to alter the original such that 
Mary’s husband just happens to be in the living room as well. Now Mary has a justified 
true belief, but still does not appear to know that her husband is in the living room, so 
much the worse for Plantiga’s proposal, and other JTB+X accounts. 
 Another standard response to the Gettier problem is to maintain the JTB analysis, 
but strengthen the justification condition such that subjects in Gettier cases lack 
justification, and thereby knowledge (Merricks 1995; Sutton 2007; Littlejohn 2012). This 
effectively amounts to side stepping the issue as Gettier’s cases are intended to constitute 
counterexamples to any JTB analysis that allows truth and justification to come apart. 
Those who strengthen the justification condition so as to block the Gettier 
counterexamples are committed to the highly unorthodox view that we can have no 
justified false beliefs. Given this entailment, the first step of Zagzebski’s recipe cannot be 
undertaken. So while these positions offer a way of maintaining the JTB analysis in light 
of the Gettier problem, they do so at the cost of positing a controversial account of 
justification, one that seems to imply that knowledge is extremely rare in the sciences and 
ordinary life. In one accepts this conclusion, it would seem to follow that JTB is the 
concept of interest, not knowledge. 
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 The Gettier problem seems to show that no amount of epistemic virtue (i.e. 
justification) is sufficient for yielding knowledge. Despite epistemologists’ best efforts at 
getting around the problem, Zagzebski’s discussion suggests that the only way to avoid 
the problem, while operating in the JTB tradition, is to strengthen the justification 
condition such that it guarantees knowledge, thereby violating standard epistemological 
orthodoxy.  
 Proposed solutions to the Gettier problem generally take the form of analyses of 
propositional knowledge or justified belief. The Gettier problem shows that the 
traditional JTB analysis is incorrect. Some address this problem by proposing a fourth 
necessary condition for propositional knowledge, a condition that allows us to distinguish 
cases of propositional knowledge from cases of mere justified true belief. Others address 
the problem by proposing analyses of justified belief, analyses according to which agents 
in Gettier cases are not justified in believing the propositions that they believe. 
 
1.2.3 THE METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS PROBLEM 
 Whether one is concerned with skepticism of the Gettier problem, the 
methodology that epistemologists use to address the analysis problem has lead to a 
narrow understanding of epistemic rationality. As I note at the end of section A., 
skeptical regress of reasons arguments attack the possibility of propositional knowledge. 
So, responses to these arguments amount to defenses of the possibility of propositional 
knowledge. At the end of section C., I note that the Gettier problem shows that the 
traditional JTB analysis of propositional knowledge is incorrect. So attempts to solve the 
Gettier problem consist in presenting analyses of propositional knowledge that 
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distinguish Gettier cases from cases of knowing propositions. Epistemologists have taken 
up a particular methodology to address both of these issues, which I discuss below. This 
methodology leads to an understanding of rationality that is quite narrow. So, in short, the 
focus on propositional knowledge has lead to this problematic understanding of 
rationality.  
 Epistemologists working on the analysis problem generally engage in a 
methodology that consists in working out the truth conditions of sentences that ascribe 
propositional knowledge of justified beliefs. One, for instance, proposes a theory of 
knowledge that fits the following schema: 
 Analysis schema-K: S knows that p if and only if j. 
 Here, j represents a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for S’s knowing p. In other 
words, j represents proposed truth conditions for sentences of the form, “S knows that p.” 
To determine if these proposed truth conditions are correct, epistemologists develop 
thought experiments in which the conditions represented by j are met. Then, 
epistemologists consult their intuitions to determine whether S actually knows that p in 
the case described. After enough intuitions are elicited, and any necessary adjustments 
are made to j, a theory of knowledge is proposed.  
 The same points apply when we are concerned with justified belief. One could, 
for instance, propose a theory of justified belief that fits the following schema: 
 Analysis schema-J: S is justified in believing that p if and only if j. 
Here, j represents a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for S’s being justified in 
believing that p. That is, j represents proposed truth conditions for sentences of the form, 
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“S is justified in believing that p.” Such a proposal is evaluated using the same 
methodology as a proposed theory of propositional knowledge.   
 While this methodology is problematic in its own right, as I argue in chapter 2 and 
3, it has also lead to an understanding of rationality within epistemology that has a very 
limited applicability. I now turn to discuss the limitations and of this understanding of 
rationality. 
 
1.3 EPISTEMOLOGY’S UNDERSTANDING OF RATIONALITY  
 Rationality amounts to epistemic constraint satisfaction. In other words, an agent 
is rational insofar as she satisfies her epistemic constraints. Epistemic constraints provide 
norms by which we can evaluate agents for good or correct performance. Good or correct 
performance must, of course, be understood relative to a particular goal, or set of goals.  
 Analysis schema-K offers norms for evaluating agents in pursuit of the goal of 
propositional knowledge. Analysis schema-J offers norms for evaluating agents in pursuit 
of the goal of justified beliefs. Since the point of forming justified beliefs is to have 
beliefs that are true and avoid having beliefs that are false, we can understand both 
analysis schemas as providing norms that must be satisfied when one’s goal is acquiring 
true beliefs. Because these norms amount to epistemic constraints, and an agent is 
rational insofar as she satisfies her epistemic constraints, the methodology of the analysis 
problem leads to an understanding of rationality in which rationality amounts to behaving 
in a way that is conducive to forming true beliefs. I will use the term truth-directed 
rationality to refer to this understanding of rationality.  
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 The norms of truth-directed rationality may indeed offer resources for evaluating 
an agent’s rationality when that agent has the goal of acquiring true beliefs, but it is 
important to note that such an understanding of rationality is quite limited in its 
applicability. When our goals are appropriate, it may be the case that forming beliefs in 
accord with the norms of truth-directed rationality is the rational thing to do. But it is not 
the case that these norms provide the appropriate criteria for evaluating agents for 
rationality in any general sense.  
 One limit of truth-directed rationality is that it fails to provide norms of rationality 
for evaluating agents who are not operating in the pursuit of truth. Standards of truth-
directed rationality are used to assess strategies and procedures in terms of their tendency 
to lead to true beliefs. One such standard is to form beliefs on the basis of complete 
evidence. Among contemporary epistemologists, evidence is understood as taking a 
propositional or linguistic form. Williamson (2000), for instance holds that one’s 
evidence consists in the totality of propositions that one knows. Conee and Feldman 
(2004) hold that one’s evidence consists in the occurrent thoughts that one is having at a 
particular time.5 If evidence takes this linguistic or propositional form, then forming 
beliefs on the basis of one’s evidence requires forming beliefs through a process of 
logical inference. In other words, one prescription of truth-directed rationality is to form 
beliefs by making inferences from one’s evidence.  
 But there are many contexts in which our goal is not to acquire true beliefs, and to 
achieve these goals we rely on non-linguistic representations. The cab driver relies on his 
mental map to navigate about the city. The barber relies on the stock photo to give his 
                                                
5 Notably, this way of thinking about evidence is a more recent development. Russell, for instance, held 
that evidence is sense data. Quine held that evidence consists in stimulations of one’s sensory receptors. 
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client the desired hairstyle. While maps and photographs can be assessed in terms of how 
accurately they represent their targets, they cannot be assessed for truth or falsity.6 So 
truth-directed standards of rationality seem to be inapplicable to circumstances in which 
our aims are not truth-directed.  
 A second limit to truth-directed rationality is that its standards generally cannot 
even be applied to agents who are pursuing true beliefs. This is because these standards 
are typically formulated in hypothetical, idealized conditions that abstract away from 
various real world constraints to which we are constantly subject.  For example, in 
considering how an ideal agent might approach a given scenario, one might set aside 
concerns pertaining to temporal deadlines or the limits of human memory. While 
standards formulated under such conditions may be appropriate for entities that are not 
subject to these kinds of constraints, or who are operating under circumstances in which 
these constraints do not arise or are mitigated by design, we are clearly not entities of this 
sort.  Rather, we are finite creatures with a fixed cognitive architecture. Since “ought” 
implies “can”, the standards of rationality to which we are subject must be sensitive to the 
limits of our cognitive capabilities. I call this the ought-can principle. Standards of truth-
directed rationality violate this principle when applied to human individuals, and thereby 
cannot serve as an appropriate guide for evaluating human individuals for rational 
behavior.  
                                                
6 A complication arises form the fact that pictures, for example, represent many things. Unlike sentences, 
images cannot single out particular properties of objects. However, due to the way in which cognition 
works, we have the capacity to attend to particular features of images. This capacity may be required for us 
to assess the degree to which an image, or other non-propositional representation, accurately represents its 
target. This capacity also enables us to have beliefs that are constituted by images. Beliefs, of course, have 
truth-values. But it is important to note that in these cases, it is the belief that has a truth-value, not the 
images that comprise the belief.  
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 A normative theory of rationality should evaluate performance, practice, and 
strategies in light of what is likely or possible. In idealized, time constraint free 
circumstances, a rational strategy may be to wait for complete information before 
choosing between alternatives. In the real word, such a strategy could not only be 
irrational, but also deadly. If, for instance, one waits to be sure that the approaching light 
is an oncoming car before deciding to step out of the path, one may end up dead before 
complete information becomes accessible. In different real world circumstances, the same 
strategy may be impossible or different strategies may be required, simply because 
circumstances and our cognitive limits do not allow us to possess or contemplate 
complete information. 
 One might acknowledge that in certain circumstances, we may have good 
practical reasons for violating standards of truth-directed rationality. However, one might 
go on to think that this just shows that in some, perhaps limited, cases these standards do 
not apply.7 But most of the time, when we are not under looming deadlines, or when we 
aren’t dealing with something so complex so as to be computationally intractable, this is 
not the case, and so my point, while a good one, is quite narrow. 
 This response suffers from two problems. First, the point I’m pushing is not just 
the obvious one that there are instances that constitute exceptions to the standards of 
truth-directed rationality. Clearly the constraints to which we are subject come in various 
degrees of stringency and leniency, and perhaps under the more lenient circumstances we 
can come closer to approximating that which truth-directed rationality prescribes. If you 
                                                
7 Alternatively, one might hold that the norms of truth-directed rationality do hold in most, or all cases. 
This has the result that what is actually limited are the circumstances in which we can satisfy these norms 
and acquire knowledge. Of course, if there are no circumstances in which we can satisfy these norms, we 
seem to be on the road to skepticism. If this is the case, then there is no knowledge, and perhaps we just 
have to get by with various degrees of justification.  
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have three years to solve a problem, then you can come closer to gathering all of the 
relevant information than you could if you had three weeks to solve the same problem.  
 But, although sometimes the constraints to which we are subject are more lenient 
than others, we can never free ourselves from them. A deadline in three years is still a 
deadline. We do often attempt to alleviate these constraints to the extent to which this is 
possible, particularly in theoretical pursuits. But we often do this by institutionalizing 
research programs to circumvent the temporal constraints inherent in our mortal status. 
Doing this also allows us to bolster our capacities for computation and memory, as does 
the development of various instruments and media for the storage of information. 
Although institutions are still subject to constraints of various sorts, they may represent 
the closest we can come to reaching ideal conditions for pure theorizing.  
 One might think that we can circumvent this issue by developing practical 
standards of rationality that are based on the truth-directed standards developed in 
epistemology. This response assumes that we can arrive at a constrained, and thereby 
practical, account of rationality by beginning with an idealized, truth-directed account, 
and then imposing practical constraints. In mechanics, for instance, the ideal pendulum 
law idealizes away from friction and air resistance, modeling a pendulum’s behavior in 
such an environment. This is unproblematic because there is actually a way that a 
pendulum would behave in such circumstances.  In contrast, we cannot idealize away 
from length or gravity because there is no way a pendulum would behave absent these 
factors because eliminating these factors eliminates the pendulum. Standards of truth-
directed rationality treat real world constraints as being of a piece with friction and air 
resistance. This is a mistaken assumption. The ideal pendulum law is useful because it 
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allows us to determine how friction and air resistance would modify the behavior of an 
ideal pendulum. In other words the ideal pendulum law allows us to approximate how a 
non-ideal pendulum would behave. The same does not hold true when we are concerned 
with cognitive systems or strategies. Effective cognitive strategies are generally designed 
to be effective within specific circumstances having their own unique sets of constraints. 
So an ideally rational cognitive system will not simply work non-ideally upon the 
imposition of constraints. Generally, such a system will cease to work at all.8 For 
instance, in an environment without temporal constraints, serial search may be the most 
effective strategy for arriving at the best answer. But if a system that uses serial search is 
transported into a temporally constrained environment, the system may run out of time 
before coming to the right answer. It has no way of making a best guess. Unless the 
system has some sort of ad hoc programming (programming that would be unnecessary 
in the temporal constraint free environment in which it was designed), it will do nothing. 
Similar problems arise when we are concerned with memory rather than time. When a 
finite system runs out of memory, it crashes. This is what happens when calculators give 
an “e” message to indicate error. 
 Moreover variation in performance is not simply a function of resource 
availability. Two systems with the exact same resources may differ in terms of problem 
solving performance depending on which algorithm is used to search memory. If one 
system is using breadth-first search while the other uses depth-first, then each systems’ 
performance will depend on the location of the relevant information within the search 
                                                
8 For further elaboration and discussion of these points see (Cummins, Poirier, and Roth 2004). 
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tree. While this problem is generally acknowledge in AI research, it has been neglected in 
epistemology. 
 The second problem with the response – namely, that it is only in limited 
circumstances that the standards of truth-directed rationality do not apply - is that it 
appears to assume that acquiring true beliefs is the primary aim of rational agents. In 
other words, rational agents are rational in virtue of adhering to normative standards of 
truth-directed rationality because doing so typically results in the formation of beliefs that 
are justified in virtue of according with one’s evidence.    
 Nevertheless, this claim ignores the fact that activities that have the appearance of 
being purely truth-directed are usually conducted in the service of action or practice. In 
these cases, our reasoning isn’t purely in the pursuit of truth, but rather, a means of 
accomplishing various practical ends. When reasoning is done in the service of practice, 
rather than in the service of truth, it should be evaluated, not in terms of its truth 
conduciveness, but in terms of how effectively it serves the action with which we’re 
concerned. For these reasons, the epistemic constraints that must be satisfied for a belief 
to be knowledge will often differ from the epistemic constraints that must be satisfied for 
a belief to be rational. A predator detection system, assessed in terms of truth-directed 
rationality, is rational so long as it typically classifies predators, and only predators, as 
predators. However, predator detection systems, like many real world cognitive systems, 
have temporal and computational constraints built-in.  The goal, at least generally, of a 
predator detection system is to avoid predators. For this reason, real world predator 
detection systems are extremely sensitive and generate many false positives. While truth-
directed standards of rationality would judge such a system to be irrational, the strategy 
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is, practically speaking, very rational.  Simply put, a practically rational predator 
detection system will exchange accuracy for speed (see Cummins, Poirier, and Roth 
2004).9  
 Or consider, for example, physics. When we are concerned with purely truth-
directed theorizing, it would be objectionable to invoke Newtonian mechanics as the 
basis for some claim. On the other hand, when NASA’s goal is to calculate escape 
velocities, they quite rationally use Newtonian mechanics to do so. While we no longer 
hold that Newtonian mechanics is the correct mechanics, it does a better job serving the 
action of calculating escape velocities than does relativity or string theory. Using the 
latter would make the computations intractable, leading to a greater possibility of error 
and less success at launching projectiles beyond Earth’s gravitational field.  
 It appears, then, that truth-directed standards of rationality have very little real 
world application. The world is full of finite epistemic agents that are subject to various 
constraints. Moreover, these agents have many non-truth directed goals. In order to give 
these agents their epistemic due, we are in need of an epistemological framework that can 
accommodate practical limitations and non-truth-directed goals.  
 
1.4 PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY  
In the previous section, I suggested that philosophical discussions of rationality 
amount to discussions of truth-directed rationality. This portrayal may appear to neglect 
philosophical discussions in which practical considerations are given their proper due. In 
                                                
9 To use more standard epistemic terms, we might also say that the system exchanges knowledge for 
effectiveness.  
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this section and the two that follow, I review a few of these approaches, and argue that 
they fall short.   
 
1.4.1 PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT AND CONTEXTUALISM  
 Recently some epistemologists have made efforts to account for practical or 
pragmatic considerations in offering accounts of knowledge. In their discussion of 
“pragmatic encroachment,” Fantl and McGrath (2007) argue that knowledge is not purely 
epistemic, but rather, there is a pragmatic condition on knowing. Specifically, they claim 
that if S knows that p, then S is rational to act as if p.  
 To motivate the position, Fantl and McGrath appeal to the standard practice of 
defending or criticizing actions by citing knowledge. Consider a couple of their 
examples: 
 I might say to my spouse, in defending my driving straight home without 
stopping off to get yams the night before Thanksgiving, ‘I know we have them at 
home.’ In citing my knowledge, I am trying to convince my spouse that I am 
rational to act as if we have yams at home – that is, head home rather than stop off 
and buy some (Fantl and McGrath 2007, 561). 
 
I knew they [the doors] were locked; why did I bother going back [to check]? 
(Fantl and McGrath 2007, 562) 
 
While Fantl and McGrath present their view as an account of knowledge that is sensitive 
to pragmatic considerations, these examples suggest that the opposite is the case. In the 
first example, the subject appeals to his knowing that there were yams at home as 
evidence for the rationality of his not stopping to get some on the way home. Rather than 
imposing a pragmatic condition on knowledge, this seems to be the imposition of an 
epistemic condition on a practical affair. Because the subject knew there were yams at 
home, it was rational for him to come straight home.  In the second example, because I 
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knew the doors were locked, it was irrational for me to go back to check. If pragmatic 
considerations “encroach” upon epistemological considerations, then it seems that what 
we ought to do should affect what we know. But in Fantl and McGrath’s examples the 
opposite seems to be the case. That is, what we know affects what we ought to do.  
 In the first example Fantl and McGrath assume that the subject acted rationally, 
and that in the second, that she acted irrationally. It is far from clear that these 
assumptions are correct. In the first case, we could imagine the husband reasoning, quite 
rationally, “I know there are yams at home, but since the store will be closed tomorrow, 
I’d better go pick some up just to be safe.” Similarly, in the second case one might think, 
“I know I locked the door, but it would be disastrous if my valuables were stolen, so I’d 
better go back to make sure.” If Fantl and McGrath are correct, then either these 
individuals are acting irrationally, or they do not know what they claim to know. In other 
words, for Fantl and McGrath one cannot both know that p and rationally act as if not-p is 
the case.  
 But unless one thinks that knowledge entails certainty, there are surely cases in 
which one can know p and rationally act as though not-p. I can know that the door is 
locked on the basis of having locked it a few minutes ago. But in this context I can also 
rationally act as though this is not the case by going back to check. 
 Similarly epistemic contextualism may be seen as an attempt to make our 
epistemic concerns sensitive to practical affairs. Contextualism is the view that the truth-
conditions of knowledge-attributing and knowledge-denying sentences may vary across 
the contexts in which they are uttered. Keith Derose (2009), for instance appeals to 
judgments arising from the considerations of pairs of cases, one in which the costs of 
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being wrong are high (i.e. a high stakes case) and one in which the costs of being wrong 
are low (i.e. a low stakes case). In both contexts, the subject is in the same epistemic 
position with regard to her evidence and justification for believing a proposition. 
However, contextualists hold that in the low stakes case the subject knows the 
proposition, whereas in high stakes case, she does not. Since subjects in both cases stand 
in the same epistemic position with regard to the same proposition, contextualists explain 
the epistemic asymmetry in terms of different standards that must be met for a 
proposition to be known.  DeRose believes that in considering these pairs of cases 
ordinary speakers will have the intuition both that speakers in the cases are speaking 
appropriately, and that they are speaking truthfully in attributing or denying knowledge to 
some subject.  
 Contextualists appear to do a better job attempting to accommodate practical 
considerations than Fantl and McGrath’s pragmatic encroachment account. Whereas 
Fantl and McGrath seem to impose standards of truth-directed rationality onto practical 
considerations, contextualists like DeRose at least seem open to adjusting our epistemic 
standards in light of practical issues. While I am sympathetic to the contextualist attempts 
to posit epistemic sensitivity to practical matters, I believe that this sensitivity should take 
a different form. Contextualism is ultimately wedded to the propositional framework that 
is standard in epistemology. I offer what I take to be a better approach in chapter 3.  
 
1.4.2 PRACTICAL RATIONALITY IN ETHICS 
 Another area in which practical rationality has received direct attention is in 
ethics. However, these discussions typically amount to reducing practical rationality to 
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truth-directed rationality. In other words, what we ought to do is held to be determined by 
what we know, or what we ought to believe. 
 Derek Parfit, for instance, has argued that metaphysical considerations 
surrounding the nature of personal identity should have important implications for our 
views about both rationality and morality (1984).  The details of Parfit’s views on 
personal identity are not relevant to the present discussion. However, Parfit motivates his 
position by appealing to thought experiments that abstract away from real world 
constraints to which we are always subject. This methodology may be fine and well for 
investigating the metaphysics of personal identify. But nevertheless, considerations that 
arise from contemplating such an abstract environment should have no bearing on how 
we think about rationality in our world.  
 As Christine Korsgaard notes, because we have a practical need to make 
deliberative choices, that is, choices about what to do, we have a further need to identify 
with a unified principle or way of making them. “It is practical reason that requires me to 
construct an identity for myself; whether metaphysics is to guide me in this or not is an 
open question,” (Korsgaard 1989, 112). Whatever we may be justified in believing about 
the metaphysics of personal identity from a truth-directed standpoint is independent of 
what we ought to do from a practical standpoint. From the practical standpoint, the very 
need to act or do anything requires that we reconcile any conflicting desires or plans that 
we might have.  As Korsgaard puts it, “there is the raw necessity of eliminating conflict 
among your various motives,” (1989, 110).  
 Elsewhere, Rawls assumes that agents in his “original position” have no time 
preferences because avoiding such preferences is a feature of individual rationality. 
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Following Sidgwick, Rawls writes, “The mere difference of location in time, of 
something’s being earlier or later, is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less 
regard for it,” (1999, 259). He acknowledges that we may have rational grounds for more 
heavily weighting present or future benefits due to their greater certainty or probability. 
However, setting aside these epistemic matters, his view is that differences in time alone 
should not be taken into account if we are to have rational preferences. 
 Perhaps if we found ourselves in circumstances where temporal remoteness did 
not go hand in hand with decreased certainty, then it would not be rational to place 
greater weight on the here and now. However, it seems likely that for the foreseeable 
future, at least, temporal distance will correlate with uncertainty. Given that this is the 
situation in which we live, norms of rationality should account for epistemic uncertainty 
when considering preferences across time. To ask how a fully rational agent would value 
preferences across time in the absence of uncertainty has no bearing on how, given our 
situation, we ought to value preferences across time.  
 Generally, the method of determining how an ideally rational being would behave 
in circumstances that abstract away from real world constraints falsely assumes that 
increases in idealization amount to increases in rationality. This is, essentially, the same 
strategy that was considered above in section III.B., namely, the idea that we can arrive at 
constrained, and thereby practical, accounts of rationality by beginning with an idealized, 
truth-directed account, and then imposing practical constraints. As I argued above, 
effective cognitive strategies are generally designed to be effective within specific 
circumstances having their own unique sets of constraints. So an ideally rational 
cognitive system will not simply work non-ideally upon the imposition of constraints. 
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Rather the system will cease to work at all. The limits of memory make reasoning in the 
absence of uncertainty impossible from the practical standpoint. An idealized system will 
crash upon the imposition of memory constraints. It will, effectively, display a 
calculator’s error “e.” 
 If our concern is with practical, rather than truth-directed, norms of rationality, 
then it is unclear what we should gain from thinking about the behavior of an ideally 
rational agent in idealized circumstances, given the false assumption that underlies this 
approach. Norms of practical rationality should amount to norms of rationality that are 
applicable to human beings. Thinking about ideally rational systems cannot provide us 
with norms of rationality that are practical in any serious sense. 
   
1.4.3 BAYESIAN APPROACHES TO PRACTICAL RATIONALITY 
 Finally, there is some attention to practical rationally among Bayesians. Bayesians 
offer an account of how one’s subjective degree of belief should be rationally updated in 
light of evidence. To do this, Bayesians requires that we conditionalize on prior beliefs. 
To estimate the probability of some event e, given the evidence, requires that we know 
the prior probability of e, that is, the probably of e without the evidence under 
consideration.  However, a problem emerges when we consider how the prior probability 
of e ought to be estimated, given that the prior probably should depend on everything we 
know about e. Because, in principle, anything can be taken as evidence for anything else 
if we have the appropriate connecting beliefs and inferences, it seems that estimating the 
prior probability requires that we take everything into account.  
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 In light of this issue, there is a case to be made for using simple heuristics rather 
than a Bayesian approach (see Gigerenzer and Todd 1999). Given our various resource 
constraints, when our concern is with practical rationality, we cannot idealize away from 
essential features of the problem under consideration. If one is faced with a problem that 
requires a quick decision (e.g. should I step out of the way of what appears to be an 
approaching headlight?), a non-Bayesian approach will be more effective, i.e., practically 
rational. While false positives are bound to occur when using simple heuristics (e.g. 
stepping aside only to discover the apparently approaching light was not in fact 
approaching), using a strategy that is truth-aimed, or a strategy that requires assessing 
totally evidence, will be cognitively expensive, intractable, and ineffective.  
 
1.5 KNOW-HOW: TAKING PRACTICAL RATIONALITY SERIOUSLY 
 One exception to the widespread narrow focus on truth-directed rationality comes 
in discussion of knowledge-how.  Since, and perhaps due to the influence of, Gilbert Ryle 
many philosophers and cognitive scientists have taken know-how to be importantly 
distinct from propositional knowledge. While propositional knowledge is truth-directed, 
know-how consists in certain abilities, skills, or dispositions.  
In traditional epistemology, much effort has been put into analyzing the concept 
of propositional knowledge. These analyses are aimed at determining the conditions 
under which propositional knowledge ascriptions are true (S knows that p iff…).  
However, cognitive scientists and many philosophers that have studied know-how have 
generally been concerned, not with truth conditions of know-how ascriptions, but with 
understanding what sort of functional analysis is required to explain various skills and 
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abilities. Typically these explanations amount to an account of the cognitive architecture 
necessary for carrying out a certain task, or exercising an ability.  Jerry Fodor nicely 
captures the spirit of this research program, holding that X-ing behavior is to be 
explained in terms of having representations that answer the question, “How does one 
X?” and a suitable cognitive architecture for exploiting these representations in a way 
that results in X-ing. 
 While Fodor holds that the representations are linguistic, in accord with his LOT 
hypothesis, one could just as well propose a non-linguistic account.  For instance, Paul 
Churchland holds that a golfer’s golf swing know-how consists in his motor 
representation of a golf swing.  John Haugeland holds that a system’s knowledge of how 
to play ping-pong is contained in the weights between the nodes in the system’s neural 
network. Bechtel and Abrahamsen identify know-how with partitioned activation spaces. 
 Seen in this way, the know-how literature creates space for an epistemic role for 
non-linguistic representational formats. This, in turn, opens up space for cognitive, yet 
epistemic, activities that are not assessable in terms of standard truth-directed rationality.  
 
1.6 EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION  
 The discussion of know-how in the previous section illustrates two well-
developed approaches to understanding epistemic cognition. On the one hand, Fodorian 
views hold that epistemic cognition is structured in accordance with the LOT hypothesis. 
Eliminativist materialist views, on the other hand hold that cognition is to be understood 
in terms of connection weights or partitioned activation spaces. In this dissertation, I 
propose to understand epistemic cognition in a way that fits between these two extremes. 
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In other words, I believe a proper understanding of epistemic cognition is not limited 
purely to propositional attitudes or a LOT, but such an understanding does not require 
moving to the extreme of eliminativist materialism.  
 My proposal, following Cummins et al. (2013) draws on four assumptions:   
 A. Representational Theory of Content: If Φ is the content of some mental state 
 M of S, then M consists in part of a representation R whose content is Φ. 
 B. Representational Pluralism: There are multiple representational schemes, each 
 with their proprietary content types and representational targets. These are 
 generally not inter-translatable. Most of these are non-propositional in the sense 
 that they are not candidates for truth-conditional semantics.10 
 C. Psychological Representational Pluralism: The mind employs multiple 
 representational schemes. These are generally not inter-translatable. 
 D. Epistemological Representational Pluralism: A great deal of knowledge 
 involves the exploitation of a diversity of representational schemes, both internal 
 and external. (Cummins et al, 2-311) 
 While there are certainly those who reject A, I take it to be a relatively 
uncontroversial assumption. Those who reject the representational theory of content 
(Brooks 1991; Van Gelder 1998; Van Gelder 1997) do so because they are opposed to 
appealing to content to explain the workings of the mind (Cummins et al. 2013). In this 
project, my primary aim is to establish a middle ground between proposition-based folk 
psychology and eliminative materialism, both which appeal to content in their own ways. 
                                                
10 See Haugeland (1991), Cummins (2010) for discussion of theses of this sort.  Also see Cummins et al 
(under review). 
11 Page numbers taken from “online first” version of the article. 
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 Assumption B claims that there are a variety of representational schemes. While 
this point seems to be overlooked in much of philosophy, for instance the theory of 
knowledge, it should not be controversial. While we can use language to describe a 
picture, and draw a picture based on a linguistic description, information is lost in the 
move from one format to the other, and so these actions should not be understood as 
information preserving translations. Assumption C is closely related, claiming that the 
mind employs a variety of representational schemes. While we can, and often do, for 
example, form propositional attitudes such as beliefs on the basis of visual perceptions, to 
visually perceive something is not the same as forming a belief in a proposition 
(Cummins et al. 2013, 2-4).  
 Assumption D is the most controversial. Combined with the first three 
assumptions, D leads to the conclusion that we have non-propositional knowledge. For 
instance, we may have knowledge the contents of which are represented through images 
or models, and this knowledge cannot be linguistically expressed (Cummins et al. 2013, 
4). If we have a good deal of non-propositional knowledge, then traditional epistemic 
concepts such as justification, truth, and belief may not hold the same level of importance 
that they are typically given. Moreover, new concepts may emerge as epistemically 
significant that have not received much, if any, attention from mainstream 
epistemologists, such as accuracy and effectiveness.  
 In the next chapter, using know-how as a sort of case study, I will argue that our 
understanding of the structure of knowledge must be sensitive to the way in which we 
represent information. This constraint will still allow for a good deal of propositional 
knowledge. We have the capacity to mentally represent propositions, and if other 
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appropriate conditions are meet, then some of these propositional representations will 
constitute cases of knowing.  At the same time, this constraint plays a liberalizing role, in 
opening up space for other types of mental representations to constitute instances of 
knowing as well.  
 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I have argued that epistemology needs to be broadened in a way 
that allows it to accommodate non-propositional knowledge. I have argued that one 
consequence of such a broadening is that we must revise the way in which we understand 
epistemic rationality. The standard way of understanding rationality in epistemology, that 
is, truth-directed rationality, arose as a result of focus on the analysis problem and the 
methodology develop to address the problem. If we are engaged in the project of 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for propositional knowledge or justified 
belief, that is, providing epistemic constraints that must be satisfied by an agent pursuing 
true beliefs, then we will naturally fall into a truth-directed understanding of rationality. 
But if epistemology is broadened so as to focus on epistemic issues that are independent 
of the analysis problem, then we must broaden or modify our understanding of epistemic 
rationality as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 
KNOW-HOW AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Intellectualism is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to 
knowing that something is the case. Anti-intellectualism is the view that knowing how 
consists in dispositions or abilities. In this chapter I offer arguments against two versions 
of intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson (2001) hold that propositional knowledge is 
both necessary and sufficient for know-how. Against their view, I argue that there are 
cases in which such knowledge is insufficient. Bengson and Moffett (2012) argue that 
propositional knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient for know-how. Rather, they hold 
that knowing how requires meeting a further condition, namely, standing in a non-
propositional knowledge of relation to a way of doing something. Against this view, I 
argue that if propositional knowledge is necessary for know-how, then we must deny that 
many clear instances of know-how are in fact such instances. Taken together, my cases 
against Stanley and Williamson and Bengson and Moffett show that propositional 
knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for know-how. 
 
2.2 STANLEY AND WILLIAMSON ON KNOW-HOW 
 S&W offer the following account of know-how: 
S knows how to X if and only if (i) for some way w, S knows that w is a way for 
her to X and (ii) S entertains the proposition ascribed in (i) under a practical mode 
of presentation (hereafter, PMP). 
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To establish that (i) is a necessary condition for know-how, S&W appeal to Lauri 
Karttunen’s (1977) account according to which embedded questions denote the sets of 
their true answers. Consider some examples from Stanley (2011, 209): 
(a) John knows where to find coffee in New York City. 
(b) John knows why to find coffee in New York City.12 
(c) John knows when to find coffee in New York City. 
(d) John knows how to find coffee in New York City.  
These sentences involve the verb “know”, and an embedded question (e.g. Where does 
one find coffee in New York City?) that consists of a question word (e.g. “where”) and an 
infinitive (“to find coffee in New York City.”).  
 On Kartunnen’s analysis, (a) has a reading according to which it is true if and 
only if for all places p that are places where John can find coffee in New York City, John 
knows that p is a place at which he can find coffee in New York City. However, Stanley 
and Williamson deviate from this element of Kartunnen’s view, holding that, in (a) for 
instance, John must only know that some place p is a place where he can find coffee in 
New York City. 
 Stanley suggests that (a) has a natural reading according to which it is true if and 
only if there is a place p that is a place where John can find coffee in New York City, and 
John knows that p is a place where he can find coffee in New York City. In other words, 
(a) can be taken to mean that there is place that is such that John knows that it’s a place at 
which he can find coffee. To generalize, (b)-(d) have synonymous readings: 
(a*) For some place p, John knows that he can find coffee in New York City. 
(b*) For some reason r, John knows that he can find coffee in New York City for reason 
r. 
(c*) For some time t, John knows that he can find coffee in New York City at time t. 
(d*) For some way w, John knows that he can find coffee in New York City in way w.  
                                                
12 While the syntax of this expression is odd, it is included in Stanley’s analysis as he takes it to be a part of 
the class of “knows-wh” expressions.  
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 Stanley takes it to be intuitively obvious that (a)-(c) have the readings given in 
(a*)-(c*) which provides reason for holding that (d) is naturally read as expressing (d*) 
 However, S&W suggest that while knowing that w is a way for one to X is 
necessary for know-how, it is not sufficient. Consider:  
 (1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.13  
 (2) Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
S&W note that there are cases where (2) is true and (1) is false.  Consider the following, 
adapted from S&W (2001, 428–429): 
Bicycle 1: Suppose that Hannah does not know how to ride a bicycle. 
Susan points to John, who is riding a bicycle, and says, 'That is a way for 
you to ride a bicycle'. Suppose that the way in which John is riding his 
bicycle is in fact a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle. 
 
Here, S&W claim that, in the case when the demonstrative ‘that’ denotes John’s way of 
riding a bicycle, this constitutes an instance in which (2) is true, but (1) is false. 
 According to S&W, both (1) and (2) ascribe to Hannah the same propositional 
knowledge. However, (1) and (2) differ in that they ascribe knowledge of the proposition 
under different modes of presentation. While (1) ascribes knowledge of the proposition 
under a practical mode of presentation, (2) ascribes knowledge of the proposition under a 
demonstrative mode of presentation. 
 S&W explain practical and demonstrative modes of presentation by comparing 
them with first-personal modes of presentation. To provide an example of a first-personal 
                                                
13 Strictly speaking, (1) is treated as “Hannah knows how PRO to ride a bicycle.” (S&W 424-425). ‘PRO’ 
is an empty pronominal element that occurs in the subject position of infinitives in English. As S&W 
discuss, there are other interpretations of ‘PRO’ and the infinitive “to ride a bicycle” available. However, 
for our purposes the relevant interpretation is one in which ‘PRO’ receives its interpretation from ‘Hannah’ 
and the infinitive is interpreted as having ‘can’-like, rather than ‘ought’-like force.  For these reasons, (1) 
can also be read as “Hannah knows how she could ride a bicycle.” 
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mode of presentation, they ask us to suppose that John looks in a mirror, which he 
mistakenly believes to be a window, and sees a man whose pants are on fire. John, failing 
to recognize the man as himself, forms what S&W call a “demonstrative belief” that the 
man has burning pants. Although the man has burning pants, and John is in fact the man, 
he does not seem to believe that he himself has burning pants. In this context, then, (3) 
seems true whereas (4) seems false (Stanley and Williamson 2001, 428): 
 (3) John believes that that man has burning pants. 
 (4) John believes that he himself has burning pants. 
 
Since “that man” and “he himself” refer to John, the complement clauses of “that” in (3) 
and (4) express the same proposition.14 However, the notion of different modes of 
presentation under which propositions can be entertained provides a way of 
distinguishing (3) and (4). In (3), John is entertaining a proposition under a demonstrative 
mode of presentation, while in (4) he is entertaining the very same proposition under a 
first-personal mode of presentation.  S&W suggest that there is a conventional connection 
between pronouns such as ‘he himself’ and first-personal modes of presentation, and that 
this conventional connection provides additional information about how subjects of 
ascriptions think about the propositions being ascribed. This allows us to predict how 
these subjects will behave in various circumstances. For instance, thinking of a person as 
oneself, or thinking of a place as here, entails being disposed to behave in certain ways. 
Yet first person thought, S&W claim, is genuinely propositional. It is just the case that 
the possession of certain kinds of propositional knowledge is related to having certain 
dispositions.  
                                                
14 Here, we are operating on the assumption that modes of presentation are not semantically relevant. 
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 S&W hold that, like (3) and (4), (1) and (2) express the same propositions. Just as 
we could with (3) an (4), we can explain the intuitive differences between (1) and (2) by 
appealing to distinct modes of presentation. Moreover, S&W posit a conventional 
connection between expressions that embed instances of the schema ‘how to X,’ and 
practical modes of presentations of ways. Moreover, they hold that thinking of a way 
under a practical mode of presentation entails having certain dispositions (Stanley and 
Williamson 2001, 429). On their view, this provides a way to explain a connection, which 
they grant, between know-how and dispositional states, without having to posit non-
propositional knowledge.  
 
2.3 AGAINST STANLEY AND WILLIAMSON 
 In this section, I argue that satisfying S&W’s condition (b) requires non-
propositional knowledge. If satisfying condition (b) is necessary for knowing-how, and 
satisfying this condition requires non-propositional knowledge, then knowing-how 
requires non-propositional knowledge, contrary to S&W’s claim that propositional 
knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for knowing-how. My case against S&W rests 
on theoretical background that was presented in section VI of chapter 1. Here, before 
proceeding, I briefly review this theoretical background. 
 
2.3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 In “Why it doesn’t matter to metaphysics what Mary learns,” Cummins et al. 
(2013) draw on four assumptions to argue that Frank Jackson’s Mary does indeed learn 
something new when she sees red for the first time, but that this epistemic gain is 
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orthogonal to physicalism and phenomenology. Here, my aim is to show that the 
theoretical background that underlies Cummins et al.’s position renders S&W’s account 
of know-how implausible, in so far as it is an intellectualist position. 
 Cummins et al begin their account by introducing the following assumptions 
(2013, 2-315): 
 (A) Representational theory of content: If Φ is the content of some mental state M 
 of S, then M consists in part of a representation R whose content is Φ. 
 
(B) Representational pluralism: There are multiple representational schemes, 
each with their proprietary content types and representational targets. These are 
generally not inter-translatable. Most of these are non-propositional in the sense 
that they are not candidates for truth-conditional semantics.16  
 
(C) Psychological representational pluralism: The mind employs multiple 
representational schemes. These are generally not inter-translatable. 
 
(D) Epistemological representational pluralism: A great deal of knowledge 
involves the exploitation of a diversity of representational schemes, both internal 
and external.  
 
Cummins et al suggests that (A) is relatively uncontroversial in the context of the 
knowledge argument, and I take it that it is equally non-controversial here (2013, 3). As 
they acknowledge, some do reject the representational theory of content (Brooks 1991; 
van Gelder 1998). But philosophers of this type usually reject the theory as a means of 
understanding the mind or brain. I take it that such an option will not appeal to S&W or 
other advocates of intellectualism.  
 Assumption (B) claims that content can be represented in a variety of formats, 
many of which are non-linguistic or non-propositional. We can, of course, construct a 
representation in one format on the basis of a representation in another. Police sketch 
                                                
15 Page numbers taken from “online first” version of the article.   
16 See Haugeland (1991), Heck (2007), Fodor (2007), and Cummins (2010) for sustained defenses of theses 
along these lines. 
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artists, for instance, create drawings on the basis of linguistic descriptions. Nevertheless, 
this is not a translation. The same point applies to other non-linguistic representations 
such as maps, models, partitioned activation spaces, and audio recordings. From this 
point it follows that we cannot express the content of a non-linguistic representation in 
language.  
 A common objection to this assumption is that pictures can be symbolically 
encoded as pairs of gray-scale and position values. But as Cummins et al. note, a 
symbolic encoding of a picture does not depict anything. The semantics of the picture do 
not overlap with the semantics of its symbolic encoding. A picture is about what it 
depicts while a symbolic encoding is about gray-scale and position pairs. Moreover, 
symbolic and pictorial representational schemes are processed quite differently. While we 
can easily process images, we need a computer with the appropriate software to process 
its symbolic encoding. Moreover, we can easily determine that two different pictures of 
the same individual are pictures of the same individual. This is far more difficult for a 
system that only has the symbolic encoding (Cummins et al. 2013, 3).  
 Assumption (C) is simply the claim that the mind employs representational 
schemes as diverse as those discussed under (B). As Kant observed, percepts are not, and 
do not translate into, propositional thoughts (Cummins et al. 2013, 4). We often express 
the fact that visual percepts, for instance, allow us to infer propositions by saying things 
like, “I see that the cat is on the mat.” Though language can be misleading in this respect, 
visual percepts, like pictures, are depictive representations that do not express 
propositions. The same point applies to other non-linguistic representations, such as 
maps, graphs, and models. They are all representations and none of them express 
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propositions. Hence, they cannot be evaluated by truth-conditional semantics. Rather, 
they must be assessed for accuracy, often along competing dimensions.  
 Assumption (D), as stated, should be fairly non-controversial. We clearly acquire 
knowledge through visual perception, linguistic testimony, consulting maps, and studying 
diagrams. A good deal of this knowledge is propositional. Nevertheless, assumption (D), 
when combined with (A) through (C) opens up the possibility that we have non-
propositional knowledge as well, for instance, when we exploit representations whose 
contents cannot be linguistically represented and come to know these contents. We can, 
for instance, know the layout of the New York subway system in virtue of having a 
mental map (Cummins et al., 2013, 4). 
 It is also worth mentioning that, in her discussion of approaching epistemology 
from the point of view of the value of understanding, Linda Zagzebski (2009) lends some 
support to assumptions (C) and (D) (and seems to accept assumptions (A) and (B)). She 
suggests that approaching epistemology from the perspective of understanding forces us 
to acknowledge that knowing does not always entail believing and that the object of 
knowledge is not always a proposition. She writes: 
Knowledge might involve mental representations, but rather than to know 
exclusively through objects with the structure of sentences, one could 
know through many other kinds of structures, including maps, graphs, 
diagrams, and models. Some forms of understanding might not even 
involve representations. What happens when we understand a work of art 
or music, the psychological structure of a character in a novel, or a theory 
in physics? Do we have a kind of knowledge? If so, would it be accurate 
to say that what we know is reducible to a list of propositions? I find that 
dubious, and I suspect that contemporary epistemology has suffered by 
ignoring the value of understanding. I also suspect that understanding is 
connected with nonpropositional knowledge, which, as I mentioned 
earlier, is usually left aside in contemporary treatments in knowledge 
(Zagzebski, 2009, 7).  
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While I am sympathetic to Zagzebski’s suggestion that understanding is connected with 
propositional knowledge, this lies beyond the scope of my present concern. The point, 
however, is that there is precedent in both epistemology and philosophy of mind for 
taking seriously the thesis of representational pluralism, as well as its psychological and 
epistemological variants. Here, my aim is to show that taking these theses seriously 
renders S&W’s view that know-how consists in propositional knowledge dubious. To 
show that this account is dubious, I now turn to argue that satisfying condition (b) 
requires non-propositional knowledge. 
 
2.3.2 THE CASE AGAINST STANLEY AND WILLIAMSON 
 In order to see why satisfying condition (b) requires non-propositional 
knowledge, we need to determine what work is done by practical modes of presentation 
in S&W’s account. As mentioned above, S&W claim that thinking of a proposition under 
a practical mode of presentation entails having certain dispositions. Since they hold that 
knowing how requires thinking of a proposition under a practical mode of presentation, 
and since thinking of a proposition under such a mode of presentation requires having 
certain dispositions, knowing how, on their view entails having certain dispositions. In 
other words, having certain dispositions is necessary for knowing how.  
 At first pass, this seems problematic for S&W’s view, insofar as their view is an 
intellectualist position. After all, a standard anti-intellectualist account of know-how 
holds that knowing how consists in having certain dispositions or abilities. However, a 
response is available for S&W. Although their view entails that having certain 
dispositions is necessary for knowing-how, it does not entail that these dispositions are 
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constitutive of knowing-how. Know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, 
specifically, propositional knowledge under a practical mode of presentation. It’s a just a 
feature of the way things work that dispositions always come along with know-how. 
 Nevertheless, the introduction of dispositions is problematic for S&W. On their 
view, practical modes of presentation are invoked to explain the connection between 
know-how and dispositions. They believe that invoking dispositions in this way does not 
require positing non-propositional knowledge. But presumably, these dispositions are the 
ones that enable performance. In the case of many activities, such as riding a bicycle, it is 
highly implausible that propositional knowledge accounts for dispositions that enable 
performance. More plausibly, the exploitation of representations formed on the basis of 
sensory motor data – practice, in short – accounts for these dispositions. At the very least 
riding a bicycle requires a motor program that is integrated with perceptual inputs. 
Following assumptions (B) and (C), this sort of information cannot be represented in a 
linguistic format.  
 If this is right, then in order to have dispositions that enable performance, one 
must practice the activity in question. The content that one acquires through practice is 
plausibly diverse in format, but it is highly implausible that all of the content is of a 
propositional variety. It is, however, plausible that the acquisition of this content enables 
one to entertain a proposition under a practical mode of presentation.  
 For S&W, propositional knowledge under a practical mode of presentation is 
necessary and sufficient for knowing how. Entertaining propositions under practical 
modes of presentation entails having certain dispositions, presumably dispositions that 
enable performance. But while entertaining propositions under practical modes of 
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presentation entails having these dispositions, it is implausible that this explains these 
dispositions. Rather possessing the content that one acquires through practice entails 
having the relevant dispositions and enables one to entertain the relevant proposition 
under a practical mode of presentation. In other words, entertaining propositions under 
practical modes of presentation entails having certain dispositions because acquiring the 
content that one acquires through practice entails having certain dispositions and 
entertaining propositions under practical mode of presentation. 
 Above, I suggested that, although having certain dispositions is necessary for 
know-how on S&W’s view, this might not be problematic for their position because they 
can claim that despite dispositions being necessary for know-how, they are not 
constitutive of know-how. But now it appears that in order to have the relevant 
dispositions, one must possess the sort of content that one acquires through practice, 
content that will typically be, at least in part, non-propositional. While having this content 
entails having certain dispositions, it also may entail entertaining the relevant proposition 
under a practical mode of presentation. But now it appears that, while entertaining a 
proposition under a practical mode of presentation is necessary for knowing how, it is not 
constitutive of knowing how. Rather, the content that one acquires through practice, 
along with certain propositional knowledge, is constitutive of know-how. If this is 
correct, then while propositional knowledge is necessary for know-how, it is not 
sufficient, contrary to the view of S&W.   
 
2.4 BENGSON AND MOFFETT ON KNOW-HOW 
 According to Bengson and Moffett (hereafter, B&M): 
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 S knows how to X if and only if 
 (c) S stands in a non-propositional knowledge of relation17 to a non-propositional 
 item, namely, a way of X-ing, w, and 
 (d) S has a grasp of a complete and correct conception of w. 
Notably, B&M’s view amounts to a “non-propositional intellectualism,” as captured by 
condition (c). For our purposes, (c) can be understood as requiring that, in order to know 
how to X, one must have familiarity or acquaintance with a way of X-ing, and this 
familiarity or acquaintance is to be understood as a non-propositional knowledge relation.  
 Although B&M hold that propositional knowledge is not sufficient for know-how, 
condition (d) entails that such knowledge is necessary. In other words, requiring that one 
has a complete and correct conception of a way of X-ing in order to know how to X 
entails requiring that one have certain propositional knowledge in order to know how to 
X. While it is possible to have a non-propositional view of conceptions, such a view is 
not held by B&M. Their motivation for holding that (d) is a necessary condition for 
know-how stems from an observation that one can have knowledge of a way of X-ing 
without knowing that the way in question is a way to X. This is because, while they hold 
that having knowledge of a way of X-ing is non-propositional, it is in part grounded in 
propositional attitudes.  
 B&M discuss several ways in which one can fail to satisfy (d). First, one can 
simply lack a conception of w. As they note, one way to escape avalanches is by making 
swimming motions. A competent swimmer who has never heard of or encountered 
avalanches may have knowledge of this way of escaping avalanches and may also have 
                                                
17 B&M refer to this as an objectual knowledge relation 
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the relevant ability. But since she has no conception of avalanches, she does not know 
how to escape them. In other words, she lacks a conception of the way of escaping 
avalanches, even though she has knowledge of this way.  
 The second way in which one can fail to satisfy (d) is by having an incorrect 
conception of w. Such a failure is illustrated by the following example (Bengson and 
Moffett 2012, 171): 
Salchow. Irina, who is a novice figure skater, decides to try a complex 
jump called the salchow.  When one performs a salchow, one takes off 
from the back inside edge of one skate and lands on the back outside edge 
of the opposite skate after one or more rotations in the air. Irina, however, 
is seriously mistaken about how to perform a salchow. She believes 
incorrectly that the way to perform a salchow is to take off from the front 
outside edge of one skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the front 
inside edge of the other skate. However, Irina has a severe neurological 
abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from how 
she actually thinks she is acting. So despite the fact that she is seriously 
mistaken about how to perform a salchow, whenever she actually attempts 
to do a salchow (in accordance with her misconceptions), the abnormality 
causes Irina to unknowingly perform the correct sequence of moves, and 
so she ends up successfully performing a salchow. Although what she is 
doing and what she thinks she is doing come apart, she fails to notice the 
mismatch. 
 
 Clearly Irina has the ability to do a salchow and the way in which she performs 
the jump is indeed a way for her to do so. However, according to B&M’s view, she does 
not know how to do the salchow because she has an incorrect conception of how 
salchows are executed.  
 The third way in which one can fail to satisfy (d) is to have an incomplete 
conception of w. This occurs in cases where one has the ability to carry out a project, 
such as building a deck18, but lacks all of the information that is necessary for carrying 
out that project. Such a person has, for instance, to look up instructions in order to bring 
                                                
18 B&M use the example of building a kytoon – a lighter than air kite.  
  43 
the project to fruition. At the time of such a person’s decision to look up instructions, 
B&M hold that the individual does not know how to carry out the project because he or 
she has only an incomplete conception of the way of doing so.  
 Finally, one may fail to satisfy (d) due to conceptual confusion. Here, B&M ask 
us to imagine that Irina corrects her conception of a way of doing a salchow by 
memorizing her coach’s instructions. Her conception is now correct because she correctly 
believes that the way to do a salchow is to take off from the back inside edge of one skate 
and lack on the back outside edge of the other after one or more rotations in the air. 
However, Irina suffers, like Burge’s (1979) arthritis patient, conceptual confusion. 
Specifically Irina takes her back outside edge to be her front inside edge and her back 
inside edge to be her front outside edge. While Irina’s conception of how to do a salchow 
is now otherwise correct and complete, she still fails to satisfy (d) because she lacks a 
sufficient mastery of certain concepts involved in this conception.  
 In regards to these examples, B&M write that, “The problem in each case 
ultimately can be traced to a problem in certain of one’s propositional attitudes or to the 
absence thereof,” (Bengson and Moffett 2012, 188). Although B&M discuss the problem 
in terms of “propositional attitudes,” it is reasonable to infer that the requisite 
propositional attitudes are instances of propositional knowledge. For instance, in 
discussing the salchow case, they write, of Irina, that, “She is mistaken about the way to 
do a salchow (she conceives of a certain sequence of movements as constituting a way of 
doing a salchow when they do not) and hence does not know how to do one,” (Bengson 
and Moffett 2012, 186, emphasis added). Irina clearly has a propositional attitude about 
how to do a salchow. But the problem is that this attitude amounts to a false belief about 
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how salchows are performed. In other words, she does not know that the way to do a 
salchow is to take off from the back inside edge of one skate and land on the back outside 
edge of the opposite skate after one or more rotations in the air.  
 
2.5 AGAINST BENGSON AND MOFFETT 
 My case against B&M consists in demonstrating that there are real life cases that 
are similar to Irina’s situation in all the relevant respects that seem to be clear cases of 
know-how. Since B&M’s account entails that Irina does not know how to do a salchow, 
they are committed to denying that these real world instances of know-how are in fact 
such instances.  
 B&M’s reason for denying that Irina knows how to do the salchow is that she has 
false beliefs about what she is doing, and thereby fails to satisfy (d). While the Salchow 
case may seem far-fetched due to the odd nature of Irina’s disorder, the scenario 
illustrates an example of a phenomena which is in fact commonplace, that is, a case in 
which an agent believes herself to be doing one thing while in fact doing something else. 
Let’s turn to three real life examples. 
 First, baseball batters are advised to “keep your eye on the ball.” This suggests 
that a way to hit a baseball is to track the baseball’s trajectory from the pitcher’s release 
point until it comes into contact with the bat. But in fact, batters cannot “keep their eye 
on the ball” due to the high velocities of pitches and the limitations of the human eye’s 
ability to track high speed movements (Hubbard and Seng 1954; Bahill and LaRitz 1984). 
If some successful hitters believe they hit by way of keeping their eyes on the ball, we 
have what is, in all the relevant respects, a Salchow-style case.  
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 The second case comes from Dreyfus (2005, 63, footnote 32) who writes: 
When Air Force instructor pilots teach beginning pilots 
how to scan their instruments, they teach the rule that they themselves 
were taught, and, as far as they know, still use. At one point, however, 
Air Force psychologists studied the eye movements of instructors 
during simulated flights and found, to everyone's surprise, that the 
instructor pilots were not following the rule they were teaching. In 
fact, as far as the psychologists could determine, they weren't following 
any rule at all (DeMaio et al. 1976). 
 
Dreyfus’s example provides another real life Salchow-style case, that is, a case in which 
individuals successfully X but have false beliefs about how they go about X-ing.  
These two examples appear to constitute instances of know-how. Baseball hitters seem to 
know how to hit baseballs and Air Force instructor pilots seem to know how to scan their 
instruments. If B&M are committed to denying that Irina knows how to do the salchow, 
then they are also committed to denying that Air Force instructor pilots know how to scan 
their instruments, and that baseball players know how to hit baseballs. While making 
such denials is not incoherent, the existence of these cases gives us reason to doubt the 
necessity of complete and correct conceptions, that is, propositional knowledge, for 
know-how.19 
 The role of complete and correct conceptions in B&M’s position raises a subtle 
ambiguity. If we consider, for example, Dreyfus’s instructor pilot case, it seems that 
while the instructor pilots know how to scan instruments (but do not know how 
instruments are scanned), the Air Force psychologists, by way of studying the pilots, 
come to know how instruments are scanned (but do not know how to scan instruments). 
Similar considerations arise in the baseball example. Hitters know how to hit baseballs, 
                                                
19 For a similar line of objection to intellectualism, see (Wallis 2008). 
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but not how baseballs are hit, while some psychologists know how baseballs are hit, but 
do not know how to hit baseballs.  
 In these cases where agents successfully X, but have false beliefs about how X-
ing is done, B&M are committed to denying that the agents have know-how because they 
fail to meet the complete and correct conceptions requirement. Due to this denial, it 
would seem that B&M, and perhaps intellectualists in general, require that knowing how 
to X requires knowing how X-ing is done. However, the examples just discussed provide 
strong reason for denying that this is the case. In other words, the cases suggest that one 
can know how to X, without knowing how X-ing is done, just as one can know how X-
ing is done without knowing how to X.20  
Perhaps more problematically, a final example suggests that there is an ambiguity 
in B&M’s very notion of complete and correct conceptions. NASA computes escape 
velocity using Newtonian mechanics. So it follows that using Newtonian mechanics is a 
way for NASA to compute escape velocity. But According to B&M, for NASA to know-
how to compute escape velocity, it must have a complete and correct conception of a way 
of doing these computations. In this case, it is not clear what having a complete and 
correct conception requires. If it requires having a complete and correct conception of the 
relevant physics, then this would entail that, according to B&M, NASA does not know 
how to compute escape velocity since Newtonian mechanics is an incorrect account of 
physics. On the other hand, if having a complete and correct conception of a way of 
computing escape velocities requires having a complete and correct conception of 
Newtonian mechanics, that is, a way of doing the computation that is effective (and 
                                                
20 See Hetherington (2008) for discussion of this distinction. 
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presumably a way that NASA knows to be effective), then NASA knows how to compute 
escape velocities in virtue of applying a false theory that they know to be false. In other 
words, NASA knows that Newtonian mechanics will work for the task at hand even 
though it involves entertaining some false assumptions. If NASA has a complete 
conception of Newtonian mechanics, there is a clear sense in which this conception is not 
correct. If what is required is that NASA has a correct conception of a way to compute 
escape velocities, and the way of doing this is to use Newtonian mechanics, then they do 
have a correct conception of the way. 
Now suppose that Irina learns that, due to her condition, the “correct” way to do a 
salchow is not a way for her to do the jump. However, she could come to know that by 
entertaining a false description of how to do a salchow, she can get the job done. Under 
these conditions, Irina’s situation becomes just like the NASA example. She knows a 
way that is a way for her to do the salchow, and she has a correct conception of what she 
needs to do in order to execute the move. She may or may not know how the salchow is 
done (i.e. she may or may not be able to give the correct description of the maneuver), 
but she knows how to do it. 
Of course, one might worry that if Irina comes to realize that the way she believes 
the jump is performed is incorrect, then this will undercut her ability. If we assume that 
she must believe the false description of how the jump is performed is correct, then the 
case is different from the NASA example (since NASA, of course, knows that Newtonian 
mechanics is not the correct account of physics), but is similar in all the relevant respects 
to the baseball case. 
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My discussion of B&M demonstrates that if propositional knowledge is necessary 
for know-how, then on their account, we will be forced to deny that many, seemingly 
clear cases of know-how are in fact such cases. Moreover, the notion of complete and 
correct conceptions is ambiguous, as illustrated by the Salchow and NASA examples. 
B&M’s position, in particular the complete and correct conceptions requirement, rests on 
our having certain semantic intuitions in response to thought experiments, such as the 
Salchow example. But there is no reason to think that ordinary language is designed to be 
as precise as B&M’s account requires; it did not evolve to accommodate cases like 
Salchow, or even the baseball example. To attempt to motivate B&M’s position by 
appeal to semantic intuitions requires a revisionary account of how language works. That 
is, it requires revising the workings of language such that language becomes precise 
enough to accommodate the sorts of examples on which B&M rest their case. But, 
whenever we are talking about psychological terms, such as know-how, revision ought to 
be motivated by science, not intuitions of the sort required by B&M. There is no shortage 
of precedent for scientifically motivated revisions (consider ‘motion,’ ‘force,’ ‘gene,’ 
‘atom,’ and so on). Why should we think ‘know-how’ is different? The Salchow example 
exploits a possibility that has been revealed by neuroscience, a possibility that would 
have been incomprehensible not long ago. While B&M are free to push for revision, such 
revision must be motivated scientifically, not by semantic intuitions.  
 In any case, the examples I have discussed appear to be non-controversial 
examples of knowing-how. According to B&M’s position, these are not cases of 
knowing-how. It is, of course, open to B&M to maintain their position. However, the fact 
that these examples appear to be non-controversial as examples of knowledge-how 
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provides strong reason for denying that propositional knowledge is necessary for know-
how. 
 
2.6 IMPLICATIONS AND UPSHOT 
 Thus far in this chapter, I have offered reasons for rejecting two prominent 
intellectualist accounts of know-how. First, I have argued that for many activities, 
knowing how requires having non-propositional knowledge of a way to do the activity in 
question. This undercuts intellectualist views, such as S&W’s, that hold that 
propositional knowledge is sufficient for knowing how. Second, I have argued that if 
propositional knowledge is necessary for know-how, as B&M and S&W both maintain, 
then we have to deny that many intuitively clear cases of knowing how are in fact such 
cases. Taken together, it appears that propositional knowledge is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for know-how. 
 Moreover, in making my case against S&W, I suggest that the content that one 
acquires through practice is quite plausibly constitutive of know-how. For many skills or 
activities, this content will be non-propositional. The plausibility of this claim stems from 
representational pluralism, and its psychological and epistemological variants. These 
theses, along with the representational theory of content, open space for a new account of 
know-how that is neither intellectualist nor anti-intellectualist. On such a view, 
propositional knowledge is, contra intellectualism, not always necessary or sufficient for 
know-how. However, know-how is not, contra anti-intellectualism, simply having an 
ability or disposition. Rather, knowing-how consists in possessing the content that that 
enables one to execute a task. In some cases, such as doing mathematics, this content may 
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be propositional. But in others, such as figure skating or skiing, this content is likely non-
propositional. Here I do not have the space to give a full account of such a view. 
However, I believe that understanding the nature of knowing-how requires moving 
beyond the intellectualist-anti-intellectualist dichotomy.  
 
2.7 RYLE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE KNOW-HOW DEBATE 
Generally, current philosophical discussion of know-how traces back to chapter 
two of Gilbert Ryle’s, The Concept of Mind, in which Ryle conducts an examination of 
concepts of mental-conduct, “which belong to that family of concepts ordinarily 
surnamed ‘intelligence’”(Ryle 1949, 25).  The members of this family include the 
concepts we indicate with words such as ‘clever,’ ‘sensible,’ ‘prudent,’ ‘logical,’ and so 
on.  Someone deficient in intelligence is described as ‘stupid’(Ryle 1949, 25)  However, 
Ryle claims that there is a distinction between being stupid and being ignorant.   
 Ryle takes this distinction to amount to one between intelligence and “possessing 
knowledge” (Ryle 1949, 26).  One can fail to be intelligent despite possessing lots of 
knowledge.  One can also exhibit intelligence, despite lacking lots of knowledge. 
However, Ryle took this distinction to be overlooked due to the influence of the 
intellectualist conception of mind. For intellectualists all mental conduct is defined in 
terms of cognition, and the primary exercise of the mind is to theorize, that is, find 
answers to questions.  For intellectualists, other activities deemed intelligent are so 
deemed because they consist in the applications of these answers.   
 However, it is important to note that Ryle understands theorizing as an operation, 
that is, an ability that one has or something that one can know how to do. While finding 
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answers to questions, or coming to know true propositions is the goal of theoretical 
operations, theorizing is not the same thing as achieving this goal. Theorizing, is rather, a 
means to achieving the goal. Theorizing is a skill that is governed by standards or criteria 
that one can do more or less well.  
 Ryle’s aim was to show, “that there are many activities which directly display 
qualities of mind, yet are neither themselves intellectual operations nor yet effects of 
intellectual operations”(1949, 26). Ryle does not deny that intelligence sometimes 
involves knowing true propositions. Rather, his point is that theorizing is one of many 
activities of the mind. Sometimes the mind engages in theorizing, and if it does a good 
job of doing so, the output will be propositional knowledge. But, contrary to 
intellectualism, there are many other mental operations that do not amount to theoretical 
operations, Theorizing is not, as intellectualists would have it, the primary exercise of the 
mind, but rather one of many things that we have the ability, or know how, to do. On 
Ryle’s view, whether an ability involves propositional knowledge is orthogonal to 
whether it is an instance of know-how. 
 Ryle holds that when we describe someone as doing something intelligently, we 
ascribe to that person, not knowledge of truths, but the ability to do a certain sort of thing.  
While doing something well involves meeting standards or satisfying criteria, having the 
ability to do so does not merely consist in knowing these criteria. One must apply these 
criteria and regulate one’s actions in accordance with them (Ryle 1949, 28). 
 Ryle notes that the above point is often expressed by saying that “an action 
exhibits intelligence if, and only if, the agent is thinking what he is doing while he is 
doing it”(Ryle 1949, 29).  Intellectualists, he claimed, take this to mean that doing 
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something intelligent requires doing two things: to consider certain propositions, and to 
put these propositions into practice. “It is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of 
practice” (Ryle 1949, 29). But if theorizing is an ability, that is, something that one 
knows how to do, then there seem to be three elements behind intelligent performance. 
While the output of theorizing is a proposition, as mentioned above, theorizing does not 
just consist in knowing a proposition. Rather, theorizing is an activity that results in 
believing or knowing a proposition. Consider playing chess, in which the practice may be 
moving piece X to location Y on the board. In this case, we have the practice (moving the 
piece), propositional knowledge, and theorizing that leads to the propositional 
knowledge. Here, the relevant theorizing may resemble working through a practical 
syllogism that leads to the conclusion that one should move piece X to location Y. 
 Since intellectualists define intelligence in terms of apprehending truths they hold 
that what makes the difference between behaviors that do, and overtly indistinguishable 
behaviors that do not, display states of intelligence is that the former involve knowledge 
of certain propositions. In other words, they hold that: 
(1) Intelligence involves the operation of considering true propositions. 
(2) Practical activities described with intelligence epithets are properly so 
described because they are accompanied by internal acts of considering true 
propositions. 
The first condition says that any operation that is, or is guided by, intelligence involves 
the agent having knowledge of true propositions.  As described in (1), this propositional 
knowledge is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for intelligence.  
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 The second thesis is a claim about why it is appropriate to describe intelligent 
behaviors as intelligent.  The first thesis says that in order to count as intelligent, an 
action must involve propositional knowledge.  The second says that in order to properly 
describe an action as intelligent, it must count as intelligent, meaning that the 
consideration of true propositions must be involved. 
Ryle frames his position as the denial of intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, 
claiming that to do something intelligently is not to undergo a “double operation of 
considering and executing” (Ryle 1949, 30). Ryle argued that intellectualism leads to a 
fatal regress because theorizing is something that can be done more or less intelligently.  
According to Ryle’s characterization of intellectualism, for an action to be 
intelligent, it must be guided by the grasp of true propositions. He argues that 
intellectualism leads to a vicious regress, because “The consideration of propositions is 
itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, more or less 
stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation 
had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility 
for anyone to ever break into the circle,” (Ryle 1949, 30). 
In other words, for something to be done intelligently, it must be preceded and 
guided by theoretical activity, that is, the consideration of propositions. But since 
theorizing or considering propositions is something that can be done more or less 
intelligently, and something that one knows how to do, it too must be preceded by a prior 
act of intelligently considering propositions, and so on ad infinitum.  
One concern with Ryle’s regress argument is that it fails to honor Fodor’s 
distinction between mental competences (i.e. various abilities such as playing chess or 
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speaking a language) and mental traits (e.g. intelligence or stupidity) (1968, 634–635).  
Mental competences amount to abilities that we can carry out more or less well. Having a 
mental trait, on the other hand, such as intelligence does not require that one be good at 
some particular activity. Being able to exercise a mental competency is being able to do a 
certain thing (e.g. being able to play chess). Having a mental trait pertains to doing things 
in a certain way (e.g. being able to play chess intelligently).  
On Fodor’s account, “Traits give rise to adverbs, competences to verbs,” (1968, 
635). For instance, if we say that Jones plays chess intelligently, “playing chess” denotes 
a competence, whereas “intelligently” denotes a trait. For this reason, Ryle’s terminology 
suggests that he is targeting an intellectualist account of traits, rather than an 
intellectualist account of competencies. Recall that, in offering his regress argument, he 
writes, “if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had 
first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for 
anyone to ever break into the circle,” (Ryle 1949, 30, emphasis added). 
The problem for Ryle is that he seems to conflate mental competences and mental 
traits. According to Fodor, only mental competences play a role in generating behavior, 
and mental traits pertain to the manner in which the behavior is performed. Ryle appears 
to conflate the distinction by holding that for an action to be intelligent, it must be 
preceded by the consideration of propositions, and this considering of propositions must 
be done intelligently. Ryle holds that this considering of propositions must be 
intelligently executed in order to account for how an agent considers the propositions 
appropriate to her activity or problem at hand. In other words, discriminating between the 
propositions that are relevant, and those that are inappropriate requires intelligence.  
  55 
Fodor argues that Ryle’s regress argument only succeeds if it is targeted against 
an intellectualist account of mental traits, but that intellectualism should be understood as 
a theory about the role of mental processes in the generation of behavior, and having a 
trait is not a matter of producing behavior (1968, 636). Rather, having a trait amounts to 
being able to behave in a certain way, for instance, not just being to do something, but 
being able to do it well. Fodor denies that traits are involved in the production of 
behavior because if they were, then the instructions for engaging in an activity would be 
distinct from the instructions for doing that activity well. For instance, he writes, “if 
instructions for speaking Latin are distinct from instructions for speaking Latin well, then 
these latter must, in turn, be distinct from instructions for speaking ((Latin well) well) and 
so on ad infinitum,” (Fodor 1968, 636).  
Fodor’s take appears to be that, for Ryle’s argument to get off the ground, it must 
aim to show that intellectualist accounts of X-ing intelligently, for instance, lead to a 
vicious regress. But since ‘X-ing intelligently’ is not the name of an activity distinct from 
X-ing, intellectualists merely need to account for acts of X-ing, which allows them to 
avoid a vicious regress. 
Whether or not Ryle was aware of Fodor’s distinction between mental traits and 
mental competences, it is not clear that the regress argument has to make reference to 
mental traits. While Ryle uses mental adverbs, which refer to traits, in the course of 
offering his regress argument, these are not essential to the argument. Theorizing is an 
activity, and so it falls under Fodor’s notion of a mental competence. On the assumption 
that theorizing, in virtue of being a competence, amounts to know-how, then 
intellectualism needs to offer an account of it. To do so, intellectualists must appeal to 
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prior acts of theorizing, and even prior acts of theorizing to explain these. Formulated in 
this manner, Ryle’s regress argument can get off the ground without the use of mental 
adverbs. 
While some might deny that theorizing amounts to know-how, such a denial 
would be unmotivated on Fodor’s account. While he acknowledges that there is a 
distinction between what we know how to do, and what we know how to explain, he also 
acknowledges that the ability to offer explanations is a skill and something we know how 
to do (Fodor 1968, 633–634). Since Fodor is prepared to allow explaining to be treated as 
a case of know-how, it seems he must also treat theorizing in the same way. 
Still, even if Ryle’s regress can be formulated without the use of mental adverbs, 
it does not seem that it will show that Fodor’s brand of intellectualism is subject to a 
vicious regress. Fodor could grant that in order to give an account of theorizing, 
understood as an instance of know-how, we will need to appeal to further acts of 
theorizing. However, we will not be forced to continue positing prior acts of theorizing 
ad infinitum. Rather, Fodor allows that psychological explanations can “bottom out” in 
elementary operations. He writes, “A completed psychological theory must provide 
systems of instructions to account for the forms of behavior available to an organism, and 
it must do so in a way that makes reference to no unanalyzed psychological processes,” 
(Fodor 1968, 629). These unanalyzed psychological processes are to be understood as 
elementary operations. When we arrive at an elementary operation, we cannot ask for 
instructions for performing it by appealing to some further sequence of operations. These 
operations are not performed in some way or other; they are merely performed.  
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By appealing to elementary operations, Fodor appears to have a way to avoid the 
vicious regress to which Ryle took intellectualism to be committed. Nevertheless, there 
are other reasons for thinking this move may be problematic, which will be discussed 
below.  
Paul Snowdon (2004) has raised several challenges to Ryle’s account of 
intelligence and know-how.  While Snowdon’s challenges appear to result from a 
misunderstanding of Ryle’s position, they are worth discussing in so far as they make the 
position in question clearer. According to Snowdon, Ryle is committed to the “Capacity 
Thesis” (hereafter CT), which is the claim that an ascription of knowledge how to X is 
equivalent to an ascription of the capacity to X.  Snowdon argues that CT is false because 
having the capacity to X is not necessary for knowing how to X. He provides six 
examples of cases in which it intuitively seems that someone knows how to X without 
having the ability or capacity to do so.   
However, Snowdon’s examples all exploit an ambiguity in the use of “ability” or 
“capacity”.  Specifically, his examples exploit either a lack of what Noë (2005, 283) has 
called “enabling conditions” or the presence of what we might call “disabling 
conditions”.  An enabling condition may be understood as a condition that must be met in 
order for someone to be able to exercise some particular capacity.  A disabling condition 
may be understood as a condition that, when met, prevents a subject from being able to 
exercise a capacity that she could exercise under normal circumstances.  For instance, 
consider one of Snowdon’s cases: 
I know how to make Christmas pudding, and have done so frequently.  Alas, a 
terrible explosion obliterates the world’s supply of sugar, so that no one is able to 
make it.  I still know how to but, like everyone else, cannot (Snowdon 2004, 8). 
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Ryle took “know-how”, understood as abilities and skills, to amount to “higher-
grade” dispositions, “the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous” (Ryle 1949, 
44).  Knowing how to make Christmas pudding, for Ryle, amounts to having dispositions 
to make Christmas pudding well or successfully in certain circumstances.  But in order 
for one to exercise this dispositional ability, one needs the right ingredients.  The sudden 
depletion of sugar in Snowdon’s examples does not suddenly strip people of their 
abilities, understood as heterogeneous dispositions, to make Christmas pudding anymore 
than being far away from a guitar strips a guitarist from his ability or dispositions to play 
the instrument skillfully.    
Snowdon introduces other cases aiming to show that being able to X is not 
sufficient for knowing how to X, again exploiting the ambiguity of “ability”.  There 
appear to be cases in which one has the ability or capacity to X without knowing how to 
do so. S&W offer the example of digesting food. “Hannah is able to digest food” does not 
seem to entail that “Hannah knows how to digest food.”  Due to these sorts of cases, it 
might seem that for the claim that being able to X entails knowing how to X to have any 
plausibility, the values for X must be restricted so as to exclude things like digesting 
food. Perhaps the values for X should be restricted to intentional actions. S&W take it 
that Ryle has something like this in mind when he speaks of actions that are “intelligently 
executed” (Ryle 1949, 30). Whatever one thinks intelligence amounts to, digesting food 
does not seem to be something that one does with intelligence.  
While restricting the range of actions that we know how to do to those that we do 
intentionally may seem appropriate in light of the food digesting example, this 
oversimplifies matters. It may be correct that digesting food is not something that one 
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does with intelligence, but this does not entail that it may not be done intelligently. It is 
just that digesting food is not something that one does, it is something that one’s digestive 
system does. Moreover, if we restrict know-how to intentional actions, then this will 
entail that we do not know how to perform cognitive tasks that require unconscious 
processing, for instance, it will entail that we do not know how to visually estimate 
distance.21 This seems wrong. In order to account for the fact that we do seem to know 
how to do many such tasks, we can appeal to Dennett’s distinction between personal and 
subpersonal levels of explanation (1986). In his discussion of the distinction, Dennett 
uses the example of pain. At the subpersonal level, explaining pain involves giving a 
physiological account in terms of operations of an organism’s pain network. At the 
personal level, our concern is not with physiology, but rather with the “mental 
phenomenon” of pain. Giving a physiological account of pain at this level would be 
inappropriate.  
While Dennett discusses pain to illustrate the distinction, depth perception serves 
as a better example for my present purposes. While people are able to visually estimate 
depth, generally they do not seem to know how to do so.22 Rather, visually estimating 
depth is something that people’s brains do for them. In this sense, depth perception is on 
par with digestion, albeit more cognitive. 
Ryle’s was concerned with mental concepts that apply at the personal level. While 
Ryle equates knowing how with dispositional abilities, because he is operating at the 
                                                
21 The question of whether people know how to visually estimate distance is somewhat ambiguous. In a 
case where we consciously visually estimate distance, the activity is distinct in the relevant sense from food 
digestion. But in cases where we do not consciously visually estimate distance, the activity appears to be on 
par with digestion. It may be more accurate in the former case, than in the latter, to speak of people 
knowing how to visually estimate distance.  
22 With the possible exception of cases of conscious distance estimation.  
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personal level, he should not be read as being committed to anything like Snowdon’s 
suggested CT, especially when the capacities under consideration operate at the 
subpersonal level. The CT conflates the personal and subpersonal levels by arguing that 
anti-intellectualism is false because we do not know how to do activities at the personal 
level that we, or more appropriately our subpersonal systems, have the capacity to do at 
the subpersonal level.  
Now let’s turn to one of Snowdon’s cases in which there is a small and narrow 
opening in a rock. A person, S, is agile and skinny and could get through the rock.  But S 
has no knowledge of the rock or task, and so does not know how to get through the rock.   
While S is clearly “able” to get through the rock in some sense, because he has no 
knowledge of the rock or the task, he has no dispositional-abilities regarding the task,23 
and so there is no reason to suppose that Ryle would take him to know how, nor be able 
in the required sense.  
 As noted in the previous section, contemporary intellectualists, characterized by 
S&W and B&M are concerned with the conditions under which propositions expressed 
by sentences of the form, “S knows how to X” are true. As Ryle characterizes 
intellectualism, the view holds that actions are intelligent, or exhibit knowledge, in so far 
as they consist in the application or utilization of knowledge, understood in terms of true 
propositions. Against this claim, Ryle held that knowing how does not require the 
possession or application of propositional knowledge.  
                                                
23 This will depend, in part, on how we fill in the details of the case. If S is trapped and her survival 
depends on getting through the rock, it is plausible that she will quickly develop the necessary 
dispositional-abilities, even if she does not have them initially. Upon developing these dispositions, it is 
more plausible to hold that she knows how to get through the rock. 
  61 
 Given that contemporary intellectualists generally take themselves to be 
responding to Ryle in some way, it is important to note that the position as characterized 
by Ryle appears at least slightly different than the position as characterized by S&W and 
B&M. Ryle explicitly identifies intellectualism as a position regarding the nature of the 
mind. S&W and B&M are concerned, at least in part, with the truth conditions of 
propositions that attribute know-how to agents. In the next section, I argue that these 
differences reflect the fact that, within the literature, there are two distinct debates taking 
place regarding the status of knowledge-how. 
 
2.8 TWO DEBATES, FOUR POSITIONS 
 Generally, the know-how literature has focused on a debate between 
intellectualists, who equate knowing-how with propositional knowledge, and anti-
intellectualists who hold that know-how is distinct from knowing-that. Generally, anti-
intellectualists follow Ryle in equating know-how with certain abilities, skills, or 
dispositions. However, framed in this broad manner, the literature overlooks a distinction 
between two debates. Given the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction, and the two 
debates, four general positions emerge. 
A good deal of the know-how literature focuses on determining the proper 
semantics analysis of “know-how” ascriptions: What are the truth conditions for 
sentences like "Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle,"?  But alternatively, the debate 
between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists can be understood as a debate about the 
correct psychological explanation for various skills or abilities, in particular whether they 
are to be explained in terms of the application of "theory" or stored propositional 
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knowledge, as (for example) in classical strong AI, or whether they are the results of non-
propositional processing of information, as (for example) in connectionist accounts. 
While parties to the latter debate typically refer to these abilities as “know-how,” they are 
not concerned with whether this usage matches up with ordinary language or semantic 
analysis. Their use of 'know-how' is designed to distinguish non-propositional processing 
from propositional processing. These are important explanatory issues surrounding 
mental competencies, whether or not we label them cases of “know-how.” Given these 
two debates, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism can be understood as theses 
regarding either. This gives us a total of four general positions, which I now turn to 
discuss. 
 Semantic intellectualism is the view that sentences of the form, “S knows how to 
X” ascribe propositional knowledge regarding X-ing to S and so knowing how reduces to 
knowing that. Negatively, semantic intellectualism holds that knowing how does not 
amount to certain abilities or dispositions. Semantic anti-intellectualism holds that 
sentences of the form, “S knows how to X” ascribe abilities or dispositions to X to S and 
denies that knowing how amounts to or reduces to propositional knowledge.  
 Setting aside semantics, others are concerned with the question of how we should 
explain mental competencies or intelligent action, a central question of cognitive science. 
Parties to this debate are concerned with what types of representations and processes that 
explain a system’s ability to exhibit intelligent behavior (see Fodor 1968). In light of 
Dennett’s distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation, there is a 
not a clear divide between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists in the debate over 
psychological explanations.  
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 Broadly speaking, we could define psychological intellectualism as the claim that 
an agent’s ability to X is explained in terms of processing propositional or linguistic 
representations that answer the question, “How does one X”? This is illustrated in the 
Chomsky/Fodor account of language use and understanding. On this view there is a little 
linguist in our heads that possesses a theory of our language, and our linguistic know-
how or competence consists in the application of this theory during linguistic exchanges. 
On the other hand, psychological anti-intellectualism can be understood as the claim that 
an agent’s ability to X is not explained by appeal to processing propositional 
representations. Some hold that these abilities involve the processing of non-
propositional representations (e.g. Churchland) while others hold that abilities are wholly 
non-representational (e.g. Dreyfus). 
 While Ryle, at times, discusses intellectualism and anti-intellectualism as 
positions regarding ordinary language, or the semantics of know-how attributions, his 
primary concern was with offering a psychological account of mental competencies. For 
this reason, one might take Fodor to illustrate the sort of intellectualism that Ryle had in 
mind. However, there are important differences between Fodor’s intellectualism, and 
intellectualism as characterized by Ryle. On Ryle’s view, intellectualism is committed to 
the claim that intelligent actions are characterized as involving explicit theorizing, and 
the application of truths arrived at through theoretical operations. This constitutes one 
version of psychological intellectualism. On this characterization, it seems that an 
intellectualist could not draw a distinction between knowing how to X, and knowing how 
to answer the question, “How does one X?”  
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 Fodor’s account, however, has the resources to honor this distinction. He writes, 
“the intellectualist account of X-ing says that, whenever you X, the little man in your 
head has access to and employs a manual on X-ing; and surely, whatever is his is yours” 
(1968, 636). While Fodor does not intend the little man and his manuals to be literal 
descriptions of the workings of the mind, the metaphor captures his commitment to the 
idea that agents employ rules in executing intelligent operations. Fodor holds that when 
an organism knows how to X, a true simulation of the organism’s behavior will provide 
an answer to the question, “How does one X?” If we have a machine that optimally 
simulates an organism’s behavior, a  
“given behavior type will appear in the machine’s repertoire if and only if 
the corresponding type of behavior appears in the repertoire of the 
organism; and second, for each type of behavior in the repertoire of the 
machine, there exists a sequence of sentences of English that the 
programming language of the machine maps onto the sequence of machine 
states which terminates in that behavior (Fodor 1968, 639).” 
 
From this, Fodor concludes that such a sequence of English sentences amounts to a true 
description of the processes underlying the system’s output. Fodor’s intellectualist 
commitment is made salient in his claim that, “If D is a true description of the etiology of 
an event e, and if e’ is an event numerically distinct from e but of the same kind as e, then 
it is reasonable to infer, ceteris paribus, that D is a true description of the etiology of e’,” 
(1968, 639).  
 Fodor’s idea is that we can understand how an organism engages in intelligent 
behavior by coming to know what processes underlie an optimal machine simulation of 
that organism’s behavior. Such a simulation provides us with an account of how the 
organism engages in the behavior in question. We describe these machine’s computations 
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in terms of rules, and instructions, that is, propositionally. Since we can infer like causes 
from like effects, we can infer that machine programs that simulate the organism’s 
behavior represent the organism’s tacit knowledge. In other words, we can infer that the 
organism’s tacit knowledge is propositional.  
 Fodor’s intellectualism is anti-Rylean because we inherit the knowledge 
possessed by our subpersonal agents (“surely, whatever is his is yours”). However, this 
view is distinct from Ryle’s characterization of intellectualism because Fodor allows that 
the propositional knowledge implicated in behavior is tacit knowledge. If an agent 
employs rules or regulative propositions in her behavior, and she is unable to articulate 
these rules, then she has tacit knowledge of them.  
 However, according to Dennett’s distinction between the personal and 
subpersonal levels, we should deny that organisms inherit the knowledge possessed by 
subpersonal agents. On such a denial, Fodor’s view does not qualify as the sort of 
intellectualism described by Ryle because it is not intellectualist at the personal level, 
which is the level of Ryle’s concern. However, this does not make Fodor a Rylean. If 
Ryle was unfriendly to intentional explanations at the sub-personal level, and if accepting 
such explanations makes one anti-Rylean, then both Fodor and Dennett come out as 
opposed to Ryle’s account of the mind. Of course, being opposed to Ryle does not make 
Dennett and Fodor allies. On Dennett’s view, we should not model subpersonal processes 
on personal level processes, which is just what Fodor does.  
 One could of course make an appeal to tacit knowledge that is quite different from 
Fodor’s. For instance, instead of positing a little man in the head who consults manuals to 
engage in intelligent behavior, one could posit a trained neural network. If we follow 
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Fodor in holding that the knowledge possessed at the subpersonal level can be inherited 
at the personal level, then no propositional knowledge will enter the picture at either 
level. 
 
2.9 PROBLEMS WITH OVERLOOKING THESE DISTINCTIONS 
 Given that the two debates have become entangled in the know-how literature, it 
is natural to wonder to what extent, if at all, they are interrelated. One might think, for 
instance, that engaging in linguistic analysis of sentences of the form, “S knows how to 
X,” tells us something about the nature of the mind because semantics provides us with 
the truth conditions of these statements. For instance, an intellectualist might argue that 
because semantics tells us that the truth conditions for know-how attributions are 
propositional, S’s knowing how to X consists in S’s knowing that p, where p constitutes 
the truth condition for the proposition, “S knows how to X.” Since S knows that p, and p 
is the truth-maker for S’s knowing how to X, then S’s X-ing competency should be 
explained in terms of her knowledge that p.  
While arguments of this sort are not uncommon in philosophy of mind, they 
constitute an instance of what Roth and Cummins (2011) call epistemological poaching. 
One engages in poaching by arguing from premises about the semantic analysis of 
sentences that use “mental” terminology to a conclusion about the structure of the mind.  
As Roth and Cummins put it: 
 One starts, for example, with a truth-conditional analysis of belief 
sentences, and argues, let’s say, that ‘believes’ is a three place relation 
between a believer, a proposition and a sentence in the language of 
thought (LOT) that expresses it (e.g., Fodor 1981). One then notes that 
some belief attributions are true. Since the truth condition for belief 
attributions requires a belief relation between a believer, a proposition and 
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an expression in LOT, it seems that anything to which one can truly 
attribute beliefs must harbor psychological states with precisely that 
structure. And, on the assumption that the brain realizes psychological 
states, we get a conclusion about the structure of the brain without having 
to do a single experiment.24 
 
Roth and Cummins provide strong reasons for rejecting the view that the structure of the 
mind can be understood through semantic analysis.  The claim is not that know-how 
ascriptions lack truth conditions. But we must be careful to distinguish the question of the 
truth conditions for ordinary attributions of know-how from the question of whether these 
truth conditions are satisfied. This distinction may be overlooked if one assumes a direct 
reference theory according to which “knows-how” refers to whatever mental states 
account for our ability to act intelligently, that is, the mental states that are constitutive of 
practical knowledge. Such an assumption is applicable only if there is a list of mental 
properties or states that are non-coincidentally correlated, properties for natural kinds. I 
have no stance on the question of whether know-how is a natural kind, though I suspect 
that it is not. If this is correct, then we have no reason for thinking that the semantically 
correct truth conditions for know-how attributions are satisfied. If, on the other hand, 
know-how is a natural kind, we have little reason for thinking that armchair reflection 
will reveal what the truth conditions of know-how attributions are.  
 For instance, it could turn out that C is the semantically correct truth condition for 
ordinary know-how attributions, but that, ordinary attributions of know-how are false 
thus construed. If C is the semantically correct truth condition for ordinary attributions of 
know-how, this brings out an assumption about the structure of the mind that is built into 
                                                
24 One might object that this is uncharitable to Fodor. Perhaps Fodor is offering an inference to the best 
mechanical explanation systematicity, logical coherence, reasoning, and productivity. The problem is such 
an inference to the best explanation rests on a bad assumption, namely, that cognition is structured in 
accordance with a language, namely, a LOT.  
  68 
language. However, there is no reason to assume that the assumptions about the mind that 
are built into language are correct. This is why epistemological poaching is not an 
appropriate methodology for answering empirical questions about the structure of the 
mind.25  
 To engage in poaching is to assume that semantics gives us the correct truth 
conditions for sentences that use mental terminology, and that scientific accounts of the 
mind are beholden to semantic analysis.  But if this assumption were correct, then this 
would mean that the mind is structured such that the language of thought (LOT) 
hypothesis and the classical program provide the correct account of mental structure.  
However, parties to the debate over LOT and the classical program take this to be an 
empirically grounded debate that is orthogonal to issues surrounding the correct semantic 
analysis of know-how attributions. If semantics and science disagree then this tells us that 
the truth conditions of ordinary know-how attributions are not satisfied, not that science 
has gotten things wrong.  
 Of course one could hold an intellectualist or anti-intellectualist view about the 
semantics of know-how ascriptions while remaining neutral on empirical questions 
regarding the structure of the mind and thereby avoid the unwarranted move from 
semantics to psychology. However, many participants in the know-how literature have 
crossed the lines between these two debates. This may be most obvious in S&W who 
motivate their account by explicitly appealing to Karttunenn’s account of the semantics 
of embedded questions, which leads them to the view that knowing-how to X requires 
knowing that some way is a way for one to X. If S&W were solely concerned with 
                                                
25 This does not rule out a role for semantics altogether. Semantics may be useful for determining what our 
everyday conceptions of various concepts are. When the concepts of interest are scientific, we should defer 
to science to see if these conceptions are satisfied.  
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semantic analysis, we should expect their account to stop here. Semantics tells us that 
sentences of the form, “S knows how to X,” ascribe to S the answer to the embedded 
question, “How does one X?” This answer consists in knowing a proposition, namely, 
that w is a way for S to X. However, as discussed above, on S&W’s view, while this 
propositional knowledge is a necessary for knowing how, it is not sufficient. The 
discussion of the bicycle riding example makes it clear that they think appealing only to 
this sort of propositional knowledge falls short of explaining know-how, hence the 
requirement that the relevant piece of propositional knowledge be entertained under a 
PMP. PMPs allow S&W to explain the connection between know-how and dispositional 
states, which in turn explains an intuitive connection between know-how and action. 
While S&W do not think positing PMPs violates the intellectualist commitment to know-
how being purely propositional, I have argued above that this is not a tenable position.  
 While B&M do not explicitly appeal to semantic analysis to establish their 
position, as mentioned above, their position is motivated by eliciting semantic intuitions 
in response to thought experiments. This move constitutes an instance of poaching. B&M 
must assume that the intuitions that are generated by Salchow are indicative of the truth 
conditions of know-how ascriptions. If these intuitions result in the judgment that Irina 
does not know how to do the salchow, then the idea is that this demonstrates that she fails 
to satisfy the truth conditions for know-how attributions, from which they conclude that 
she fails to know how. But, as discussed above, we have no reason to think that ordinary 
language is designed to handle cases like Salchow. 
 It is not just intellectualists who cross the lines between the debates over 
semantics and explanatory issues of psychology. Ryle, in many places, takes an ordinary 
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language approach in motivating anti-intellectualism. For instance, he writes, “When a 
person is described by one or other of the intelligence-epithets…this description imputes 
to him not the knowledge, or ignorance, of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability, to 
do certain sorts of things,” (Ryle 1949, 27). At the same time, Ryle is clearly not just 
concerned with semantics or ordinary language use. His stated primary aim in the second 
chapter of Concept of Mind “is to show that there are many activities that display 
qualities of mind, yet are neither themselves intellectual operations nor yet effects of 
intellectual operations,” (Ryle 1949, 26). This makes it clear that his interest indeed lies 
with the structure of the mind, though he may well have thought that ordinary language 
serves as a window through which we can come to know how things are.  
 While understanding how ordinary speakers use sentences of the form, “S knows 
how to X” may be a worthwhile project in its own right, its scope should be understood 
as pertaining to how people use language. While this is an empirical question, it is 
distinct from empirical questions regarding the structure of the mind and the role that 
cognition plays in the generation of intelligent behavior. These are questions properly 
addressed by cognitive science, not linguistics or ordinary language philosophy. While 
people may use mental terminology in a way that presupposes a particular account of the 
mental, this language use does not constitute evidence for claims about how the mind is 
structured.  
 History is replete with cases in which ordinary usage of terms fell into conflict 
with scientific approaches. For instance, compare how ordinary language treated ‘fish,’ 
‘motion,’ or ‘life’ 200 years ago. Language is about the world, and how we use language 
and the concepts that underlie our usage is influenced by our beliefs about the world. 
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Linguistics analysis is an appropriate method for determining how ordinary language 
works, and ordinary use of ‘know how’ is no exception. Studying ordinary language in 
this way will bring out various assumptions, both tacit and explicit, regarding the 
structure of the mind in the case of mental terms such as ‘belief’ and ‘know how.’ 
Semanticists are certainly entitled to tell us how language works, but they are not entitled, 
on the same grounds, that assumptions built into language are correct.  
 
2.10 ALTERNATIVE TO CROSSING BOUNDARIES 
 Attempting to use semantic analysis of knowledge locutions in order to 
understand the structure of the mind results, in part, at least, from a failure to take 
seriously the thesis of representational pluralism.26 The use of linguistic analysis to 
answer questions about the mind and cognition assumes, at least tacitly, that 
representational pluralism is false, and that cognition is structured so as to be apt for 
semantic analysis, that is, structured around a language of thought that has the same kind 
of structure as natural language.  
 B&M seem to allow for some degree of pluralism, in holding that know-how 
requires standing in a non-propositional knowledge-of relation to a way of acting, where 
ways are understood as being non-propositional. However, they take it that these 
knowledge-of relations are grounded in certain propositional attitudes, so that ultimately 
knowledge-how has a crucial propositional component. S&W come closer to explicitly 
denying pluralism. While they do acknowledge a connection between know-how, action, 
                                                
26 Again, this is not to say that there is no use for semantics altogether. Semantics may provide a guide for 
determining what our pre-theoretic understanding of scientific concepts amounts to. But using semantics to 
engage in epistemological poaching assumes that the mind is structured in a way that semantic analysis can 
analyze, that is, like natural language.  
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and having certain dispositions, they take pains to explain this in terms of propositional 
attitudes by appeal to PMPs. 
 The most important difference between the intellectualist positions offered by 
S&W and B&M are that while the former take propositional knowledge of a certain sort 
to be both necessary and sufficient for know-how, the latter take it to be only necessary, 
acknowledging that a non-propositional knowledge-of relation is also required. But 
despite the requirement of propositional knowledge on both accounts, both S&W and 
B&M make efforts to show that their views have implications for how we should think 
about mental processes. Abandoning their propositional commitments, and 
acknowledging representational pluralism allows them to achieve this end. For S&W, as I 
have discussed, an acknowledgment of pluralism allows them to accomplish what they 
seek to achieve through appeal to PMPs. For B&M, pluralism makes sense of the non-
propositional, knowledge-of relation that they argue is required for know-how.  
 
2.11 WHY ALL THE SEMANTICS? 
 Knowledge and intelligence are cognitive states or activities. Since epistemology 
is, or encompasses, the theory of knowledge, the field should take seriously 
psychological accounts of how the mind represents and processes information. However, 
most of the field approaches the study of knowledge using linguistic analysis. This occurs 
in both mainstream epistemology, which focuses almost exclusively on propositional 
knowledge, and in the know-how literature. 
 The methods by which most epistemologists operate presuppose that something 
like folk psychology captures the structure of the mind, where folk psychology is 
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understood as the view that the mind represents information in a linguistic or 
propositional format. If one endorses or operates under this presupposition, then it is 
natural to think that engaging in poaching is an appropriate method for coming to 
understand the mind’s structure and processes. That is, if one thinks that the mind 
represents and operates on propositional attitudes, then linguistic analysis seems like an 
appropriate method for understanding the mind’s contents. 
 In chapter 1, I argued that the focus on propositional knowledge in mainstream 
epistemology is not the result of our coming to have a better understanding of the 
structure of knowledge, but rather an artifact of the field’s concern with skeptical regress 
arguments and offering analyses of propositional knowledge. In other words, while most 
epistemology operates as though all knowledge is propositional, we lack strong reasons 
for thinking this is actually the case. In this chapter I have shown that operating under 
this propositional knowledge framework presents difficulties for explaining actions and 
behaviors that appear to exhibit knowledge or intelligence, that is, actions and behaviors 
that we know-how to do. 
 Focusing primarily on S&W and B&M, I have argued that allowing for 
representational pluralism enables us to explain many exhibitions of intelligence that 
cannot be explained under the presupposition that all knowledge is propositional, or even 
under a weaker presumption that all knowledge has at least a propositional component. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, moving beyond a purely propositional framework 
allows us to develop norms of rationality that are applicable to the circumstances in 
which we typically find ourselves, that is norms of practical rather than truth-directed 
rationality.  
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 In the next chapter, I offer a new framework for epistemology that bridges the gap 
that has long stood between philosophical and empirical approaches to understanding 
knowledge.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A FRAMEWORK FOR A PLURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Cummins et al (2004) suggest that philosophy operates under a tradition that 
distinguishes epistemology from a broader study of rationality. While mainstream 
epistemology focuses on propositional knowledge, and evidence-based justification of 
belief, a broader study of rationality examines not only the norms of rational belief 
formation, but also practical reason, which encompasses rational action. 
 In chapter 1, I argued that mainstream epistemology’s focus on propositional 
knowledge is primarily due to the focus on the analysis problem, which emerged out of a 
concern with skeptical regress of reasons arguments which go back to the ancient 
skeptics and more recently with the Gettier problem (Gettier 1963). While concern with 
the analysis problem may explain why the epistemology literature has had the focus it has 
had over the last several decades, there are also assumptions about the nature of 
cognition, rationality, and intelligence that underlie the focus on propositional knowledge 
and truth-directed norms of rationality.  
 Generally, rationality is understood as epistemic constraint satisfaction. Epistemic 
constraints provide norms by which we can evaluate epistemic systems for good or 
correct performance.27 Good or correct performance must, of course, be understood 
relative to a particular goal or set of goals. In epistemology, it is generally taken for 
granted that the goal of an epistemic agent qua epistemic agent is to form beliefs that are 
                                                
27 This is not to say that there was no rationality before we began to articulate epistemic constraints. Rather, 
studying behavior in order to determine what constitutes good or correct performance allows us to 
articulate these constraints.   
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true, and avoid forming beliefs that are false. Good or correct performance, then, is 
understood in epistemology as performance that leads to believing true propositions, so 
insofar as epistemology is concerned with normative standards of rationality, it is 
concerned with normative standards of belief formation, and takes reasoning to consist in 
making inferences among propositions. 
 The activity of distinguishing true propositions from false ones by way of 
considering evidence is generally discussed in terms of justification. Given one’s 
evidence, what is one justified in believing? Justification is taken to be a central epistemic 
constraint that must be met by epistemic agents in order for these agents to be rational. 
As discussed in chapter 1, the normative standards of rationality that emerge from the 
propositional framework in epistemology are properly understood as normative standards 
of truth-directed rationality, which amounts to a theory of justification. Given one’s 
evidence, what is one justified in believing? Since the theory of knowledge is concerned, 
in part, with the normative standards of justified belief, and justification is understood as 
a truth-conducive property, it is unsurprising that the picture of normative rationality that 
emerges from the field is of the truth-directed variety.  
 It is not clear, nor obviously significant for present purposes, what came first in 
epistemology: the propositional framework, or the truth-directed take on normative 
standards of rationality. However, it is clear that these two perspectives go hand in hand. 
Normative standards of rationality are designed to govern or prescribe rational behavior 
relative to specific goals, and the achievement of specific goals requires specific 
resources and capacities. Epistemology assumes that the primary goal of an epistemic or 
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cognitive system is to arrive at true beliefs. This is precisely the sort of goal or activity 
that truth-directed standards or normative rationality are designed to evaluate.  
 Whatever the merits of the fit between epistemology’s propositional framework 
and its standards of truth-directed rationality, work in cognitive science shows that 
epistemology’s propositional take on cognition places limits on what the field’s standards 
of rationality can evaluate. The development of connectionism, for instance, suggested 
that cognition may not require propositional attitudes. Churchland and Churchland (1999) 
argue that we should eliminate propositional attitudes altogether and suggest that we 
should instead understand intelligence and cognition in terms of neural processes, such as 
those modeled by connectionist networks. Haugeland (1991) and Cummins (1996)  argue 
that non-linguistic representations (imagery, activation patterns, and so on) don’t have 
propositional contents at all.  Since these representations lack propositional contents, they 
cannot be assessed for truth. Rather these representations must be assessed for accuracy 
across various, sometimes competing, dimensions. The general lesson to be drawn from 
this work in cognitive science is that a good deal of cognition is not structured in accord 
with the sort of logical inferential relations among propositions that are the mainstay of 
traditional epistemology and truth-directed rationality.  
 Since epistemology’s standards of truth-directed rationality are equipped only to 
evaluate cognitive system’s whose goals are to believe true propositions, they cannot be 
used to evaluate any form of cognition that is not structured in accord with logical 
inferential relations among propositions. They cannot, for instance, evaluate the behavior 
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of connectionist networks28, or a cognitive system that reasons by using imagery or scale 
models.29 
 A brief caveat is in order here. There are cognitive systems that use imagery or 
models to realize truth-evaluable states. The problem is that truth-directed accounts of 
rationality assume that epistemic cognition is structured in accordance with logical 
inferences among propositions. Presumably, this sort of inference is possible in systems 
that use imagery or models to realize belief-like, truth-evaluable states. Truth-directed 
standards of rationality are equipped to evaluate a system’s performance in making 
inferences among propositions. The problem, however, is that truth-directed rationality 
does not have the resources required to demonstrate sensitivity to the role that non-
linguistic representations play in this reasoning. In these sorts of cases, it seems plausible 
that it is really the non-linguistic representations that are doing the epistemic heavy 
lifting. The belief-like states that these systems can realize are merely the output of this 
heavy lifting. If we don’t have some means of evaluating the role of the non-linguistic 
representations, then we are overlooking a good deal of cognitive work that is 
epistemically significant.  
 In any case, since cognition is not limited to entities that operate exclusively in 
terms of propositional representations, we need rational and epistemic standards that are 
formulated to account for cognitive diversity. Cognitive diversity is the thesis that there is 
a good deal of diversity across cognitive systems and this diversity is realized in different 
ways. Different cognitive systems have different resources, architectures, limitations, 
practical constraints, and goals. In light of cognitive diversity, the study of rationality 
                                                
28 The exception, perhaps, being connectionist networks that implement classical architectures.  
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should adhere to rational diversity, or diversity in “rules of right reason,” (Cummins et al 
2004).  
 Since epistemology operates under a perspective from which cognition consists in 
making inferences among propositions with the goal of arriving at true ones, it is not 
equipped to accommodate rational or cognitive diversity. In other words, there is a sort of 
mismatch between what cognitive science tells us that a normative theory of rationality 
should require, and what epistemology provides as such a theory.   
 This does not in itself, of course, establish that epistemology’s normative 
standards of rationality are without value. Rather, it only shows that they are limited in 
applicability. This may appear to be a reason for maintaining the traditional division 
between epistemology and broader studies of rationality.  
 However, we have yet to address the fact that a normative theory of rationality 
cannot require of an agent that she do what she is not capable of doing. Call this the 
ought-can principle. The ought-can principle provides additional reasons why normative 
standards of rationality must accommodate cognitive diversity through rational diversity.  
As mentioned above, normative standards of rationality are designed to govern or 
prescribe rational behavior relative to specific goals, and the achievement of specific 
goals require specific resources and capacities. Sometimes normative standards of 
rationality that govern the rational behavior of a specific sort of cognitive system relative 
to a specific goal will impose requirements that cannot be met by other cognitive 
systems. While such standards may be appropriate for systems that can meet these 
requirements, they cannot apply to systems that cannot due to the ought-can principle. 
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Below, I will examine what, if any, cognitive systems may be subject to epistemology’s 
normative standards of rationality in light of the ought-can principle.  
 So far we have discussed two ways in which epistemology’s normative standards 
of rationality are limited.30 First, they only apply to cognitive systems that operate 
exclusively on linguistic representations, and aim at the goal of acquiring true beliefs. 
Second, they only apply to cognitive systems that are capable of meeting them. Both of 
these limitations are the direct result of cognitive diversity. In light of these limitations, 
below I will consider two options for reconciling epistemology and the lessons from 
cognitive science that give rise to cognitive and rational diversity.  
 The first option, which appears to be followed by philosophical tradition, is to 
keep epistemology separate from broader studies of norms of rationality. Under this 
option, the idea is that epistemology’s job is to provide an analysis of propositional 
knowledge, i.e., to solve the analysis problem, as well as develop normative standards of 
rationality that should be adhered to by agents whose goal is acquiring propositional 
knowledge.  
 The second option is to revise epistemology so as to accommodate the lessons 
from cognitive science and demonstrate sensitivity to cognitive diversity. At first glance, 
it is not entirely clear how much revision acknowledging cognitive diversity requires. At 
the very least, reconciling epistemology with cognitive diversity will require an 
expansion of the current epistemological framework that operates in terms of 
propositional representations and a truth-directed construal of norms of rationality. One 
way in which this might be done would be to divide epistemology into sub-domains that 
                                                
30 These sorts of limitations will exist for any account of normative standards of rationality, though the 
focus here is simply the standards of rationality that are operative in epistemology.  
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correspond to various diverse types of cognitive systems. Perhaps in doing so, we would 
find that the current framework of mainstream epistemology will apply to one or some of 
these domains, that is, certain types of cognitive systems. On the other hand, if it turns 
out that mainstream epistemology’s framework does not apply to any actual cognitive 
systems, the value of the current epistemological framework becomes questionable.   
 
3.2. DOXASTIFICATION 
However, before considering these two options for reconciling epistemology and 
cognitive science, I consider one way in which a proponent of traditional epistemology 
might try to argue that cognitive diversity does not require substantial revision in 
epistemology, which I call the doxastification strategy. More specifically, the strategy 
provides a way for an advocate of traditional epistemology to argue that apparent cases of 
non-propositional knowledge can be accommodated within epistemology’s propositional 
framework. If such an argument succeeds, then this may provide a way for 
epistemology’s traditional normative standards of rationality to accommodate cognitive 
diversity.   
 
3.2.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 In this section, I assume the truth of both representational pluralism and 
psychological representational pluralism.31 The strategy of my argument will be to show 
that these theses cast doubt upon epistemological monism, which is the thesis that all 
knowledge is propositional. I have argued in chapter 1 that epistemological monism has 
                                                
31 See chapters 1 and 2 for full discussion of these theses.  
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been the running assumption in epistemology due to the field’s focus on skeptical regress 
of reasons arguments, which trace their origins to the ancient skeptics, and due to the 
focus on the Gettier problem (Gettier 1963).  I have referred to research programs in 
epistemology that focus on these two issues the analysis problem.  
 Let’s suppose that I am correct and that the reason epistemology has operated 
under the assumption of epistemological monism is due to the fact that the analysis 
problem has been at the forefront of research in epistemology. While this supposition 
may provide some reason to think that we are in need of an argument for epistemological 
monism, it does not provide evidence that monism is false. Moreover, because monism is 
the running assumption in epistemology, it may seem that the burden of proof lies with 
those, such as myself, who endorse epistemological pluralism.  
 While I believe that representational pluralism, and its psychological variant are 
fairly non-controversial, the epistemological implications of these theses have not been 
given due consideration. For these reasons, my aim here is to argue that if 
representational pluralism and psychological representational pluralism are correct, then 
epistemological monism is implausible, and so epistemological pluralism should be the 
guiding assumption in epistemology.  
 Unfortunately, due to the general assumption of epistemological monism, there 
has been little to no work that seeks to develop a compelling case for the thesis. So in 
order to establish that the representational pluralist theses render epistemological monism 
implausible, I will present what I take to be the strongest argument for endorsing 
monism, and show that this argument has the consequence of turning knowledge, 
  83 
justification, and evidence into hollow concepts. I label this argument the doxastification 
strategy. 
 The plan of this section is as follows. In the next subsection, I argue that 
representational pluralism and psychological representational pluralism, along with a bit 
of semantic evidence, provide a prima facie case for epistemological pluralism. In doing 
so, my goal is to place the burden of proof squarely on epistemological monism. This will 
set up the doxastification strategy as a response to this prima facie evidence for 
epistemological pluralism. After explaining and presenting doxastification, I proceed to 
show why the argument fails as a case for epistemological monism. I then go on to 
discuss a few implications of epistemological pluralism, and motivate the need for it to 
become the guiding assumption in epistemology.  
 
3.2.2 A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
 On the assumption that knowledge is, in part, a cognitive activity or state, 
understanding cognition is a prerequisite for understanding the nature of knowledge. 
Psychological representational pluralism entails that many of our mental representations 
are non-propositional. For instance, the thesis allows that we have mental representations 
that are imagistic, scale models, auditory, motor sensory, maps, and so on. The thesis, of 
course, also allows that we have propositional mental representations. 
 Because I am assuming here that knowledge is a cognitive activity, and that 
understanding the nature of mental representations is a prerequisite for understanding the 
nature of knowledge, there is no obvious reason at the outset of our investigation why we 
should privilege one representational format as being the one and only format that can 
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instantiate knowledge. So if epistemology begins with what should be its appropriate 
prerequisite - understanding the nature of cognition and mental representation - and we 
hold that mental representation is pluralistic, epistemological pluralism is a more 
reasonable starting assumption than epistemological monism.  
 Now the fact that epistemology has focused almost exclusively on propositional 
knowledge due to concerns with the analysis problem should not be understood as an 
assumption of epistemological monism over pluralism. But this focus does show us at 
least two things relevant to the issue at hand. First, due to the nature of epistemology’s 
history, epistemologists have focused primarily on knowledge that is represented in only 
one of the many representational formats that we have at our disposal. Second, the focus 
shows that epistemology has not attended to what I have identified as one of its 
prerequisites, that is, understanding the nature of cognition and mental representation. 
Perhaps at the beginning of epistemology’s history, our best psychological theories held 
that cognition is exclusively propositional, and perhaps philosophers were aware of this 
at the time. But this historical fact, if it is one, does not establish that epistemology has 
succeeded in fulfilling this prerequisite. For fulfilling this prerequisite is something that 
most be done time and again whenever we have advances in our understanding of how 
the mind works and how it represents information. So even if epistemology at one time 
attended to this prerequisite, the current state of the field indicates that a recertification of 
sorts is in order.32  
 To recap, the psychological prima facie case for epistemological pluralism is as 
follows. On the assumption that knowledge is, in part, a cognitive state or activity, 
                                                
32 To their credit, many of the British Empiricists thought that mental representation was, at least in part, 
imagistic. Locke, for example, thought that our ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities that they 
represent.  
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understanding cognition and mental representation should come before understanding or 
investigating knowledge specifically. On our current understanding of psychology, 
mental representation takes a variety of formats, many of which are non-propositional. 
There is no reason, at this point in the investigation, to assume that only one of these 
representational formats is the seat of knowledge. So, our starting assumption, after 
completing this preliminary psychological work, should be epistemological pluralism.  
 Since we are assuming that knowledge is a cognitive state or activity, 
psychological data should take precedence over semantic data when we are trying to 
understand the nature of knowledge. However, some epistemologists may think that, due 
to our semantic competence, looking at how the term “knowledge” and its cognates are 
employed by competent speakers provides us with important epistemological data. That 
is, rather than understanding the nature of cognition and mental representation before 
attempting to directly understand knowledge, we need to determine what the objects of 
knowledge must be in order to understand the semantics of sentences that ascribe 
knowledge to epistemic agents.  
 But even if semantics, rather than cognitive science, were the appropriate 
prerequisite for epistemology, the starting assumption should still be epistemological 
pluralism rather than monism.  
 Consider some locutions that provide some prima facie semantic evidence for 
epistemological pluralism: 
 (1) Jones knows that a shot to the head killed JFK.  
 (2) Jones knows how the New York City subway system is laid out. 
 (3) Jones knows what the Mona Lisa looks like. 
 (4) Jones knows what “God Only Knows” sounds like.  
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Only in (1) does the object of knowledge appear to be a proposition. In (2) the object of 
knowledge is the layout of a subway system, in (3) it is the appearance of a painting, and 
in (4) it is the sound of a song.  
 The semantic prima facie evidence for epistemological pluralism consists in the 
fact that we frequently attribute knowledge to epistemic agents where the objects of 
knowledge are not propositions, but other things, such as layouts of subways systems, 
something naturally represented by a map, or tunes to songs, something naturally 
represented in auditory memory or in a score. Neither of these can be represented with a 
comparable degree of accuracy or detail by sentences. If the motivation behind an appeal 
to this methodology is our semantic competence, then there is no reason to think that only 
sentences such as (1) reflect our competence, and that sentences such as (2) – (4), and 
other knowledge attributions that do not ascribe knowledge of propositions, fail to reflect 
our competence, but are some sort of performance error. In other words, the semantic 
evidence, just like the psychological evidence, indicates that epistemological pluralism, 
rather than monism, should be our starting assumption in epistemology.  
 For reasons discussed in chapter 2, psychology should take precedence over 
semantics when we are concerned with the referent of a psychological term, such as 
“knowledge,” or the concept to which it refers. However, in this case, the psychology and 
semantics appear to be in agreement, and thereby provide complementary evidence for 
epistemological pluralism.  
 The semantic evidence provides us with some indication as to what sorts of things 
qualify as objects of knowledge. Meanwhile, the psychological evidence provides us with 
some insight regarding how these objects of knowledge are mentally represented. When 
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we ascribe propositional knowledge to an agent, psychology tells us we have the means 
to represent this knowledge propositionally. When we ascribe non-propositional 
knowledge to an agent, psychology tells us that we have other, non-propositional, 
representational formats by which to represent this information. We can represent 
knowledge of the New York subway system with mental maps and we can represent 
knowledge of the tune of a song with auditory representations.  
 
3.2.3 THE DOXASTIFICATION STRATEGY 
 Since monism appears to be the guiding assumption in epistemology, it may seem 
that the dialectical burden lies with those who advocate epistemological pluralism. In the 
previous section I aimed to shift this burden by arguing that understanding cognition and 
mental representation, as well as the use of “knows” and its cognates, should be 
prerequisites for doing epistemology and that these both suggest that our starting 
assumption should be epistemological pluralism rather than monism. If I have succeeded 
in shifting this burden, monism stands in need of a defense.  
 The doxastification strategy is a way in which a proponent of epistemological 
monism can mount such a defense. This strategy consists in offering a propositionalized, 
or doxastifized, account of prima facie cases of non-propositional knowledge. While 
there has been no general discussion of the doxastification strategy, it has been applied in 
both epistemology and philosophy of mind. In order to illustrate and explain the strategy, 
I will discuss two such examples. 
 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have used a version of the strategy to 
argue for intellectualism, that is, the thesis that knowing how to do something amounts to 
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propositional knowledge (Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; Stanley 2011b). 
To support their position, they argue that knowledge-wh (i.e. knowing where, knowing 
why, knowing when, and knowing how) attributions are propositional knowledge 
attributions. Because I have offered a full discussion of Stanley and Williamson’s 
treatment of knows-wh locutions in chapter 2, here I review only their discussion of 
know-how ascriptions.  
 Know how attributions are generally expressed by sentences of the form, “S 
knows how to X.” In sentences of this form, the object of S’s knowledge appears to be, 
not a proposition, but a procedure for, or way of, X-ing. So these sorts of sentences 
appear to provide prima facie semantic evidence for epistemological pluralism, just as (1) 
– (4) do. Since the semantic evidence suggests that the object of knowledge is a 
procedure, we can turn to psychology to see how things of this sort are mentally 
represented. Here, the nature of the mental representation will likely depend on the 
specifics of the procedure. Certain procedures may be such that they can be represented 
propositionally (e.g. procedures for doing long division33), whereas others may not (e.g. 
procedures for playing tennis).  
 Stanley and Williamson apply the doxastification strategy to this prima facie 
instance of non-propositional knowledge by arguing that when we attribute knowledge of 
an embedded question (e.g. “how to X”) to an agent, the object of knowledge is a 
proposition that answers the embedded question (e.g. a way of X-ing). On their view, 
sentences of the form, “S knows how to X” ascribe to S knowledge that some way w is a 
                                                
33 Though even here it may depend on the specifics of the procedure. Learning long division typically 
involves learning things such as how to properly align the digits. Children with exotropia, a form of 
strabismus in which the eyes are deviated outward, often have difficulty properly aligning digits, and 
thereby make errors. This suggests that visual percepts play an important role in doing long division in this 
manner. 
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way for her to X.34 In short, Stanley and Williamson are providing an account of a know-
how attribution under which it is a propositional knowledge attribution. They are 
doxastifying knowledge how.  
 Another application of the doxastification strategy is found in Cummins et al’s 
(2013, 6) discussion of content-demonstrating speech acts, of which the following is an 
example: 
 
(5) Beethoven looked like this:   
 
A content-demonstrating speech act has two basic components: a linguistic component 
that contains a demonstrative (e.g. “Beethoven looked like this.”) and a representation 
that is introduced by the demonstrative (e.g. the black and white picture of Beethoven). 
The linguistic component can function to introduce different sorts of representations, 
such as images, maps, and graphs, as well as further linguistic representations. In other 
words, the linguistic component containing the demonstrative specifies a target for the 
representation being introduced, and the result is true if and only if the representation 
accurately portrays the specified target.  
 Note that (1) – (4) from above can be rephrased as knowledge attributions of the 
contents of content-demonstrating speech acts, as follows:  
                                                
34 As I have discussed elsewhere, in order for S to know how to X on Stanley and Williamson’s view, she 
must also entertain her knowledge that w is a way for her to X under a practical mode of presentation. As 
far as I can tell practical modes of presentation are not relevant to the doxastificaiton strategy, so here I 
focus only on the propositional knowledge component of Stanley and Williamson’s position. For a more 
detailed discussion see chapter 2.  
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(1*) Jones knows that JFK was killed like this: he was shot in the head. 
(2*) Jones knows that the New York City subway system is laid out like this: [map of 
NYC subway system] 
(3*) Jones knows that the Mona Lisa looks like this: [picture of the mona lisa] 
(4*) Jones knows that “God Only Knows” sounds like this: [audio of song] 
Cases in which one knows a content-demonstrating speech act in which the introduced 
representation is non-propositional, such as (2*) – (4*) and (5) provide further evidence 
for epistemological pluralism.  In these cases, the object of knowledge is, in part, a non-
propositional item introduced by a demonstrative. Following psychological 
representational pluralism, these non-propositional items are mentally represented in non-
propositional formats. So, if the object of one’s knowledge is that which is expressed by a 
content-demonstrating speech act that contains a non-propositional element, and 
knowledge is a certain cognitive state, i.e. a certain type of mental representation, then 
the non-propositional component of what one knows in these cases is constituted by a 
non-propositional mental representation. In short, these appear to be cases of non-
propositional knowledge.  
 However, a proponent of epistemological monism may apply the doxastification 
strategy by arguing that when we attribute to someone knowledge of a content-
demonstrating speech act, the object of knowledge is the truth-condition of that speech 
act, which is a proposition. So even in cases where the content-demonstrating speech act 
contains a non-propositional element, what is known is a just a proposition, namely, the 
truth condition. 
 Let’s consider some examples. As Cummins et al (2013) note, (5)’s truth 
condition can be expressed as follows:  
 (5a) The picture introduced is an accurate representation of what Beethoven 
 looked like.  
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The truth conditions for (1) – (4) can be expressed as follows: 
 (1a) The sentence introduced is an accurate representation of how JFK was killed. 
 (2a) The map introduced is an accurate representation of New York City’s 
 subway system. 
 (3a) The picture introduced is an accurate representation of the Mona Lisa. 
 (4a) The sequence of sounds introduced is an accurate representation of “God 
 Only Knows.” 
 
So doxastifying knowledge that (5) will amount to arguing that when we say that 
someone knows (5), the knowledge being ascribed is knowledge that (5a) is the case. In 
other words, knowing (5) is, despite impressions to the contrary, propositional 
knowledge. In the same way, (2*) – (4*) can be doxastified by arguing that they are 
knowledge attributions of the propositions expressed in (1a) – (4a), that is, attributions of 
propositional knowledge.  
 
3.2.4 AGAINST DOXASTIFICATION  
 In the previous section we looked at two applications of the doxastification 
strategy. In this section, I argue that the doxastification makes for bad epistemology by 
divorcing the notions of justification, evidence, and knowledge from the content that does 
genuine evidential and epistemic work. 
 To illustrate the problem with doxastification, let’s begin by focusing on (5) and 
(5a). Recall that knowing (5) seems, prima facie, to be a case of non-propositional 
knowledge because the apparent object of knowledge is not a proposition, but rather the 
content of an image. But according to doxastification, when one knows (5), one’s 
knowledge consists not in an image, but in the proposition that is the truth condition for 
(5), namely, (5a).  
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 As Cummins et al (2013) note, one can know the truth condition of (5), (5a), 
without having a clue what Beethoven looks like. A blindfolded person can point to the 
image and confidently assert, “Beethoven looked like this,” just as long as they have been 
told that the picture at which they are pointing is an accurate picture of Beethoven. In 
other words, one can know the truth condition for (5) without having any information at 
all about Beethoven’s appearance, beyond the fact that it is accurately represented in the 
indicated picture. To have information about Beethoven’s appearance, one needs to have 
access to the content of the picture (or the content of some other picture of him that is 
sufficiently accurate). As Cummins et al put it, “Since the content of the picture 
introduced is not part of the specification of the truth condition, knowledge of the truth 
condition does not provide the relevant access,” (2013, 7).  
 It is important to note that things are different when the representation introduced 
by a content-demonstrating speech act is a linguistic representation, as in (1). This case is 
the same in that one can know the truth condition for (1), (1a), without having a clue how 
JFK was killed because (1a) does not provide access to the content of the representation 
in (1) (“he was shot in the head”). But this case is different from the Beethoven example 
because here we can replace (1a) with a linguistic representation that does provide access 
to the relevant information, such as (Cummins et al 2013, 7): 
 (1a*) A shot to the head killed JFK.  
Since (1a) obtains just in case (1a*) obtains, it might seem that the lack of access to the 
relevant information provided in (1a) is not epistemologically significant.  
 In this case, the availability of (1a*) does indeed make the lack of information in 
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case is a linguistic representation. That is, there is a clear way to incorporate the relevant 
information into the specification of a linguistically expressed truth condition. But since 
the content of the representation in the Beethoven case is not linguistic, it cannot be part 
of a truth condition. There is no linguistic representation that contains the information 
contained in the picture, and so there is no linguistically expressible truth condition that 
can contain this information. This is a straightforward consequence of and hence 
evidence for, representational pluralism (Cummins et al 2013). 
 One might be tempted to argue that the Beethoven example, and other similar 
cases, actually lends support to epistemological monism. The idea is that because one can 
know the truth conditions of the content-demonstrating speech acts contained in (2) – (5) 
without having access to the non-propositional representations that are demonstratively 
introduced, this shows that knowledge does not require any non-propositional 
components, even in cases where the apparent object of knowledge is not a proposition. 
These sorts of cases further show, according to this line of argument, that even when one 
does have access to the non-propositional representations, this access is in no way 
epistemologically essential because one can know the relevant propositions (i.e. the truth 
condition of the content-demonstrating speech acts) without having this access.  
 However, this illustrates just why taking these cases to be supportive of 
epistemological monism is mistaken. While one can know the truth condition of a content 
demonstrating speech act without having access to the representation introduced by that 
act, knowing this truth condition requires that someone has access to the relevant 
representation. In cases where one knows the truth conditions of content-demonstrating 
speech acts that have a non-propositional representation, without having access to the 
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representation, one’s evidence or justification for this knowledge comes by way of a 
linguistic report. In the Beethoven case, one has to be informed by a reliable source that 
the picture introduced accurately represents what Beethoven looked like. Of course, it is 
not necessary that one’s informant have access to the information contained in the 
picture. Perhaps the informant is in the same position as the informed. But in order for an 
evidential testimonial chain to be generated in the first place, at some level there must be 
a source of evidence that does have access to the information contained in the picture. 
After all, the reason that the picture is an accurate representation of Beethoven is due to 
the content of the picture.  So where one knows that the picture is an accurate 
representation of Beethoven without having access to the content of the picture, one’s 
justification is parasitic on a source that does have this access.35 In this sense, having 
access to non-propositional representations introduced in content-demonstrating speech 
acts is epistemologically essential.  
 Of course, we often come to know propositions through visual perception, so it is 
important to see why the Beethoven case, and others like it, is different from ordinary 
cases of propositional knowledge by visual perception. We often know or believe things 
on the basis of what we see and this knowledge or belief is often of the sort that seems to 
be non-controversially propositional. I know that my shirt is brown because I see that it is 
brown. I know that my cat is looking out the window because I see her looking out the 
                                                
35 This same issue arises in Stanley and Williamson’s discussion of know-how. While they hold that 
knowing how to X entails knowing that some way is a way for one to X, they acknowledge that one can 
know that some way is a way for one to X without knowing how to X. Although the case they discuss is 
one in which the agent does have access to the item being introduced demonstratively, the case can be 
altered such that this access is no longer available which makes the case similar in all the relevant respects 
to the Beethoven example. See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of these issues.  
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window. My shirt is brown and my cat is looking out the window are clearly propositions, 
even if I come to know them through visual perception.  
 Part of the issue here is that language can be deceiving. ‘See’, ‘hear’ and ‘feel’ 
can take propositional complements (e.g. I see that my cat is looking out the window). 
But this linguistic usage does not establish that percepts are expressions of propositions, 
or that they can be or are mentally represented in the way that propositions are. We can 
certainly infer propositions on the basis of visual, or other types of, perception. But the 
content of a proposition inferred in this way is not the same as the content of the visual, 
or other, percept that was the basis of the inference. Percepts are like other non-
propositional representations, such as pictures, maps, recordings, and scale models, in 
that they can be more or less accurate representations of their targets, but are not 
evaluable using truth-conditional semantics (Cummins et al 2013). 
 In the Beethoven case, (5) is true because the picture introduced is an accurate 
representation of what Beethoven looked like. But the reason that this truth condition 
obtains has to do with the content of the picture, and its structural relationship to 
Beethoven’s appearance. As (5a) shows, we can report this accuracy propositionally, but 
this linguistic report is not doing any of the evidential work, nor is it representing the 
content of the picture and its structural relationship to Beethoven’s appearance. In order 
to assess whether a picture, or another non-propositional representation, is accurate, we 
need access to a genuine evidential relationship between the representation and its target. 
This is a prerequisite for accurately reporting linguistically that, for example, the picture 
introduced is an accurate representation of what Beethoven looked like.   
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 What the Beethoven case and others like it shows is that we can come to know 
that a non-propositional representation is accurate with respect to its target without 
having access to the content of the representation. This generally, if not always, occurs 
through receiving a linguistically expressed report that the representation is indeed 
accurate. While this may amount to justification or evidence of a sort, it is a rather weak 
form of justification that is parasitic on a source that has the information that does the 
genuine evidential work, namely, the content of the representation under consideration 
and its structural relationship its target.36 
 Moreover, the fact that one can know that a representation accurately represents 
its target without having access to the content of the representation (or to the target, i.e., 
the thing being represented) supports epistemological pluralism. To continue with the 
example, the fact that one can know that the image in (5) is an accurate representation of 
Beethoven without having clue what Beethoven looked like shows that knowing what 
Beethoven looked like is knowledge that is not propositional.  
 This type of support for epistemological pluralism does not come only from cases 
where one knows the contents of a content-demonstrating speech act that contains a non-
propositional representation. Recall the examples I mentioned above of propositional 
knowledge by way of visual perception. I know that my cat is sitting on the window 
because I see her sitting there. I know that my shirt is brown because I see that it is 
brown. In these cases, my evidence for these propositions consists in my visual percepts, 
as well as perhaps some background knowledge or beliefs. But of course, in these cases 
                                                
36 Often times the evidence that links a representation to its target is quite complex. For instance, when we 
look at a picture of Beethoven, we are not in a position to assess the structural relationship between the 
picture and Beethoven’s actual appearance because we do not have access to the latter. Rather, we typically 
just assume that the representation does indeed accurately depict, or otherwise represent, its target.  
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one can know these propositions without the aid of visual percepts or pictorial 
representations. All I need to do is to linguistically report them to you, who are in the 
next room. And of course this knowledge can continue to spread by others making further 
linguistic reports. But these cases are like the Beethoven case in that ultimately the 
justification for this propositional knowledge consists in genuine evidential relationships 
between percepts and their representational targets. When I say that, “I see that my cat is 
looking out the window,” what is really going on is that I infer this proposition on the 
basis of visual perception, just as I infer the proposition that my shirt is brown on the 
basis of visually perceiving its color. There is information represented by my visual 
percepts that is not a part of the content of the propositions I infer on the basis of these 
percepts.  
 Doxastification is equally problematic when Stanley and Williamson apply it to 
argue that knowing how is a form of propositional knowledge. Recall that on their view, 
knowing how to X is propositional knowledge because it amounts to knowing that some 
way is a way for one to X and entertaining this proposition under practical mode of 
presentation. But, as discussed above, one can know that some way is a way for one to X 
without knowing how to X, or without having any idea of what the way of X-ing amounts 
to. One only needs to be told that some way is a way for one to X. This is illustrated 
through a modified version of one of their examples which was discussed in chapter 2: 
 Suppose that Hannah does not know how to ride a bicycle. Susan, Hannah’s 
 friend, points to John, who is riding a bicycle, and says, 'That is a way for Hannah 
 to ride a bicycle'. Suppose that the way in which John is riding his bicycle is in 
 fact a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle. Susan, who is known to be a reliable 
 source of information, calls Hannah, telling her, “I saw John riding his bicycle 
 earlier, and you know what? The way in which he rode is a way for you to ride 
 your bicycle.”  
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Where ‘that way’ and ‘the way in which he rode’ refer to John’s way of riding a bicycle, 
Hannah comes to know that that way is a way for her to ride a bicycle, but does not come 
to know how to ride a bicycle.  
 Now Stanley and Williamson hold that the issue here is that Hannah has not 
entertained this proposition under a practical mode of presentation, which is, on their 
view, necessary for knowing how. Yet they do not hold that introducing the notion of 
practical modes of presentation is incompatible with know how being propositional 
knowledge. I have argued in chapter 2 that in order for practical modes of presentation to 
do the work Stanley and Williamson need them to do, positing them must amount to 
positing non-propositional knowledge. I will not repeat these arguments here. 
 What is relevant to the present discussion is that what makes it true that some way 
is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle is that there is a certain fit between a way of riding a 
bicycle, and a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle. Here things are more complicated than 
in the Beethoven example because it is unclear what sorts of relationships constitute the 
appropriate sort of fit between a way of X-ing, and a way for some person, S, to X. But 
what is clear is that a way for some person, S, to X is a way of X-ing. So in order to have 
knowledge of a way of X-ing, one will need a representation, mental or otherwise, that 
accurately represents a way of X-ing. In the case of bicycle riding, it is highly 
implausible that a linguistic representation can capture the content of a way of bicycle 
riding. There is a good deal of information that is plausibly relevant to bicycle riding that 
is non-propositional in nature, such as visual information, motor-sensory information, 
kinesthetic information, and perhaps more. At the very least riding a bicycle requires a 
motor program that is integrated with perceptual inputs. It is simply a consequence of 
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representational pluralism that this sort of information cannot be represented in a 
linguistic format. Moreover, it is plausible that propositional knowledge is not only 
insufficient for bicycle riding, but unnecessary as well. Some dogs can ride bicycles. If 
dogs do not have propositional mental representations, then they certainly don’t know 
that some way is a way for them to ride bicycles. But it seems clear that some know how 
to ride, while others do not, and those that do know how have learned to do so. 
There may be some things that we know how to do, where ways of doing those things can 
be represented propositionally. But bicycle riding appears to be at least one case in which 
know-how is non-propositional. Attempting to doxastify know-how decouples the 
information that is central to knowing-how to do something from purported instances of 
knowing-how.  
 To conclude this section, the doxastification strategy is a way in which a 
proponent of epistemological monism argues that apparent instances of non-propositional 
knowledge are actually cases of propositional knowledge. When one knows what 
something looks like, doxastifiers claim that what one knows is that a representation 
accurately represents the appearance of the object under consideration. When one knows 
how to do something, doxastifiers claim that what one knows is that some way is a way 
for one to do that activity. But the reason that these propositions are true, when they are 
true, is that a genuine structural and evidential relationship exists between the 
representation and its target, whether that target is an appearance, a subway system 
layout, a song, or a way of doing something.  
 Doxastification turns knowledge, justification, and evidence into weak concepts 
that are divorced from the content that does the genuine evidential work. If we didn’t 
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have this information or content, then many of our claims to propositional, not to mention 
non-propositional, knowledge could never get off the ground. We know what Beethoven 
looks like, and this is because we have access to representations that accurately represent 
his appearance. We also know that these representations accurately represent his 
appearance because we, or someone else, have access to the structural relationship that 
obtains between these representations and their target. We can refer to these relations and 
representations linguistically, but evidence is at bottom a representational affair, and 
reference is not representation.  
 
3.2.5 IMPLICATIONS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
 In the previous section I argued that doxastification makes for bad epistemology 
because it divorces the notions of knowledge, justification, and evidence from the content 
that does the genuine evidential and justificatory work, as well as the content that is 
central to our knowing various things. Since doxastification, as I have laid it out, is a 
response to prima facie evidence for epistemological pluralism, and since doxastification 
makes for bad epistemology, we should explore the implications of epistemological 
pluralism.   
 Perhaps the most obvious implication of epistemological pluralism is that 
knowledge is not always something that has the property of truth.37 Many representational 
formats are not assessable by truth-conditional semantics, and must instead be assessed 
for accuracy across various, often times competing, dimensions. However, it is important 
                                                
37 Even in cases in which a belief is comprised of non-linguistic representations, it is only the belief that is 
true or false. The images, for example, that comprise the belief do not have truth-values.  
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that we understand that we cannot simply substitute talk of accuracy for talk of truth, 
where it may appear appropriate to do so.  
 Under the traditional epistemological framework, knowledge is binary – you have 
it or you don’t. Often times, this question will be settled by whether the proposition under 
consideration is true or false. But under epistemological pluralism, we have to make 
room for knowledge that is represented non-propositionally. These representations must 
be assessed for accuracy rather than truth. But unlike truth, accuracy is graded rather than 
binary. Whereas propositions are true or false, images, maps, scale models, and so on, 
can represent their targets to various degrees of accuracy. This becomes even more 
complicated because in order to represent a target accurately across one dimension, a 
representation will often have to sacrifice representing its target accurately in another 
dimension. The Mercator projection, for example, being a conformal projection preserves 
angles across all locations at the cost of distorting the size of geographical objects and the 
Earth’s overall geometry. A consequence of this sort is a necessary consequence of 
representing a globe in two dimensions.  
 So far it may appear that the broader concept of knowledge that we need under 
epistemological pluralism will be something like evidential accurate representation (as 
opposed to justified true belief). However, since accuracy is graded, rather than binary, 
we might think that a certain degree of accuracy is required in order for an evidential 
representation to qualify as knowledge. In other words, we might think the broad concept 
of knowledge that we need under epistemological pluralism is evidentially sufficiently 
accurate representation.  
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 Unfortunately, there are at least a couple of problems with this approach. First, it 
is not at all clear how we would go about determining the threshold for sufficient 
accuracy. Moreover, since increased accuracy along one dimension often comes at a cost 
of decreased accuracy along another, if knowledge were simply evidential sufficiently 
accurate representation, this would appear to require our arriving at a notion of overall 
accuracy that accounts for accuracy trade-offs across competing dimensions. I am not 
certain whether such a project is hopeless, but the prospects seem grim.  
 One way to address this issue, albeit to a limited extent, is by introducing the 
notion of effectiveness. While this notion will not allow us to arrive at a notion of overall 
accuracy, it may serve the function of helping us to determine which dimension of 
accuracy is most relevant to the problem under consideration. While the Mercator 
projection distorts the sizes of geographical objects, it is effective for marine navigation 
because it represents rhumb lines, that is, lines that make constant angles with the 
meridians, as straight segments. Of course, since rhumb lines and meridians are not actual 
features of the Earth, the Mercator projection might be understood as generally less 
accurate than other representations of the Earth, such as globes. However, it is more 
effective when the goal at hand is marine navigation.  On the other hand, when we are 
concerned with the relative sizes of geographical objects, a globe is more effective than 
the Mercator projection.  
 Due to the fact that accuracy, unlike truth, is graded, one implication of 
epistemological pluralism appears to be that we will have cases in which one agent 
knows something better than another. If A and B both have mental images of Beethoven, 
but A’s image is more accurate than B’s, it seems we can conclude that A knows better 
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than B what Beethoven looked like. But due to the complications that come along with 
the introduction of accuracy and effectiveness, it may be impossible to supply any 
general criterion by which we can assess when one agent knows something better than 
another. This is not to say that epistemic assessment becomes impossible; rather it 
becomes multifaceted, task-specific, and goal-relative. Instead of simply judging that A 
knows something better than B, we may have to describe how each agent works, how 
relatively accurate their representations are across the relevant dimensions, and their 
merits and drawbacks with respect to a variety of goals.  
 Let’s return to the predator detection example from chapter 3. Suppose that we 
have two agents, A and B, who go about identifying predators in different ways. While A 
and B both identify predators using visual cues, A quickly infers that an object is a 
predator based on only a few cues while B waits until significantly more cues are present 
before it will infer than an object is a predator. Relative to the goal of simply identifying 
predators, B will fair better than A. In other words B will identify more predators as 
predators than A will. But relative to the goal of predator avoidance and survival, A will 
fair better than B, particularly in cases where time is of the essence. When an object is 
indeed a predator, A will engage in avoidance behavior during a time at which B is still 
awaiting further cues.  
 In this case, it does not appear that we can say whether A or B’s knowledge is 
“better.” However, we can say that, with respect to the goal of predator avoidance, 
although B’s knowledge is more accurate, it is less effective than A’s. With respect to the 
goal of predator identification, when time and predator avoidance are not relevant, it may 
be that B’s knowledge is both more accurate and more effective.  
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 The graded nature of accuracy suggests that epistemic assessment, under 
epistemological pluralism, requires notions of knowledge that is “better” or “worse.” But 
as the predator detection and Mercator projection examples show, this is deeply complex. 
The notion of better (or worse) knowledge is going to have to be indexed to something or 
other. If it is claimed that one agent’s knowledge is better than another’s, we should ask, 
“Better for what?” Better for understanding the Earth’s actual geographical structure? 
Better for marine navigation? Better for identifying predators, or better for avoiding 
them?  
 Trading one representational resource for another will always come with costs 
and benefits. We have already seen this with the predator detection and Mercator 
projection cases. But there are plenty of other instances as well. Some representational 
resources will benefit an individual’s biological fitness without benefiting the individual. 
Some tradeoffs will benefit tractability at the cost of accuracy, such as NASA’s use of 
Newtonian mechanics, rather than relativity theory, to compute escape velocities. Still 
other tradeoffs will benefit communicability at the cost of accuracy, such as using 
language to describe something that is more accurately represented in another format, 
such as depiction.  
 Still, effectiveness relative to a specified goal or function cannot be the sole 
criterion for epistemic assessment under epistemological pluralism. We will, after all, still 
need a way to distinguish non-propositional knowledge from mere non-propositional 
mental representations. It seems plausible that there will be cases in which the most 
effective strategy would be to rely on mental representations that are so structurally 
dissimilar from their targets that it would be unreasonable to call them accurate in any 
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sense. Perhaps there are other criteria that will allow us to distinguish non-propositional 
knowledge from mere non-propositional mental representations, At present, it is not clear 
to me what these would be, and so perhaps some minimal threshold of accuracy will be 
required. What these minimal threshold amounts to may vary across various epistemic 
domains.  
 The point to all of this discussion is that epistemic assessment is no simple matter 
under epistemological pluralism. Under pluralism, knowledge is not only pluralistic, but 
stratified (see Cummins et al. 2004). Epistemology must become more fragmented and 
specialized in the way that science has. It would be unreasonable to hold that science has 
taken a step backwards by becoming fragmented or stratified. This fragmentation is 
simply a product of scientific advancement. Fragmentation can advance epistemology in 
a similar manner.  
 It is beyond the aim of this chapter to give a full account of what epistemic 
assessment looks like under epistemological pluralism. But it should be clear that 
traditional approaches to this issue are not applicable.  
 
3.2.6 CONCLUSION 
 In this section I have argued that, from a pre-theoretic, i.e. a pre-epistemological, 
standpoint, both cognitive science and semantics provide prima facie support for 
epistemological pluralism. I then suggested that the doxastification strategy is among the 
strongest or most natural ways to respond to this prima facie support for pluralism. 
However, due to representational pluralism, doxastifying prima facie cases of non-
propositional knowledge divorces the genuine evidential or justificatory content from 
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traditional philosophical accounts of knowledge and justification, i.e., epistemological 
monist accounts. In other words, in light of representational pluralism, doxastification 
and epistemological monism reduce knowledge and justification to hollow notions that 
are parasitic on the, often non-propositional, representations and contents do the real 
work. For these reasons, doxastification makes for bad epistemology. In the final section 
I began to sketch some of the implications of epistemological pluralism. While this 
project is far from complete, the troubling consequences of epistemological monism and 
doxastification illustrate the need for epistemologists to give the implications of 
epistemological pluralism serious attention.   
 
3.3 OPTIONS FOR RECONCILING EPISTEMOLOGY WITH COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
 In the previous section, I considered one way in which a proponent of traditional 
epistemology might try to argue that there is no need for a reconciliation between 
cognitive science and epistemology.  
 In section II I laid out two ways in which we might reconcile the current state of 
mainstream epistemology with cognitive diversity. These are:  
 (a) Divorce epistemology, understood as the theory of knowledge, from the study 
 of norms of rationality and the assessment of cognitive systems, broadly 
 construed. 
 (b) Revise epistemology to accommodate cognitive diversity and the lessons from 
 cognitive science. 
My own preference is to pursue the latter option. However, the first should not be simply 
dismissed. In this section, I provide reasons for pursuing (b) over (a). 
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3.3.1 DIVORCING EPISTEMOLOGY FROM THE STUDY OF RATIONALITY  
 Cummins et al. (2004) note that, under the tradition we have inherited in 
philosophy, “epistemology proper” is treated as being distinct from the broader study of 
rationality. Epistemology proper focuses on propositional knowledge and the evidential 
justification of belief, whereas the broader study of rationality focuses on questions of 
practical reason and rational action, in addition to rational belief.  
 On Cummins et al’s view, epistemology overlaps with, but does not encompass, 
the broad study of rationality. Cognitive science should force us to account for the fact 
that a great deal of cognitive activity is not inference among propositional attitudes. We 
must be sensitive to representations that are more or less accurate across various 
dimensions, and the processing of representations of this sort cannot be captured in terms 
of propositional representations and logical inference. Epistemology’s propositional 
framework places a limit on the sorts of cognitive activity that it is in a position to 
evaluate. For this reason, Cummins et al argue that we need to account for cognitive 
diversity by way of diversity among “rules of right reason,” and that mainstream 
epistemology is ill suited for this task (2004, 289). We need standards of rationality that 
go beyond the limits imposed by a propositional framework.  
 While Cummins et al use “epistemic” and its various cognates in discussing 
rational diversity, they take it that the subject matter of their project is rationality rather 
than knowledge, though they hold that this notion of rationality is to be understood 
broadly as epistemic constraint satisfaction. The idea is that epistemology does bear on 
questions of getting things right or wrong, doing better or worse, and this is what allows 
us to assess diverse cognitive systems in terms of rationality.  
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 While I have described the option that CPR seem to be pursuing as divorcing 
epistemology from the study of rationality, this label may not be fair, even if what is at 
issue is merely terminological. CPR do seem to take their subject matter to be 
epistemology of a sort, but a type of epistemology that is distinct from, or broader than, 
issues surrounding philosophical accounts of propositional knowledge. So if we think of 
epistemology as the theory of propositional knowledge, then Cummins et al are not 
engaged in epistemology. But if we think of epistemology more broadly, then it is 
possible that there is a good deal of epistemic subject matter that does not have anything 
to do with propositional knowledge, at least not directly. 
 So the issue of whether Cummins et al are in fact divorcing epistemology from 
the broader study of rationality may be a terminological one. But even if this is right, I 
worry that their approach concedes too much to traditional epistemology. If knowledge is 
anything more than an abstract or ideal philosophical notion, then it is something than 
can be, and surely is, possessed by actual cognitive systems. If epistemology is to have as 
its subject matter something that exists in the world, then its subject matter should be 
understood as a cognitive state, that is, a state realized by actual cognitive systems. CPR 
acknowledge this point, saying that the rationales that are realized as the disciplined 
processing of non-truth-evaluable representations “are not expressible in the idiom of 
logic or of the propositional attitudes, and that implies that traditional epistemology has 
little to tell us about the Rules of Right Reason as those are actually found in nature and 
culture,” (2004, 289).   
 Here, Cummins et al are surely correct, and this point might tempt one to think 
that a naturalistic study of rationality needs to be divorced from epistemology. But the 
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worry is that this move would leave no real world subject matter for epistemology. On 
the assumption that knowledge is manifested in actual cognitive systems, there are rules 
of right reason that apply to the sorts of reasoning that give rise to knowledge. But if 
mainstream epistemology has little, or perhaps nothing, to tell us about the rules of right 
reason as they are actually found in nature and culture38, this should motivate friends of 
naturalistic approaches to cognition, not to abandon epistemology, but to revise the field 
such that it is constrained by what science has told us about the nature of cognition.  
 
3.3.2 RECONCILING COGNITIVE DIVERSITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY  
 Cummins et al are engaged in a project that is broadly concerned with the study of 
rationality and goes beyond the boundaries of traditional epistemology. I propose, rather, 
that we begin thinking about how to broaden epistemology, such that is more closely 
aligned with broader studies of rationality and a scientific understanding of cognition. 
Following Cummins et al, I propose we think of rationality as epistemic constraint 
satisfaction. This provides a framework from which we can develop an epistemology that 
is sensitive to cognitive diversity.   
 Above, I discussed two ways in which epistemology’s normative standards of 
rationality are limited in scope: First, they only apply to cognitive systems that are 
exclusively propositional, and second, they apply only to cognitive systems that are 
capable of meeting them. In what follows, I examine the prospects for applying 
epistemology’s normative standards of rationality to a variety of types of cognitive 
                                                
38 The institution of science, understood as a part of culture, might be close to being the sort of cognitive 
system to which the norms of rationality of traditional epistemology apply. However, the widespread use of 
non-propositional representation in science renders this questionable. This issue will be discussed in greater 
detail below.  
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systems. This examination potentially provides a reason, distinct from the doxastification 
strategy, for preserving epistemology’s normative standards of rationality. However, if 
we find that there are no cognitive systems to which these standards apply, then this may 
provide a reason for abandoning these standards altogether.  
 I begin by looking at the prospects for applying epistemology’s normative 
standards of rationality to what may seem to be their most obvious target, namely, 
individuals, understood as adult human beings. From the get go, these prospects do not 
appear to be promising as cognitive science has shown us that human beings are not 
exclusively propositional cognitive systems. However, I set this concern aside in the 
course of discussing human beings potential candidates for epistemology’s standards of 
rationality, focusing solely on the question of whether these standards can apply to us 
without violating the ought-can principle. In a later section, I take up the prospects for 
applying epistemology’s normative standards of rationality to the institution of science, 
understood as a cognitive system. There I will assume that these standards can be so 
applied without violating the ought-can principle, and focus on the use of non-
propositional representations within science.  
 
3.4 EPISTEMOLOGY’S RATIONALITY APPIED TO INDIVIDUALS 
 In this section I argue that applying epistemology’s normative standards of 
rationality to individual adult humans violates the ought-can principle. These standards of 
rationality fail to demonstrate a sensitivity to resource constraints to which we are 
constantly subject, namely, those of time and memory. If this is correct, then we will 
need to find another candidate for these standards in order to preserve their import.  
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 It may seem that at bottom, epistemology’s normative standards of rationality 
simply require that we form beliefs in a way that is sensitive to evidence, which does not 
seem to violate the ought-can principle. Rather, it would seem that such an activity is 
commonplace, and thereby something that we have the resources to do. So in order to see 
why epistemology’s normative standards of rationality are problematic when applied to 
individuals in light of the ought-can principle, we need to investigate some of the details 
of these standards, and the manner in which they have come to be formulated.  
 As discussed in the first chapter, as well as above in this chapter, the account of 
truth-directed rationality that emerges from epistemology violates the ought-can principle 
by being formulated in hypothetical, abstract, and sometimes idealized conditions that 
abstract away from various real world constraints to which we are constantly subject. If 
we consider, for example, how an ideally rational agent might approach a given scenario, 
we will set aside concerns pertaining to the limits of human memory, temporal deadlines,  
the speed at which we can process information.39 
 Note that this amounts to two dimensions of abstraction. First, we can abstract 
away from our limitations, such as limits to working memory, or the limited speed at 
which we can process information. This leads to the tendency to formulate normative 
standards of rationality that require that we do things that go beyond our limitations, that 
is, standards that violate the ought-can principle. Second, we might abstract away from 
constraints that are built into the problems with which we are concerned. This may be a 
violation of ought-can as well, but more importantly, this type of abstraction changes the 
very problem under consideration.  
                                                
39 We also tend to set aside concerns regarding the kind of information – both its form and content – that we 
can effectively process. This practice will be discussed in detail in a later section.  
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 One might think that even though we are often restricted by memory or 
computational power, this is not a problem for the picture of rationality that is in play in 
epistemology. Rather, all this shows is that we engage in a good deal of activity that is 
not epistemic, and perhaps this activity is not subject to the sorts of norms I have been 
discussing. Epistemology’s job is to articulate norms of rationality that need to be 
followed to arrive at knowledge, and we certainly engage in many pursuits that do not 
have knowledge as an end. But there is no reason why epistemology should be held 
accountable for not engaging in projects that fall outside of its domain.  
 This response may come naturally to proponents of the way in which 
epistemology has been conducted over the last several decades. As discussed above, 
epistemic constraints, that is, constraints that must be met in order for a system to be 
rational, have to be formulated in terms of a particular goal or set of goals. The proponent 
of standard of epistemology will hold that the epistemic constraints that are being 
articulated in epistemology are appropriate for agents whose goals are forming justified 
beliefs and acquiring propositional knowledge. It is for this reason that there is a 
traditional distinction between mainstream epistemology and broader studies of 
rationality. Whereas epistemology can evaluate rationality in terms of the goal of belief 
formation, broader studies of rationality assess performance when different goals are 
being pursued. 
 However, this response runs afoul of the observation noted in the first chapter that 
theorizing is generally conducted in the service of action or practice. In articulating 
norms of truth-directed rationality in epistemology, the assumption is that the goal is the 
pursuit of truth, which is why we want beliefs that are justified. But more often than not, 
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we develop theories not purely for the pursuit of truth, but for effectiveness in regards to 
various non-truth-aimed ends. When theorizing is done for this reason, it should not be 
evaluated in terms of its truth-conduciveness, but rather, in terms of how effectively it 
serves the action with which we are concerned. In other words, theorizing of this sort 
should be evaluated by normative standards of practical, rather than truth-directed, 
rationality.  
 Again, the proponent of standard epistemology has a reply waiting in the wings. 
Sure, we often develop theories that are useful for accomplishing our ends and often 
these ends don’t have to do with arriving at truth. But again, these cases of theorizing fall 
outside of the domain of epistemology, and are more properly governed by a broader 
study of rationality, which covers practical, rather than truth-directed, reasoning. When 
theorizing is done in the service of action, this falls in the domain of practical reasoning. 
But when theorizing is done in order to get at truth, this falls in the domain of traditional 
epistemology.  
 Given the responses we have considered on behalf of the proponent of traditional 
epistemology, let’s take stock of what the scope appears to be of the normative standards 
of rationality that are in play in the field, and to which sorts of cognitive systems they 
could apply without violating the ought-can principle.  
 First, recall that epistemic constraint satisfaction provides norms for assessing 
cognitive systems for good or correct performance. Quality of performance is goal 
relative. So the first condition for the applicability of epistemology’s norms of rationality 
is that one’s goal must be the pursuit of truth, perhaps by way of justified beliefs. But 
generally, when we are interested in getting at the truth about some matter, we must be 
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sensitive to other goals that we have as well and the constraints that come along with 
these. Even when we are engaged in what might be understood as purely truth-aimed 
projects, these generally have deadlines.40 If these deadlines were not in place, it might be 
ideal to take more time engaging in research, or seeking out more evidence. But 
eventually we must settle with what we have, even when the evidence is incomplete.  
 One might respond by granting that the idealized, truth-directed standards of 
rationality embedded in epistemology do violate the ought-can principle, and thereby lose 
their normative force for creatures like us while maintaining that they are still useful 
because they provide us with an, admittedly ideal, goal to strive for. In other words, they 
lay out what epistemic constraints would be satisfied by an ideal agent, and being an ideal 
rational agent is something we should try to do, even if we can never complete the task. It 
is not, after all, uncommon for us to strive for goals that we can never meet. A dedicated 
hitter in baseball will strive for the goal of getting on base at every at bat, that is, the goal 
of being an ideal hitter. But of course no hitter can reach base at every trip to the plate, 
and so the standards that we use to evaluate actual hitters will be different than the 
standards that would be met by a hypothetical ideal hitter (This is why one qualifies as a 
excellent hitter by having an on base percentage of .400). Analogously, we should think 
of the standards of rationality in epistemology as providing goals to aim for, the idea 
being that we can become better epistemic agents by so aiming. And just as we use 
different criteria for assessing hitters than the standards that would be met by an ideal 
                                                
40 In these circumstances, the goal might be described as determining what one ought to believe given the 
evidence of which one is currently aware. This, of course, does not require seeking out new evidence or 
taking inventory of one’s memory or background knowledge and beliefs. It may appear that truth-directed 
rationality can serve as a useful guide in such cases. The problem is that standards of truth-directed 
rationality are formulated in, and thereby designed to apply in, contexts in which no practical qualifications 
are in place. That is, contexts in which the goal is to determine what one ought to believe, not determine 
what one ought to believe given the evidence of which one is currently aware, ignoring new evidence. 
When this qualification is eliminated, the very problem itself is changed. 
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hitter, we can use different criteria for evaluating epistemic agents than the standards that 
would be met an ideal agent. In other words, we can develop standards of rationality that 
do not violate the ought-can principle by starting with idealized standards, and then 
accounting for the practical constraints to which we are subject.  
 If we do remove the normative element from epistemology’s idealized standards 
of rationality, then of course they will no longer violate the ought-can principle. 
However, it is mistaken to think that we can arrive at normative standards of rationality 
that do not violate the principle by starting with those that do, and then imposing practical 
considerations. Effective cognitive strategies are generally designed to be effective within 
specific circumstances that have their own unique set of constraints. Since idealized 
standards of rationality are formulated on the basis of how an ideal rational agent would 
behave in a constraint-free environment, they are designed to apply to cognitive systems 
that operate in such an environment. An ideally rational cognitive system will not simply 
work non-ideally when placed into a constraint-laden environment. Rather, it will 
generally cease to work at all (Cummins et al. 2004). Since an ideally rational system will 
cease to work in a non-idealized environment, we cannot look at how it would behave in 
such an environment to arrive at non-idealized standards of rationality.  
 On a similar note, when we try to determine an ideally rational strategy for 
approaching a problem or goal by abstracting away from real world constraints, we don’t 
approximate how an ideally rational agent would approach the problem. Rather, we 
change the problem. So even if we could get some handle on how an ideally rational 
agent would approach some problem, this problem will not be one we will encounter in 
our constraint-laden circumstances.  
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 For example, consider the problem of predator detection. The point of a predator 
detection system is to allow an organism to avoid predators, and so the ability to detect 
predators quickly is an essential feature of such a system. To be effective, a natural 
predator detection system will tolerate a high degree of false positives. The cost of a false 
positive is far lower than the cost of taking more time in order to maximize accuracy. If 
we were to follow the standard ideal rational agent standard in epistemology, we might 
think that an ideal predator detection system is one that is maximally accurate. Following 
the suggestion entertained above, this would suggest that, though we are not ideally 
rational, we should aim for the goal of maximum accuracy when concerned with 
detecting predators. But taking this as the goal ignores the very goal that predator 
detection systems are designed to achieve, namely, predator avoidance. If a maximally 
accurate predator detection system is subject to real world time constraints, any organism 
that uses such a system will not survive to reproduce (Cummins et al. 2004, 296–297). 
The “ideal”, i.e. maximally accurate, predator detection system and the natural one are 
aimed at solving different problems. The former is solving the problem of accurately 
detecting predators while the latter is aimed at detecting predators within a limited time 
frame, that is, in time to escape. If we abstract away from temporal considerations, we 
change the very problem being solved. If we are interested in solving problem X, then we 
should model effective strategies for solving X, not effective strategies for solving a 
structurally distinct problem, Y. This is why the baseball analogy is a bad one: both the 
ideal hitter and actual hitters are aiming at the same problem, namely, safely reaching 
base.  
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 We have then, two reasons for thinking that individuals cannot be the appropriate 
subjects for epistemology’s normative standards of rationality. First, these standards of 
rationality govern pure theorizing, which we can never be wholly engaged in due to the 
constraints to which we are subject, even if these are simple deadlines. Second, these 
standards cannot be simply modified to account for practical concerns because any 
attempt to so modify them changes the nature of the problem under consideration from a 
problem that is realized in an ideal abstract environment, to a problem that is interwoven 
with all the other problems and goals with which we have to be concerned. In this next 
section, I consider the institution of science as a candidate for epistemology’s normative 
standards of rationality.  
 
3.5 EPISTEMOLOGY’S RATIONALITY APPLIED TO SCIENCE 
 In the previous section I argued that epistemology’s normative standards of 
rationality cannot be applied to individuals without violating the ought-can principle. 
These standards appear to require that rationality requires engaging in a sort of pure, 
truth-aimed theorizing that must be conducted independently of concerns that result from 
resource constraints and practical considerations to which we are constantly subject. 
Since we are incapable of theorizing in such a manner, these standards violate the ought-
can principle. 
 However, we often make efforts to circumvent these constraints in various ways, 
particularly in theoretical pursuits. One way in which we do this is by institutionalizing 
research programs. This allows us to bolster our capacities for computation and memory, 
as does the development of various instruments and media for the storage and processing 
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of information. Although institutions are still subject to some constraints, perhaps they 
come close enough to reaching the idealized conditions in which epistemology’s 
standards of rationality are developed, such that they can be held accountable to these 
standards without violations of the ought-can principle. 
 For present purposes, I will grant the assumption that through institutionalization, 
science comes close enough to reaching these idealized conditions. This eliminates 
concerns that the ought-can principle is violated for the institution of science. However, 
one might be concerned from the onset by my conceiving of the institution of science as a 
cognitive system.  
 This raises the question of how we should think of the concept of a cognitive 
system. While it would be beyond the scope of this project to give a full analysis of the 
concept, Cummins et al. (2004, 289–290) provide several features that provide a general 
characterization of such systems, some of which are listed below: 
• Cognitive systems are information driven, and some of this information is 
represented. 
• Cognitive systems are complex, with interactions among sub-systems and 
components also being information driven. 
• Cognitive systems are goal directed, and hence subject to normative assessment. 
In this sense, these systems can be rational or irrational. 
 
If one accepts that these features provide a general characterization of cognitive systems, 
then this opens up space for a notion of collective cognition, i.e., the idea that cognition is 
not limited to individual organisms. For instance, consider crowdsourcing, often called 
“artificial artificial intelligence” which has been defined as:  
A type of participative online activity in which an individual, an 
institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a group of 
individuals of varying knowledge, heterogeneity, and number, via a 
flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a task. The undertaking of 
the task, of variable complexity and modularity, and in which the crowd 
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should participate bringing their work, money, knowledge and/or 
experience, always entails mutual benefit. The user will receive the 
satisfaction of a given type of need, be it economic, social recognition, 
self-esteem, or the development of individual skills, while the 
crowdsourcer will obtain and utilize to their advantage that what the user 
has brought to the venture, whose form will depend on the type of activity 
undertaken (Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara 2012, 9–
10). 
 
While the institution of science is clearly not an instance of crowdsourcing, the two share 
several of the features of cognitive systems listed above, such as being information 
driven, goal directed, complex, and having sub-systems. So if one is willing to accept that 
crowdsourcing constitutes an instance of collective cognition and is a sort of cognitive 
system, one should be prepared to accept the same for the institution of science.  
 Since I have granted the assumption that applying epistemology’s normative 
standards of rationality to the institution of science does not violate the ought-can 
principle, in this section the focus will be on the other respect in which these standards of 
rationality are limited, namely, they are equipped to evaluate only cognitive systems that 
operate exclusively in terms of propositional representations and are aimed at believing, 
or otherwise acquiring, true propositions. However, science engages in widespread use of 
non-propositional representations, and for this reason, epistemology’s norms of 
rationality are incapable of assessing science for rationality. Moreover, science is not 
always aimed at truth, and is instead interested in developing accurate representations of 
its targets. It follows from the representational pluralism thesis, introduced in section IV, 
that these are different types of targets.  
 Since epistemology’s normative standards of rationality evaluate a system’s 
performance in regards to how well it gets at the truth, these standards will not be 
applicable to any system that aims at something else. Moreover, these standards take 
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reasoning and rationality to consist in inferential relations among propositions. So even in 
cases where the aim is truth, if non-propositional representations are involved in the 
reasoning process that leads to the truth, epistemology’s standards of rationality will be ill 
equipped to evaluate such reasoning.  
 Giere (1999) provides evidence that the traditional view of science in philosophy 
of science is not an accurate understanding of how science works. As we will see below, 
he argues that scientists use visual models in deciding among competing theories, which 
requires that we make room for non-propositional representations in our understanding of 
scientific practices, theories, and knowledge. As a case study, Giere draws on the use of 
visual representations in the debate in 20th century over stabilism and mobilism in 
geology. According to stabilism, the Earth’s major geological features were formed in 
roughly their current figuration, whereas under mobilism, the relative positions of these 
features have changed since their original formation. Mobilism was finally accepted 
because certain visual representations made it clear that certain geological data was 
highly improbable on a stabilist account. In other words, these visual representations 
played a central role in making a “crucial decision” between two competing scientific 
theories.  
 In other cases, scientists are interested in, not only using, but in constructing, 
representations that are visual, and thereby cannot be evaluated for truth, but instead for 
accuracy. An advocate of the normative standards of epistemology might think that in 
these cases, we can simply substitute talk of “accuracy” for talk of “truth” and otherwise 
preserve the standard epistemological construal of rationality. However, accuracy has 
certain characteristics that truth does not, eliminating the prospects for such a 
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substitution. Moreover, as discussed in section IV, the evidential role played by such 
representations rests on the structural relationship between the representations and their 
targets. This sort of relationship cannot be captured by the linguistic report by these 
representations are sufficiently accurate.  
 For a further example, consider Brown’s discussion of two visual representations 
of the methane molecule, a ball and stick model, and a space filling model (2003, 23, 
figure 2.4). While both representations are consistent with experimental data, they each 
accurately portray certain features of the methane molecule while failing to accurately 
capture other features. For instance, in the ball and stick model the use of rods, or 
“sticks”, allows the representation to accurately capture the bond distance between the 
carbon atoms and each hydrogen atom. The space filling model provides information 
about the relative sizes of the atoms, but at the expense of representing information about 
the bonds between these atoms (Brown 2003, 24). When we are concerned with non-
propositional representations that must be assessed for accuracy rather than truth, we 
have to keep in mind that accuracy along one dimension often comes at the expense of 
inaccuracy along others.  
 The general lessons to be drawn from the discussion of Giere and Brown is that, 
even if we assume science has sufficient resources to overcome the constraints to which 
individuals are subject, epistemology’s normative standards of rationality are still not 
capable of evaluating scientific reasoning due to the role of non-propositional 
representations in this reasoning.  
 If we understand knowledge as something that is achieved through the satisfaction 
of standards of rationality, and epistemology’s standards of rationality are incapable of 
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evaluating scientific reasoning, then it seems knowledge as understood in science is 
distinct from how it is understood in epistemology, and good epistemological 
performance in science must be evaluated by standards of rationality that are distinct 
from those that are traditionally used in epistemology. In short, the institution of science 
does not appear to be a suitable candidate for epistemology’s normative standards of 
rationality.  
 
3.6 RATIONALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 
 Thus far, my attack on the current state of epistemology has focused on the field’s 
commitment to truth-directed, rather than practical, normative standards of rationality. 
Since epistemology is generally understood to be the theory of knowledge, rather than the 
theory of rationality, it needs to be clear to what degree the concerns I have raised call for 
revision within the field. As I have discussed, the normative standards of rationality in 
epistemology amount to a theory of justification. So it may appear that the concerns I 
have raised apply only to epistemological work on the concept of justification, rather than 
the concept of knowledge. In this section I discuss the relation between rationality, 
justification, and knowledge.  
 If the account of justification in epistemology violates the ought-can principle, 
that is, if being justified requires cognitive systems to satisfy epistemic constraints that 
they cannot satisfy, then knowledge will be unattainable for cognitive systems like us. In 
other words, because the general consensus is that justification is necessary for 
knowledge, if we cannot be justified in the way that epistemology’s norms of rationality 
demand, knowledge will be out of reach. 
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 This skeptical consequence appears to follow from epistemology’s use of 
normative standards of truth-directed rationality. These standards constitute epistemic 
constraints that must be satisfied for a belief to be justified, and so these constraints must 
be satisfied to acquire knowledge. But if these constraints violate the ought-can principle, 
then they clearly cannot be satisfied. Fortunately, the ought-can principle provides a way 
in which we can avoid this skeptical result. Rather than accept that knowledge is 
unattainable because we cannot satisfy the relevant epistemic constraints, we can take the 
fact that we cannot satisfy these constraints as a reason for rejecting the claim that these 
are the constraints we must satisfy in order to have knowledge.  
 Recall the analysis problem, i.e., the epistemological research program of 
developing an analysis of knowledge that avoids skepticism and Gettier-style 
counterexamples. In order to see how the issues of rationality, justification, and 
knowledge are intertwined, we need to determine what epistemologists are targeting 
when working on the analysis problem.  
 
3.7 METAPHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
 Whether one thinks philosophical theories of knowledge should be sensitive to 
psychological or scientific accounts of knowledge may depend on what one takes the 
target of the analysis problem to be. In other words, when philosophers engage in 
developing analyses of knowledge, what do they take themselves to be analyzing? 
Whether or not it is explicitly acknowledged, the analysis problem applies exclusively to 
accounts of propositional knowledge.  
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 Even if we can establish that those engaged in the analysis problem are attempting 
to develop analyses of propositional knowledge, it is still not clear what the target of this 
analysis is, or should be. One might think that a correct analysis of knowledge should be 
one that is a necessary truth, that is, an analysis that picks out all and only cases of 
propositional knowledge in all possible worlds (see Ichikawa and Steup 2012).  
 But if an epistemologist’s aim is to provide an analysis of propositional of 
knowledge that is extensionally correct in all possible worlds, it is unclear what 
constrains such a project, that is, what determines whether a proposed analysis is correct. 
The standard methodology employed by philosophers that are engaged in projects of this 
sort is some form of reflective equilibrium. The method of reflective equilibrium amounts 
to working back and forth between a theory of a concept (e.g. justice or knowledge) and 
intuitions or considered judgments regarding particular cases. When the theory and an 
intuition do not line up, we either revise the theory to accommodate the intuition, or 
reject or explain away the intuition. When we have conflicting intuitions, one or both of 
them must be given up. Eventually, the goal is to have our theory and intuitions line up in 
a “reflective equilibrium,” (Daniels 1979; Goodman 1955; Rawls 1999).  
 If the method of reflective equilibrium is supposed to enable us to develop 
conceptual analyses that are necessary truths, then the method must be assumed to 
provide us with modally robust epistemological powers, that is, the ability to glimpse into 
other possible worlds and gather data that is relevant to the concept we are engaged in 
analyzing. This is why hypothetical thought experiments are taken to be useful for 
philosophical analysis. Since these thought experiments are hypothetical, they describe 
cases that are not realized in our world, but conditions in other possible worlds.  
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 If intuitions that are generated through the method of reflective equilibrium are 
supposed to provide the constraints on developing an analysis of knowledge that is a 
necessary truth, then we must assume that they have evidential force. If they were not 
taken to have this force, then there would be no reason why we should revise our theories 
to accommodate these intuitions, or go to the trouble of explaining them away.  
 Cummins (1999) has suggested that the method of reflective equilibrium is simply 
a kind of standard scientific method given a new name. In science a theory is constructed 
to account for observations, and observations that are incompatible with a theory must be 
explained away. When they cannot be explained a way, the theory must be revised to 
account for the data. In philosophical reflective equilibrium, intuitions or considered 
judgments are taken to play the role of observational data in science.  
 However, as Cummins subsequently argues, the reason that observational data is 
taken seriously in science is because it is intersubjective. Scientific observations can be, 
and are, calibrated, that is they can be checked by an independent standard. Intuitions or 
considered judgments, by contrast, are not intersubjective. Different individuals have 
different intuitions about the same cases. In science, when we have conflicting 
observations, we have to explain away one or both of them. When this cannot be done, 
the observations have to be set to the side, and neither can be taken as evidence for or 
against a theory.  
 In order to calibrate intuitions, we need to have another means of access to the 
target of these intuitions. In some cases, it may be possible to calibrate our intuitions. But 
if there are such cases, then intuitions become evidentially useless. If we have a theory 
that is sufficiently established to serve as a check on our intuitions, then we have no use 
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for the intuitions as a way to establish, or provide evidence for the theory in question. On 
the other hand, when we lack a standard by which we can calibrate intuitions, we have no 
reason to think these intuitions are evidential (Cummins 1999).  
 Even if we set aside the calibration problem, there does not appear to be any 
plausible account of how intuitions can be the result of a modal reality. In other words, 
there is no plausible explanation as to how intuitions could be reliable indicators of states 
of affairs in other possible worlds. On the other hand, there are plausible psychological 
accounts of how intuitions are formed, and these accounts provide strong reasons for 
doubting their evidential significance (Cummins 1999).  
 One might, of course, be unconvinced by these arguments or hold that there are 
certain concepts that can only be studied through intuition, and a theory of such concepts 
should aim to settle into a reflective equilibrium. One might, for instance, think that so 
long as we are not skeptics about certain domains, such as ethics or mathematics, then we 
must accept that intuitions are epistemologically valuable in these domains because 
nothing else could ground knowledge in these domains (Cummins 1999).  
 While I don’t find this argument to establish that intuitions are evidential in 
certain domains persuasive, here my concern is not with mathematics or morality, but 
rather with the theory of knowledge. Knowledge, perhaps unlike ethics and mathematics, 
is a domain that can be, and has been, studied scientifically. If one engages in reflective 
equilibrium in attempting to develop a theory of a concept that overlaps with science, 
then one will engage in epistemological poaching. We can, and do, have intuitions about 
concepts that overlap with science. For example, before taking a physics course, some 
people will have the intuition that when two balls of the same size, one hollow and one 
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solid, are dropped from 100 feet, the solid ball will hit the ground first. But of course, if 
we investigate this question empirically, we will find that the two balls will hit the ground 
at the same time.  
 Recall from chapter 2 that B&M’s complete and correct conceptions requirement 
for know-how rests on our having certain semantic intuitions in response to thought 
experiments, such as their Salchow case. As I argued there, we have no reason for 
thinking ordinary language is designed to be as precise as their account of know-how 
requires because it did not evolve to accommodate cases like Salchow. Their account 
requires a revision of how language works. But when scientific terms, including 
psychological terms, are under consideration, revision needs to be motivated by science, 
not semantic intuitions.        
 Setting aside skeptics, epistemologists hold that we have knowledge. Unless one 
is a substance dualist, one will surely hold that this knowledge is represented or 
instantiated in a physical system.  If this is right, then “knowledge” just like “know-how” 
is, at least, a partly psychological term, and if we are to make claims about how 
“knowledge” is to be used, these claims need to be motivated by science, not semantic 
intuitions.   
 An advocate of standard epistemology might respond by denying that any of these 
issues have implications for epistemology when we have a proper understanding of the 
field. Epistemology, the response goes, is concerned with providing an analysis of 
knowledge and this is independent of scientific questions about how cognition works, or 
how knowledge or information is mentally represented.  
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 Philosophers operating under this perspective want to have their cake and eat it to. 
They want philosophical analysis to be unconstrained by science, but they also want 
science to be constrained or influenced by philosophy. The problem is that these 
constraints have to run both ways. You cannot quarantine philosophy from science 
without also quarantining science from philosophy. To insist that implications go only 
one way, from philosophy to science, is to endorse poaching. If philosophy really is 
roped off from any influence from science, then not only can science not have 
implications for philosophy; philosophy cannot have implications for science. It cannot, 
for instance, tell cognitive scientists or psychologists what concept they should be 
studying when they are interested in how knowledge is mentally represented. Under such 
a quarantine, philosophical and empirical studies of knowledge (and other issues) become 
entirely disconnected, and if this is occurs, then philosophy will be reduced to a field 
concerned with solving self-generated puzzles, and generating the standards for properly 
solving these puzzles, resulting in a notion of incorrigibility similar to that of sense data. 
If one thinks that sense data are mind-dependent, that is, independent of objects outside 
of the mind, then we cannot be wrong about objects or properties of sense data. However, 
these mind-dependent objects are quarantined from anything else in the same way that 
one might try to quarantine philosophy from science. The benefit of such a quarantine, 
incorrigibility in the case of sense data or autonomous self-governance in the case of 
philosophy, comes at a cost of having no implications outside of the quarantine. If 
philosophy or sense data had implications outside of their isolated domains, then when 
the implications fail, we would have reason for making changes. But since the 
quarantined cannot have implications of this sort, they provide no evidential value.  
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 Here, one might think that even if this is what philosophy is reduced to, this is not 
problematic for the field, because philosophy is concerned with, and can still make, 
progress within philosophy. Even if philosophy is quarantined from scientific data, and 
cannot have implications for science, philosophers within the quarantine serve as a check 
on one another, and so even if there is a broad sort of incorrigibility understood as 
philosophical autonomy or self-governance, there are still checks and balances within the 
field, which generates standards of correctness and opportunities for error and correction.  
 This form of self-governance should not be as comforting as it might initially 
sound. Under this quarantined set up, since philosophy cannot be held in check by 
scientific data, what seems to be left, at least in conceptual analysis projects, is some 
form of reflective equilibrium and a reliance on intuitions or considered judgments.  
Moreover, certain concepts that would appear to be scientific, such as knowledge or 
know-how, will be understood as non-scientific, and so poaching objections get pushed to 
the side. But even if we set aside poaching, there are still reasons to worry about taking 
intuitions as evidential within the quarantine. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the 
significance of any progress within the quarantine.  
 One of the worries regarding the use of intuitions as evidence has already been 
discussed above, namely, the worry that in order for intuitions to be evidential they must 
be calibrated, but once they are calibrated, they become evidentially useless. But even if 
one is unconvinced by this challenge, a further problem raised by Cummins (1999) 
pertains to the issue of which intuitions are taken to be evidential and which are to be 
dismissed. If reflective equilibrium is to be understood as analogous to scientific practice, 
where intuitions play the role of observational data, then it is important to properly treat 
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cases of conflicting intuitions. If we have a case of conflicting intuitions, then they cannot 
be taken as data until the conflict is resolved.  
 Unfortunately, this norm does not seem to be generally followed in philosophy. 
While philosophers make efforts to explain away intuitions that conflict with their own, 
they continue to claim support from these intuitions without first resolving the conflict. 
Cummins draws on the example of intuitions generated from Twin-Earth cases in the 
theory of content. Since Putnam’s (1975) view on Twin-Earth cases is widely accepted 
within philosophy, one might think that it is reasonable to take his intuitions about the 
case to be evidential. However, most non-philosophers do not share the Putnamian 
intuition (Cummins 1999). But since these conflicting intuitions come from non-
philosophers, they are not taken as a source of conflict, that is, a reason for resolving the 
dispute before proceeding forward. This amounts to a second form of quarantine. Not 
only does philosophy become quarantined methodologically, it becomes quarantined 
sociologically. The use of reflective equilibrium isolates philosophy methodologically 
because in order to avoid poaching, philosophy cannot have implications outside of 
philosophy. Restricting the relevant intuitions to philosophers isolates philosophy 
sociologically because even non-philosophers who might be understood as engaging in 
reflective equilibrium have their considered judgments set aside, at least when they are in 
conflict with the accepted intuitions within philosophy.  
 If we accept that intuitions are non-evidential and also wish to avoid operating 
under a perspective of philosophy where the field is quarantined from science, then we 
need to consider alternative methods and perspectives. As Cummins (1999) argues, there 
is hope for philosophy without intuitions. In the theory of mental representation, he 
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suggests that, instead of asking whether ‘water’ refers to H2O on Earth and XYZ on 
Twin Earth, we can ask what explanatory role is played by representation. Similarly, 
philosophers of physics don’t consult their intuitions about what space or time are, but 
instead ask how we need to understand these concepts if the physical theories that invoke 
them are to be accurate and explanatory.  
 I suggest that we do the same in epistemology. Rather than asking what 
knowledge is from a quarantined position, we should ask what role knowledge plays as 
the concept is deployed in the various domains that employ it. It is quite possible that 
knowledge plays a different role in different domains or even within the same domain. 
For instance, the role of knowledge in ordinary language or common sense may be 
different from the role of knowledge in science. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
discuss what role knowledge plays in these domains. If these roles turn out to be distinct, 
then this will suggest a need for a pluralistic approach to the theory of knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  132 
CHAPTER 4 
THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE ACROSS EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOMAINS 
 
4.1 COMMONSENSE AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE 
 In this chapter, I examine the role that knowledge plays in two domains: common 
sense or ordinary language and within the institution of science. In this section I begin 
with the former. 
In everyday usage, or under common sense, knowledge is often invoked to 
provide a sense of warranty or assurance for action. If someone tells us that they know 
something, we feel a certain degree of confidence in acting as though what we are told is 
the case. Admittedly, thinking of knowledge in this way has drawn some attention in the 
epistemology literature. In this section I outline my proposal and explain how it is distinct 
from existing accounts.  
 In the first chapter I discussed Fantl and McGrath’s pragmatic encroachment 
approach to epistemology, which provides some support to the idea that a common sense 
concept of knowledge plays a warranty-granting role. While Fantl and McGrath take their 
account to be one in which non-epistemic, practical considerations “encroach” upon 
epistemology, I criticized their account for appearing to posit epistemic encroachment 
upon the practical. Recall that they claim that if S knows that p, then S is rational to act as 
if p. My criticism of their position amounted to arguing that there are cases in which we 
know that p, but may still be rational to act as if it is not the case that p or which it would 
be irrational to act as if p. While I stand by this criticism, their discussion provides 
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motivation for the claim that knowledge plays a warranty-providing role in common 
sense.  
 Fantl and McGrath motivate their view by noting that we often defend or criticize 
actions by citing knowledge. The husband defends his action of driving straight home 
without stopping to get yams the night before Thanksgiving by citing his knowledge that 
there were already yams at home. The worrisome person criticizes her action of going 
back to check the doors by citing her knowledge that they were already locked. In the 
first example, knowledge is playing an assuring role, while in the second case an action is 
being criticized because the agent fails to heed the assurance or warranty that knowledge 
should provide.  
 But there seem to be many cases in which one can know that p and rationally act 
as if not-p. Consider a modified version of the predator detection case in which a woman 
is trying to decide which route to take on her walk home from work late at night. 
Ultimately her goal is to get home safely and as quickly as possible, so the shortest route 
may initially seem preferable. However, the shortest route goes through several empty 
dark alleys while the longer route goes along well-lit streets with lots of traffic. Now 
suppose that, through whatever means, the woman comes to have lots of good evidence 
that the shorter route is safe at the time, such that most philosophical accounts of 
knowledge would say she knows the route is safe. On Fantl and McGrath’s view, this 
would appear to entail that it would be rational for her to take the short route through the 
dark alleys home. But if she were to do so, we could easily imagine a family member 
criticizing her decision by saying, ““Despite all of your evidence, there was no guarantee 
that the alleys were safe,” or “Despite all of your evidence, you didn’t know that the 
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alleys were safe.”  How should we evaluate the women’s epistemic state in this 
circumstance from the perspective of common sense? Was her belief that the alley was 
safe a case of knowledge?  
 The claim that there is a substantial connection between knowledge and action has 
received a fair amount of treatment among epistemologists in the last several years. Jason 
Stanley (2005) labels the thesis that knowledge does not depend on practical matters 
intellectualism (not to be confused with intellectualism about know-how). A common 
commitment among anti-intellectuals, i.e. those that believe that knowledge does depend 
on practical matters, is that “one should act only on what one knows,” (Stanley 2005, 9; 
also see: Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne 2004). Call this the act-knowledge 
principle. There appears to be an ambiguity in this principle that should be noted. On one 
reading, the principle can be understood to say that what we know determines how we 
ought to act. That is, if I know that p, then I should act as if p. On another reading, the 
principle can be understood as saying that how we ought to act determines what we 
know. That is, if I should act as if p, then I know that p. Despite this ambiguity, 
Hawthorne’s discussion of the principle suggests that he has the former in mind. He 
writes,  
 
“One ought to only use that which one knows as a premise in one’s 
deliberations. There are complications that call for ceteris paribus style 
qualifications. In a situation where I have no clue what is going on, I may 
take certain things for granted in order to prevent paralysis, especially 
when I need to act quickly,” (Hawthorne 2004, 30). 
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While I am sympathetic to the sprit of anti-intellectualism in this context (and in others), 
Hawthorne and others appear to be placing the epistemological cart before the practical 
horse, despite the caveat regarding ceteris paribus qualifications. My concern with 
Hawthorne’s discussion of the principle is that it suggests that ceteris paribus 
circumstances will be the rule rather than the exception. In other words, his discussion 
suggests that most of the time we need to acquire knowledge, as understood in 
mainstream epistemology, before being able to act rationally.  But due to the very nature 
of practical goals and the constraints inherent in real life, things will hardly ever be equal, 
and there will almost always be things that we have to take for granted in order to act in a 
timely manner. So even if it might in some sense be true that we should use only what we 
know, in the standard philosophical sense, as a premise in our practical deliberations 
when all other things are held equal, it will almost never be the case that this qualification 
applies.   
 If knowledge depends on practical matters, as I believe it does in every day 
contexts, then questions of how we ought to act should come before questions of what we 
know. If we ought to act only on what we know, i.e., if we ought to only use what we 
know as premises in deliberations about what to do, then knowledge does not depend on 
practical affairs, as anti-intellectualists seem to want, but rather, answers to questions 
regarding practical affairs appear to depend on knowledge. This amounts to imposing 
norms of truth-directed or epistemological rationality on the practical domain, not 
imposing norms of practical reasoning on the epistemological.  
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 Despite the problems with their view, Fantl and McGrath capture an important 
insight in noting that we appeal to knowledge to defend or criticize action. The problem 
with their position comes by way of the manner in which they apply this insight. If 
knowledge is indeed used to defend or criticize action, then in this domain knowledge is 
playing a warranty-granting role, i.e., it provides an assurance that the action being 
defended was the right one, or the action being criticized was the wrong one. Actions, 
however, are subject to evaluation according to normative standards of practical 
rationality. So if knowledge is being used to justify an action as rational, then it should be 
evaluated in terms of its practical, rather than truth-directed, effectiveness. 
 If knowledge does indeed play this sort of role in everyday contexts, then 
knowledge under common sense will differ substantially from knowledge as understood 
in traditional epistemology. In traditional epistemology, knowledge is a type of true belief 
that has special features, viz., justification and perhaps some sort of anti-Gettier 
condition. But that which serves as a provider of warranty or assurance in practical 
reasoning need not have these special features. In fact, it may not even need to be a true 
belief.  
 Let’s return to the modified predator detection scenario. From the standpoint of 
standard epistemology, it may seem that the woman knows the shorter route is safe, and 
so she ought to take this route since her goal is to get home both safely and as quickly as 
she can. But the costs of being wrong about the safety of the short route in this case are 
extremely high. She could be robbed, kidnapped, or worse. Here, rather than acting on 
what she, according to standard epistemology, knows, the rational strategy would seem to 
be adhering to a rule of thumb that says dark alleys are to be avoided. In this case, this 
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rule of thumb would seem to, at least in part, justify the action of taking the longer route. 
In contrast, the woman’s belief that this alley is safe at this time does not seem to be 
adequate to make the action of taking the shortest route rational. 
 Now it might appear that, in this example, the evidence that the woman has for 
the alley’s being safe and the belief formed on the basis of this evidence should provide a 
sort of warranty or assurance that taking the short route is safe and thereby the rational 
action given her goals. So this might appear to be a case in which the warranty based 
account of knowledge and the way in which I am trying to connect knowledge to 
practical reasoning come apart.  
 The reason for this apparent divergence is that the degree of warranty or 
assurance needed to rationally form a belief is often far less than that which is needed to 
rationally undergo a course of action. Forming a belief is generally low risk, whereas 
taking an action often is not. If the woman in our example forms the belief that taking the 
short route would be a safe thing to do, then if it turns out she is wrong there is no 
substantial cost to be paid. The cost of being wrong comes into play only if she acts on 
this belief.  
 Intellectualists, i.e. those who hold that knowledge is not dependent on practical 
considerations, will hold that, in the case under discussion, the woman does know that the 
alley way is safe because the costs of acting on a false belief do not factor into their 
understanding of what is required for knowledge. Furthermore, they will deny that 
knowledge needs to be the sort of thing that provides warranty or assurance for action. 
Anti-intellectuals, on the other hand, hold that knowledge is connected to practical 
considerations, but they go wrong in formulating the details of this connection. For 
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proponents of this view, the connection between knowledge and action consists in the 
claim that we should act only on what we know, or that it is rational to act on what we 
know. But even on this position, knowledge appears to be understood in the way that is 
standard in epistemology. That is, anti-intellectuals will take it that, because of her 
evidence, the woman knows the alley is safe, and so it is rational for her to proceed home 
on this route, which amounts to imposing truth-directed norms of rationality on practical 
affairs. 
 Rather than taking the alleyway example to be one in which the warranty-
providing and pragmatic accounts of knowledge come apart, the case is in fact one in 
which common sense and philosophical understandings of knowledge come apart. In this 
case, the woman’s evidence may provide enough warranty or assurance for forming the 
belief, and coming to know, in a standard philosophical sense that is divorced from 
practical considerations, that the alleyway is safe. But this same degree of warranty is not 
sufficient for her to rationally go home by way of this route. So if knowledge is used to 
establish the practical rationality of an action in common sense by providing warranty, 
the woman does not have common sense knowledge.  
 Given the criticisms I have leveled against traditional accounts of normative 
standards of rationality in epistemology, it might seem odd that here I seem to be 
suggesting that the demands of common sense knowledge are more stringent than those 
of philosophical knowledge. A good deal of my criticism of standard epistemology 
amounted to arguing that epistemology’s standards of rationality are too demanding in 
that they violate the ought-can principle. But here, I’ve suggested that in the modified 
predator detection example, the woman may have enough warrant to meet the standards 
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for philosophical knowledge that the alley is safe, but not enough to meet the standards 
that must be met in order for her to rationally act on this belief.  
 The appearance of inconsistency stems from two different perspectives from 
which this evaluation is being conducted. In the truth-directed domain, the goal of a 
rational agent is forming true beliefs, and the standard procedure is to abstract away from 
constraints of time and memory. In abstracting away from these constraints, the problem 
becomes not one of finding an effective strategy for serving a practical goal, but rather 
simply forming a belief that is true. The consequences of being wrong when the goal is 
purely truth-directed are very low, or non-existent, at least until the theory is put into 
practice. When we are engaged in pure theorizing, we can take as much time and gather 
as many resources as we need in order to ensure that we are in the ideal epistemic 
position, making getting things wrong highly unlikely. If we do get things wrong in such 
circumstances, this can generally be explained in terms of a failure to account for an 
important piece of evidence, or a failure to reason correctly.  
 From the practical perspective, various constraints and the consequences of being 
wrong are central to the problem at hand. This is why, as discussed above, abstracting 
away from constraints and practical applications changes the very nature of the problem 
under consideration. Due to the way in which abstraction alters the problem under 
consideration, there is a sense in which normative standards of truth-directed rationality 
are more demanding, but a different sense in which the normative standards of practical 
rationality are more demanding.   
 The standards are more demanding in the truth-directed case because they violate 
the ought-can principle. They require us to overcome resource constraints that we cannot 
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possibly overcome. Here time is particularly relevant to the issue of consequences of 
being wrong. When we have unlimited time, as we do in abstract idealized circumstances, 
we can become as certain as we can of anything that, for instance, the alleyway is safe 
and that traveling home on this route is the correct course of action. But in this case, the 
problem is not evaluating what action it is most rational to take, rather it is deciding 
which belief it is most rational to adopt, that is, the belief that the short route is or is not 
safe. So even if it seems that the woman does come to know that the alley is safe in the 
example, which is clearly not an idealized circumstance, evaluating whether her belief 
was rationally formed is distinct from evaluating whether her action is rational because 
the practical consequences of being incorrect factor into the latter, but not the former 
evaluation.  
 The standards are more demanding in the practical case because the consequences 
of being wrong are crucial to determining the correct or rational course of action. In many 
cases, this will mean that the rational course of action is not what would be most optimal 
from a God’s eye perspective, but rather taking the action that errs on the side of caution. 
Even when one has enough evidence to rationally form the belief that, for example, the 
shortest route home is safe, the rational action is to err on the side of caution and take the 
longer route. 
 So far I have suggested that knowledge in common sense contexts is that which 
serves the role of making action, rather than belief, rational by way of providing warranty 
or assurance. If this is correct, then epistemology’s job is to determine what knowledge is 
if it indeed it is to be suited to play such a role. In traditional epistemology, knowledge 
can be roughly characterized as a true proposition that one believes on the basis of 
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evidence (i.e. a justified true belief). While propositions of this sort may at times be 
sufficient to provide warrant for action, such a characterization is inadequate to cover all 
cases. Since effectiveness is more important than truth-conduciveness in the practical 
domain, that which plays the role of knowledge in commonsense will, at least in some 
cases, deviate from how knowledge is understood traditionally in philosophy.  
 While this perspective has been generally ignored or overlooked in philosophy, it 
has received some attention in cognitive science. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) lay out 
three perspectives on the question of how organisms make inferences in cases of 
uncertainty or incomplete information. The first perspective is the classical view, which 
holds that the laws of human inference are laws of probability and statistics. Those who 
are inspired by the classical view take statistical methods to be both the normative and 
descriptive models of inference and decision-making.  The second perspective is the 
heuristics and biases program, which holds that the classical view is correct normatively, 
but not descriptively. In other words, human inference is error prone and systematically 
biased. Rather than using the rules of probability and statistics, we use quick and dirty 
heuristics. Still, adherents to the heuristics and biases program believe that the laws of 
probability and statistics are normative, and errors in reasoning are defined in terms of 
failures to adhere to these laws. The third perspective, which is endorsed by Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, holds that the laws of probability and statistics neither describe human 
inference, nor provide the normative standards that govern it.  
 Experimental tests of the classical view and the heuristics and biases program 
have generally been conducted in unrealistically simple situations, such as Bayesian 
inference with binary hypotheses where all the relevant information is provided for 
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participants (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995). However, in the real world Bayes’s 
theorem and other algorithms that are taken to be rational on the classical view are 
complex and intractable for the human mind. If the classical view is correct, then this 
would entail that the mind is akin to a Laplacian Demon. If the heuristics and biases view 
is correct, then this would entail that humans are “hopelessly lost in the fact of real-world 
complexity,given their supposed inability to reason according to the canon of classical 
rationality, even in simple laboratory experiments,” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 
650–651). 
 Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s perspective on human inference is inspired by Herbert 
Simon’s work on bounded rationality. Simon’s (1956; 1982) view is that cognitive 
systems need to satisfice rather than optimize, where satisficing amounts to using an 
algorithm that successfully accommodates conditions of limited resources and 
information. If we consider, for example, the problem of mate selection, a satisficing 
procedure would be to choose the first mate that meets an organism’s level of aspiration 
rather than engaging in the intractable task of calculating the expected utility of choosing 
each possible mate and then going with the choice that scores the highest (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein 1996, 651). 
 As may be obvious, the perspective of rationality embedded in philosophy closely 
resembles the classical view. The research that motivates the heuristics and biases 
program demonstrates that the descriptive component of the classical view is incorrect, 
that is, humans fail to make inferences in accord with the rules of probability and 
statistics. But if we take this research to show that human inference is systematically 
biased and “error” prone, this should be taken, not to show that humans are 
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systematically irrational, but rather that we are wrong in taking the laws of statistics and 
probability to be normative due to the ought-can principle.  
 One worry regarding this use of the ought-can principle is that because we have 
discovered that humans have developed the laws of statistics and probability, there is an 
obvious sense in which we can reason in accordance with them. Perhaps most people do 
not do so, and perhaps a good number of people cannot do so, but this does not show that 
a normative view of statistics and probability violates the ought-can principle. It only 
shows that some people are rational in virtue of meeting these normative standards, while 
others are not.  
 There are at least two ways to respond to this objection. First, as mentioned 
above, the experiments that have been used to show that people systematically fail to 
adhere to the rules of statistics and probability use simple situations in which all the 
relevant information is provided to the subjects. In the real world things are far more 
complex, and so applying these rules becomes intractable for human minds. Since 
applying these rules is intractable in real world situations, taking these rules to be 
normative does appear to violate the ought-can principle. This amounts to what 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein call the cognitive side of Simon’s notion of bounded 
rationality. Human minds are cognitively limited, unlike the Laplacean Demons of the 
classical view of rationality (Simon 1945). However, Simon’s bounded rationality also 
has an ecological side, which emphasizes that minds are adapted to real-world 
environments. On Simon’s view, these two sides go hand in hand. He writes, “Human 
rational behavior is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task 
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor,” (Simon 1990, 7). In short, 
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Simon’s bounded rationality, combining ecological and cognitive issues, shows that 
cognitive systems should be understood in terms of the environments in which they have 
evolved, not in terms of the normative standards of classical, i.e. truth-directed, 
rationality (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 651). 
 Gigerenzer and Goldstein show that simple, cognitively and ecologically realistic 
algorithms, are often more effective than the tools of classical rationality, that is, statistics 
and probability. As a demonstration, they use algorithms that implement principles of 
probabilistic mental models (PMM), which assume that we make inferences about the 
unknown based on probability cues. A probability cue is a feature from which we can 
make a probabilistic inference that an object falls within a certain category. A PMM uses 
limited information, such as probability cues, to make fast inductive inferences. To 
decide which of two objects is larger, a PMM uses information about a reference class of 
which the two objects are members. If, for instance, one is trying to decide which of two 
cities has a larger population, a potential cue is whether the cities have major league 
sports teams. Since major league sports teams tend to be located in cities with larger 
populations, if one city has a team and the other does not, the city that has the team is 
more likely to have the larger population (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 652). While 
using this cue will lead to some errors (e.g. when comparing Louisville, KY to Green 
Bay, WI), it will generally lead to the correct answer. 
 Gigerenzer and Goldstein model limited information in various ways, using the 
example of trying to decide the relative size of populations of German cities. One might 
have incomplete information regarding the objects in the reference class (e.g. she might 
only recognize some of the cities), limited knowledge of the cue values (e.g. whether or 
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not a given city has a soccer team), or in both of these respects. To approach this task, 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein use a Take The Best algorithm41, which consists of five steps 
(1996, 653):  
• Step 1:  the recognition principle: If only one of the two objects is recognized, 
choose the recognized object. If neither is recognized, choose randomly between 
them.  
• If both are recognized proceed to step 2.  
• Step 2: search for cue values: For the two objects, retrieve the cue values of the 
highest ranking cue from memory.  
• Step 3: discrimination rule: Decide whether the cue value discriminates: A cue 
discriminates between objects when one of the objects has a positive cue value 
(e.g. has a major league sports team) and the other does not.  
• Step 4: cue-substitution principle: If the cue discriminates, stop searching for cue 
values. If the cue fails to discriminate, return to Step 2 and continue until a cue 
that discriminates is found.  
• Step 5: maximizing rule for choice: Choose the object with the positive cue value. 
If no cue discriminates, choose randomly.  
The Take The Best algorithm exhibits several noteworthy features. First, search extends 
only through part of the information in memory and stops as soon as a discriminating cue 
is found. Second, the algorithm does not integrate information, but instead uses cue 
substitution. Finally, the amount of information that is processed is dependent on each 
task (which pairs of objects are being considered) and varies depending on the 
                                                
41 While this is a general algorithm, Gigerenzer and Goldstein illustrate how it works by way of the city 
population size example.  
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information possessed by various individuals. For these reasons, the algorithm models 
bounded, rather than classical or truth-directed, rationality and demonstrates the notion of 
satisficing. That is, it stops after coming across the first discriminating cue, just as an 
organism may stop after finding the first potential mate that meets its level of aspiration 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 653–654). 
 Gigerenzer and Goldstein go on to provide empirical evidence that the Take The 
Best algorithm performs as many correct inferences as other “competitor” algorithms that 
adhere to standards of classical truth-directed rationality. In fact, Take The Best 
outperformed some of these competitor algorithms. Since Take The Best was also faster 
than any of the other algorithms, it is taken by Gigerenzer and Goldstein to exhibit the 
best overall performance (1996, 658). It is reasonable to take quickness of performance 
into account because “In many situations, time is limited, and acting fast can be as 
important as being correct,”42 (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 660). 
 The discussion of Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s findings puts us in a good position 
to offer a characterization of what knowledge needs to be to play the role that it appears 
to play under commonsense. Before offering this characterization, let’s review some of 
the relevant considerations. First, we are operating on the assumption that in 
commonsense, knowledge plays a warranty-granting role for action. In other words, 
knowledge in this context is what makes an action justified or rational. Since action falls 
into the domain of practical, rather than truth-directed rationality, action-based 
performance is to be evaluated according to normative standards of practical rationality. 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s Take The Best algorithm illustrates the type of procedure that 
                                                
42 It is worth noting test taking is often such a situation as tests are frequently administered under time 
limits and test takers are penalized for questions they fail to answer. This context should be kept in mind by 
critics of ecologically realistic accounts of reasoning.   
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could serve to justify action from a practical perspective because the algorithm is 
effective in contexts of limited time and information.  
 Now here things become a bit tricky. If knowledge is that which makes action 
rational, and using the sort of algorithm of which Take The Best is an example is the sort 
of thing that makes an action rational, then we seem to be faced with the possibility that, 
under a commonsense perspective, algorithms rather than propositions are the sorts of 
things that constitute knowledge. This would constitute quite the radical departure from 
the way in which knowledge is generally understood within philosophy, and perhaps 
other disciplines as well. While I do not think radical departure from the status quo is in 
itself a strike against a proposal, it is the sort of thing that warrants some discussion and 
explanation.  
 If we take, for instance, Fantl and McGrath’s examples to be representative of 
how knowledge is employed in commonsense contexts, then this would indicate that, in 
these contexts, knowledge is constituted by propositions that are then used to support 
actions (I know that we have yams at home, so I’ll drive straight home). While this may 
seem like a fairly straight forward way in which to articulate that which plays a warranty-
providing role for action, it does not strike me as completely adequate for a couple of 
reasons. 
 First, this seems to violate the very methodology I attempted to motivate earlier as 
an alternative to reflective equilibrium, that is, the methodology of seeing what 
knowledge needs to be if is to play the role it plays in various domains. Fantl and 
McGrath’s examples, and other that are similar, appear to presuppose some account of 
knowledge, and then argue that knowledge plays the role of justifying action. In other 
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words, the idea seems to be that we settle on the question of what knowledge is through 
another method, and then afterwards come to realize that it is applied to certain practical 
goals or problems.  
 Second, it does not seem that knowing a relevant proposition, or set of 
propositions, is sufficient for making an action rational. In addition, one needs a 
procedure for applying the proposition(s) to the case at hand. Analogously, knowing the 
premises of a deductively valid argument is not enough infer the argument’s conclusion. 
While the premises certainly play a role, one also needs to know the rules of inference 
that allow one to infer the conclusion from the premises. These inference rules can be 
thought of as procedures for deducing the conclusion from the premises. So standard 
propositional knowledge does not alone seem to be sufficient for making an action 
rational. One also needs to have an understanding of how to apply this knowledge to the 
problem under consideration.  
 These two points suggest that some form of decision procedure, or algorithm, is 
needed in order for an action to be rational. Having propositional information that can 
serve as an input to an algorithm alone does not provide sufficient warrant or assurance 
that a certain course of action is rational. To have a sufficient degree of warranty, one 
also needs an effective procedure for processing or utilizing that information. To put it in 
somewhat more standard terms, it would seem that knowing how to put the information at 
one’s disposal to practical use is essential for making a course of action practically 
rational.  
 In this section, I have offered a rough characterization of what knowledge needs 
to be if it is to play the role to which it is put in commonsense or everyday contexts. I 
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have argued that in these contexts, knowledge is that which serves as a source of 
warranty or assurance for action; it is what makes an action rational. While this 
characterization is admittedly rough, I believe it serves as preliminary work for a fairly 
substantial epistemological research project.  
 The most concrete part of my proposal has been to suggest that that which makes 
action rational, and thereby the sort of thing that fits the role of knowledge as used in 
commonsense, is the use of an effective decision procedure or algorithm of the sort 
discussed by Gigerenzer and Goldstein. This may seem unsatisfactory, given that it seems 
that knowledge is often used or discussed in everyday contexts in a way that is much 
closer to the way knowledge is understood in standard epistemology. It does not seem out 
of place with commonsense to say I know that Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri, or 
that I know that Barack Obama is the president of the United States in 2013.  
 I take this to suggest that we need to understand knowledge in pluralistic way. 
While I do think knowledge is often used in everyday contexts to justify or criticize 
action, it is unlikely that this captures all uses. Ultimately, the issue of what role 
knowledge plays in commonsense is an empirical question, and so it would be most 
desirable to accumulate a set of linguistic data to give us a clearer sense of the different 
roles the concept plays in ordinary usage.  
 
4.2 SCIENCE 
 The aim of science is to provide us with an understanding of the world. In other 
words, science aims to explain natural phenomena. It would seem, then, that the role that 
knowledge plays in science is an explanatory role. However, it may be possible to have 
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an explanation for a phenomenon that is not correct or accurate. Such an explanation 
demonstrates, not how actually a phenomenon occurs, but rather how possibly or how 
plausibly the phenomenon occurs. Since science aims to provide theories that are not only 
explanatory, but correct or accurate, the role of knowledge in science is that of an 
accurate explanatory role.  
 In traditional philosophy of science, scientific explanations, i.e. scientific 
knowledge, is understood as that which is expressed by scientific laws. Under Hempel’s 
famous Deductive-Nomological (DN) Model of scientific explanation, a scientific 
explanation has two main components: an explanandum, which is a sentence that 
describes the phenomena being explained, and an explanans, which is a set of sentences 
that account for the explanandum, at least one of which expresses a “law of nature” 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).  
 While Hempel’s (DN) model has been rejected for various reasons, many 
subsequent accounts of scientific explanation appear to assume that explanations are 
sentence-like in structure (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1989; Salmon 1971). However, more 
recently, philosophers of science have taken a mechanistic model approach to 
explanation, and have moved beyond the linguistic framework established by Hempel. 
According to Salmon’s Causal Mechanical model, an event is explained by tracing the 
causal processes that lead to it. This sort of explanation shows how the event in question 
“fit[s] into a causal nexus,” (Salmon 1984, 9). Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) 
offer a mechanistic account of explanation, stating that we use mechanisms to explain 
how phenomena arise or how processes work. They define mechanisms as “entities and 
activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up 
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to finish or termination conditions.” However, some of their language suggests that an 
explanation consists, not in a mechanism, but in a description thereof. They write,  
“Descriptions of mechanisms show how the termination conditions are 
produced by the set-up conditions and intermediate stages. To give a  
description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that 
phenomenon, i.e., to explain how it was produced,” (Machamer, Darden, 
and Craver 2000, 3, emphasis added). 
But while Machamer et al state that descriptions of mechanisms for phenomena explain 
those phenomena, they made be read charitably as using “description” in broad sense to 
refer to representations of mechanisms, some of which may be non-linguistic. For 
instance, their paper includes many diagrams that are described as representing entities, 
properties, and activities that constitute mechanisms. These diagrams, unlike linguistic 
descriptions, represent spatial and structural features of mechanisms. In fact, Machamer 
et al note that “diagrams represent features of mechanisms that could be described 
verbally but are more easily apprehended in visual form,” (2000, 8). 
 Machamer et al hold that we should think about mechanisms as entities and 
activities in part for epistemic reasons, as both of these elements are important for 
offering mechanistic explanations. In order to understand the epistemic role played by 
activities and entities, we need to further clarify what mechanisms amount to. Activities 
are that which produces a change, and entities are that which engages in activities. 
Moreover, Machamer et al hold that mechanisms exist in nested hierarchies. The levels of 
these hierarchies are part-whole hierarchies, and lower level entities and activities are 
components in mechanisms that produce higher level phenomena (Machamer, Darden, 
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and Craver 2000, 13; Craver 1998; Craver and Darden 2001). Moreover, nested 
hierarchies of mechanisms generally bottom out in low-level mechanism, which are the 
components that are accepted as being unproblematic or accepted as fundamental. 
Bottoming out is interest-relative, and a mechanistic explanation ends when describing 
lower-level mechanisms would not be relevant to the problem at hand (Machamer, 
Darden, and Craver 2000, 13). 
 Activities of mechanisms play an important epistemic, i.e. explanatory, role 
because they are necessary for rendering the target happening intelligible (Machamer 
2000). Intelligibility arises from a mechanism being represented in terms of bottom out 
entities and activities. On Machamer et al’s view, a mechanistic explanation needn’t be 
correct or accurate in order to give rise to intelligibility, so long as the representation of 
the mechanism shows,  
“how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work. Intelligibility 
arises not from an explanation’s correctness, but rather from an elucidative 
relation between the explanans (the set-up conditions and intermediate 
entities and activities) and the explanandum (the termination condition or 
the phenomenon to be explained),” (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 
21).  
 Throughout this dissertation, I have assumed that knowledge is a cognitive state 
or activity. In this section, I have suggested that the role played by the concept of 
knowledge in science is providing explanations for phenomena. Machamer et al appear to 
operate under the assumption that explanation is closely tied to intelligibility or 
understanding. However, some philosophers of science argue that intelligibility and 
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understanding are not necessary for something to be an explanation. Trout (2007), for 
instance, refers to hyper complex models of speciation and disease, noting that these lack 
resources of familiarity to give rise to psychological states that are typically associated 
with understanding. Craver (2007) claims that Van Essen’s hyper complex model of 
information processing in the visual cortex is an example of an explanation that we 
cannot cognitively represent.  
 Philosophers of science appear to be divided as to the question of whether 
understanding or intelligibility is required for something to constitute a scientific 
explanation. If understanding is not required for something to count as an explanation, 
and if knowledge is a cognitive state, then it seems implausible that the role of knowledge 
in science could be an explanatory role. But to determine what role knowledge plays in 
science, the best method would appear to be deferring to the judgments of actual 
practicing scientists, as these may differ from those of philosophers of science.  
 Waskan et al. (2013) have conducted a series of experiments that investigate 
whether laypersons and practicing scientists require of explanations that they render their 
target happening intelligible, where intelligibility amounts to an intellectual state of 
understanding how or why, at least possibly, a given phenomenon came about. They 
consider three hypotheses: the objectivity hypothesis, the intelligibility hypothesis, and the 
intellig-ability hypothesis. The objectivity hypothesis, applied to a population, is the 
claim that a population does not hold that psychological states are central to explanations. 
The intelligibility hypothesis is the claim that a population requires that an explanation 
actually render its target phenomenon intelligible, while the intellig-ability hypothesis 
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holds that a population only requires that an explanation have the capacity to render a 
happening intelligible, even if it does not actually do so.  
 Through their series of experiments, Waskan et al. have found that, contrary to the 
implication of the objectivity hypothesis, scientists and laypersons both appear to have a 
concept of explanation in which intelligibility plays a central role. Their data, in fact, 
tends to support the claim that, among these populations, actual, rather than potential, 
intelligibility is required of explanations. In other words, Waskan et al.’s research 
supports the intelligibility hypothesis over both the objectivity and intellig-ability 
hypotheses.  
 While further research will be required to determine whether the intelligibility 
hypothesis tends to hold across the diversity of scientific disciplines, Waskan et al.’s 
research represents a novel method for the philosophical study of scientific explanation in 
that it defers to the judgments of practicing scientists (as well as laypersons) rather than 
only the judgments of philosophers of science. In other words, the data tends to support 
those in line with Machamer et al rather than those in line with Craver or Trout.  
 Due to Waskan et al.’s findings, it is consistent to assume both that knowledge is 
a cognitive state and that its role within science is an explanatory one. However, as noted 
above, Machamer et al suggest that explanations needn’t be accurate. We can have 
explanations that show us how possibly, or how plausibly, a phenomenon comes about, 
rather than how actually that phenomenon occurs. So the role of knowledge in science 
appears to be, not merely being explanatory, but providing explanations that are accurate 
or correct. If this is correct, then epistemologists can take on the task of determining what 
knowledge amounts to in order to be suited to play this role.  
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 Following Machamer et al’s discussion, the target of a scientific explanation is a 
mechanism that is composed of entities and activities. We understand such a mechanism 
when we are provided with a representation of the mechanism that shows us how 
possibly, plausibly, or actually the mechanism works. However, since science aims, not 
only to provide explanations, but also to provide explanations that are accurate or correct, 
whatever plays the role of knowledge in science will have to be an accurate 
representation of a mechanism that gives rise to understanding or intelligibility. 
 While we have yet to articulate what knowledge must be if it is to play the role it 
appears to play in science, it already seems clear that the scientific role of knowledge is 
distinct from the role of knowledge in common sense or ordinary language. Recall, from 
the previous section that, under common sense, knowledge appears to play a role of 
providing warrant for action, i.e., a role of making action rational. This is clearly different 
from playing a role of rendering happenings or phenomena intelligible, i.e., of helping us 
to understand phenomena.  
 It should not be surprising that knowledge plays a different role in science than it 
does in common sense given that individual agents generally have different goals, 
resources, and limitations than practicing scientists, or even scientific institutions. In 
common sense, the epistemic agents of focus are generally individuals, and individuals 
are typically concerned with acting rationally in the face of all the practical constraints to 
which they are subject. In other words, knowledge is subservient to practical 
considerations. In these contexts, rationality is tied to effectiveness, and so accuracy will 
be sacrificed for increased effectiveness. This is generally not the case in science, where 
the goal is to maximize accuracy. 
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 Let’s take stock of where we are. Here, we are assuming that the role of 
knowledge in science is explanatory, where these explanations are maximally accurate. 
Moreover, Waskan et al’s research suggests that explanations are, at least in part, 
psychological. Specifically, explanations are constituted by psychological states of 
intelligibility, that is, understanding how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually 
something works. Since science aims to provide explanations that are accurate or correct, 
the psychological state of main interest in this context will be that of understanding how 
actually something works.  
 While further work will be needed to determine what a psychological state of 
understanding how something works amounts to, Machamer et al’s discussion, combined 
with Wasken et al’s research, provides grounds for an initial sketch. In Machamer et al’s 
discussion, the assumption appears to be that the main objects that science aims to 
explain are mechanisms, which are composed of entities and activities. We understand a 
mechanism through representations of those mechanisms, representations that illustrate 
how the mechanism in question works.  
 In addition to Waskan et al.’s findings, Stephen Grimm (2010) provides 
compelling arguments in favor of the claim that the goal of scientific explanation is to 
generate understanding. Moreover, Grimm provides what is, at the very least, a 
preliminary account of that to which the relevant psychological state of understanding 
amounts. To present his account, Grimm draws on an example in which two friends are 
observing a pilot practice takeoffs and landings. We are to imagine one friend asking the 
other, “Why can this plane fly?” In this case, the goal of an explanation of this occurrence 
is to allow us to understand why the plane can fly. In particular, on Grimm’s account, the 
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goal of an explanation in this case will be to bestow to the relevant agent a grasp of 
Bernoulli’s principle, and to be able to apply the principle to the relevant details about the 
plane (2010, 341). 
 On Grimm’s view, in order to understand why the plane can fly, it is not sufficient 
to simply know Bernoulli’s principle, and the specific details about the particular plane. 
This is because one can know all of these things, but fail to apply them to the question of 
why the plane can fly. Due to this problem, Grimm thinks that understanding, in this 
case, requires grasping the answers to the question, and this grasping entails having an 
ability to put the correct answer to use (2010, 341). In the plane example, grasping 
Bernoulli’s principle entails having the ability to foresee how changes in values of 
variables lead to changes in values of other variables, and having the ability to apply the 
principle to specific circumstances. Grimm writes,” 
For example, suppose I believe that because the shape of this airplane’s 
wings is raised along the top and flat along the bottom, the air traveling 
across the top of the wing will speed up to meet the air traveling along the 
bottom of the wing. If I have grasped Bernoulli’s principle, and if I then 
apply the principle to this case, what I will ‘‘see’’ (or, more cautiously, 
‘‘seem to see’’) is that, given that the air traveling across the top of the 
airplane’s wing is moving at a higher velocity, the pressure exerted by the 
air on the top of the wing will decrease. Moreover, I will ‘‘see’’ (or at 
least seem to see) that since the pressure exerted by the slower moving air 
along the bottom of the wing will then be greater than the pressure exerted 
along the top of the wing, lift—in other words flight—will result (Grimm 
2010, 341). 
 
This example, and the surrounding discussion, raises a couple of important points. First, 
as Grimm himself notes, the ability to anticipate how changes in values of variables leads 
to changes in values of other variables and having the ability to apply the principle to 
specific cases appears to be one and the same ability. Lacking the ability to manipulate 
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variables in the principle surely entails lacking the ability to apply the principle to 
specific instances.  
 Second, Grimm’s use of the term “see” suggests that grasping the answers to the 
question of why the plane can fly involves non-propositional content. Whether or not this 
is Grimm’s intention is admittedly unclear. Perhaps he means that when we grasp 
Bernoulli’s principle and apply it to the case at hand, I am able to infer the proposition 
that “the air traveling across the top of the airplane’s wing is moving at a higher velocity, 
the pressure exerted by the air on the top of the wing will decrease.” 
 Regardless of Grimm’s intentions in using “see” in the way that he does, the 
considerations that were raised in the doxastification section suggest that grasping 
answers to why-questions in the sense that is the goal of explanation will require having 
access to non-propositional content, such as a diagram or blueprint of an airplane. To 
reiterate a key point of the doxastification section, one can know Bernoulli’s principle 
and various specifications of a particular airplane without having a clue as to how they 
apply to concrete circumstances. All that this would require is reading, or being told, 
what the principle states and what the specifications of the airplane amount to. Having 
the ability to apply and manipulate the principle will require something more. As I argued 
in chapter 2, skills and abilities generally require possessing information that cannot be 
acquired or represented linguistically. If understanding phenomena through explanations 
amounts to having certain skills or abilities, then there is no reason to think that these 
skills require only propositional information.  If we think of explanations in mechanistic 
terms, then some of the information that is needed will plausibly be visual or 
diagrammatic, that is, information that allows us to perceive a “fit” of sorts between the 
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relevant elements. As Wayne Riggs puts it, “An important difference between merely 
believing a bunch of true sentences within subject matter M, and having understanding of 
M, is that one somehow sees the way things fit together. There is a pattern discerned 
within all the individual bits of information of knowledge (2003, 218). 
 We are now, I believe, in a position to offer a rough characterization of what role 
knowledge plays in science, and what knowledge needs to be if it is to play such a role. In 
science, knowledge plays the role of rendering happenings intelligible, that is, of 
providing explanations for phenomena. More specifically, knowledge plays a role of 
providing correct or accurate explanations. To have knowledge then, within the scientific 
domain, amounts to possessing an accurate or correct explanation. Waskan et al and 
Grimm provide reason to hold that possessing an explanation in the relevant sense entails 
understanding, of finding intelligible, the target phenomenon. If Grimm is correct, then 
finding a happening intelligible amounts to having a certain grasp, ability, or skill, that is, 
having know how of a particular sort. This appears to be one feature that scientific and 
common sense or ordinary language knowledge have in common – they both appear to 
require having the ability or skill to apply information in certain ways. Of course, the way 
in which information is applied in everyday contexts will generally be different from the 
way in which it is applied in scientific contexts. 
 Before concluding this chapter, one further complications needs to be addressed. 
The complication is that science is generally an institutional or collective endeavor. At 
the individual level, it appears that the cognitive state that plays the role of knowledge in 
science will be that of a state of understanding, which Grimm suggests entails having 
certain skills or abilities. But since science is generally a collective enterprise, following 
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the present proposal will require developing an account of understanding, ability, and 
skill that makes sense when applied to collective cognitive systems. At present, I am not 
sure what such an account will look like. However, there are at least two obvious 
possibilities.  
 One possibility is that at the collective or institutional level, understanding, skill, 
and ability are to be understood in roughly the same manner as they are understood as the 
individual level. For example, we might understand the utterance, “Science understands 
how planes fly” as serving as shorthand for the claim that a sufficient number of 
individual scientists, or a sufficient number of members of a subset of scientists, 
understand how planes fly.  
 A second possibility would be that in order for science to understand a 
phenomenon, it could be the case that different scientists, or collections of scientists, 
understand different components of that phenomenon. Perhaps none of the scientists, or 
groups of scientists, understands the phenomenon in full, but if we sum together the 
individual components that they do separately understand, we will arrive at a full 
understanding of the phenomenon under consideration.  
 If the suggestions offered in this section are correct, then they constitute further 
support for the claim that epistemology stands in need of revision. The traditional 
epistemological framework is not equipped to evaluate knowledge under the role it plays 
in science and this role is distinct from the role that it plays in common sense. Hence, we 
have further need for epistemological specialization and fragmentation.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation I have argued that the framework under which epistemology 
operates should be broadened to account for developments in cognitive science that 
indicate that a good deal of cognition and reasoning involves the use of non-linguistic 
representations. 
 In chapter 1, I argue that, although epistemology is the theory of knowledge, 
epistemologists generally operate as though their field is simply the theory of 
propositional knowledge. Epistemologists generally assume that knowledge is a certain 
type of belief relation to a true proposition. However, cognitive science indicates that 
many of our mental representations are not belief-like at all, and thereby, not belief 
relations to propositions. Rather, the mind employs representations that take the form of 
images, scale models, activation patterns, and so on. I call this claim representational 
pluralism. If some of these non-linguistic representations are constitutive of knowledge, 
as I argue in later chapters that they are, then this requires a substantial revision of the 
traditional epistemological framework. I proceed to introduce some potential 
consequences of departing from the propositional knowledge tradition in epistemology. 
These consequences pertain most directly to two issues, namely, philosophical 
methodology and our understanding of normative standards of rationality.  
 My discussion of methodological issues begins with the introduction of the 
analysis problem. The analysis problem is the problem of developing a conceptual 
analysis of propositional knowledge and justified belief. I argue that this problem 
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emerged from concerns with skeptical regress arguments and the Gettier problem. The 
traditional methodology for analyzing these concepts, and hence, for addressing the 
analysis problem, has consisted in determining the truth conditions for attributions of 
knowledge and justified beliefs. To determine these truth conditions, epistemologists 
develop thought experiments designed to elicit our semantic intuitions regarding the use 
of “knowledge,” “justified belief,” and their respective cognates. After enough intuitions 
are elicited, we formulate a theory of knowledge or justification. 
 While this methodology is problematic in its own right, as I argue in chapters 2 
and 3, it has also lead to the embrace of an understanding of rationality that is limited and 
narrow in its application. Rationality amounts to epistemic constraint satisfaction and 
epistemic constraints provide criteria that allow us to assess an agent’s behavior for good 
or correct performance. Good, or correct, performance must be understood relative to a 
specific goal or problem. Since epistemology assumes that knowledge is a certain belief 
relation to a true proposition, the goal or problem of concern in epistemology is that of 
forming true beliefs. So, when epistemologists think about rationality, they think of 
behaving in a way that is conducive to forming true beliefs. In other words, the standards 
of rationality that epistemologists use to evaluate agents for rationality apply only to 
agents who exhibit behavior that is aimed at forming true beliefs. So, one reason that the 
traditional understanding of rationality in epistemology is problematic is because it is 
inapplicable to agents who have other goals, both epistemic and practical. 
 The second problem I discuss for epistemology’s traditional understanding of 
rationality is that the standards of rationality are formulated in abstract conditions that 
idealize away from various practical constraints to which we are constantly subject. It is 
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important to keep in mind that this second problem is, in some sense, orthogonal to the 
first, although it arises, at least at times, from the standard epistemological methodology. 
Nevertheless, even if the traditional epistemological framework is correct in holding that 
all knowledge is belief-like, epistemology’s traditional standards of rationality are 
inapplicable to any actual individuals because actual individuals are finite creatures with 
fixed cognitive architectures. Since epistemology’s traditional standards of rationality are 
formulated in idealized conditions that abstract away from these limitations, they should 
be understood as guiding the behavior of agents who exist in those sorts of environments. 
But agents who exist in those sorts of environments will be subject to more demanding 
standards than actual agents. Actual agents, of course, cannot meet these standards, and, 
since ought implies can, cannot be held to them.  
 In short, chapter 1 argues that we need to depart from the epistemological status 
quo in order to accommodate the possibility of non-belief-like, that is, non-propositional 
knowledge. The dissertation proceeds to explore some of the consequences of this 
departure, specifically the consequences for philosophical methodology and our 
understanding of rationality in epistemology.  
 In chapter 2 I discuss knowledge-how, a type of knowledge that many have 
argued is non-propositional. In the first part of the chapter I discuss two intellectualist 
positions, that is, positions that hold that know-how is propositional. Stanley and 
Williamson argue that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for 
know-how, while Bengson and Moffett argue that propositional knowledge is not 
sufficient, but is necessary, for know-how.  
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 Stanley and Williamson’s position is that knowing how to X amounts to knowing, 
under a practical mode of presentation, that some way is a way for one to X. Against their 
position, I argue that if practical modes of presentation do the work that is required of 
them, then positing them amounts to granting that non-propositional knowledge is 
necessary for know-how. According to Stanley and Williamson, practical modes of 
presentation explain the connection between know-how, dispositions, and actions. 
However, these dispositions are presumably those that enable performance, and in order 
to have these dispositions, I argue that we need to practice the activity in question. 
Through this practice, we acquire the content that gives rise to the relevant dispositions. 
Following representational pluralism, it is highly implausible that this content is always, 
or even typically, linguistic or propositional. Hence, positing practical modes of 
presentation amounts to positing non-propositional content.   
 Bengson and Moffett concede that there is a non-propositional element that is 
necessary for know-how. Specifically, they argue that in order to know how to X, one has 
to stand in a non-propositional knowledge relation to a way of X-ing. However, they also 
argue that knowing how to X requires propositional knowledge because one can stand in 
a non-propositional relation to a way of X-ing without knowing that it is a way of X-ing, 
and thereby fail to know how to X. As I argue, their position entails that many clear-cut 
cases of knowing how are not cases of knowing how because the relevant agents do not 
know that, that is, have propositional knowledge the way in which they X is the way in 
which they X. Taken together, my discussion of Stanley and Williamson and Bengson 
and Moffett shows that propositional knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
know-how.  
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 The second half of chapter 2 discusses the origins of the contemporary know-how 
debate going back to Gilbert Ryle. I argue that, since Ryle’s time, two debates have been 
taking place in the know-how literature: one regarding the semantic analysis of know-
how ascriptions, and another regarding how we ought to explain various skills or 
abilities. The first debate is concerned with truth conditions for sentences such as, 
“Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle,” while the latter debate is concerned with 
determining whether skills are the result of applying a “theory” or stored propositional 
knowledge, or are the result of the processing of non-linguistic information.  
 Unfortunately, these debates have been entangled in the literature. For instance, 
some philosophers, including Stanley and Williamson, Bengson and Moffett, and Ryle, 
have made inferences about how we ought to explain skills or abilities on the basis of 
semantic analyses of know-how ascriptions or appeals to ordinary language. Both of 
these strategies assume that intuition driven semantic analysis gives us the correct truth 
conditions for sentences that use mental terminology and that scientific accounts of the 
mind are beholden to language. In other words, these strategies amount to what Martin 
Roth and Robert Cummins call epistemological poaching.  
 As an alternative approach that disentangles these debates, I argue that the 
representational pluralist thesis needs to be taken seriously. The use of epistemological 
poaching tacitly assumes that the thesis is false and that cognition is structured around a 
language of thought that has a similar structure to natural language. Taking 
representational pluralism seriously can allow epistemology to develop a broader, yet 
more specialized, framework that bridges the longstanding gap between the field and 
empirical approaches to understanding knowledge.  
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 In chapter 3 I argue that epistemology’s failure to take representational pluralism 
seriously has skewed the field’s understanding of normative standards of rationality. I 
discuss two ways in which epistemology’s normative standards of rationality are limited. 
First, they apply only to agents with purely linguistic or belief-like cognitive systems. 
Second, they apply only to cognitive systems that are capable of meeting them, due to 
what I call the ought-can principle.  
 But before discussing these limits on epistemology’s normative standards of 
rationality, I consider one way in which a proponent of traditional epistemology might try 
to argue that representational pluralism does not require substantial revision of 
epistemology’s framework. I label this type of argument the doxastification strategy. 
 Before discussing the doxastification strategy in depth, I present prima facie 
evidence for what I call epistemological pluralism, the thesis that there are many types of 
knowledge, many of which are non-propositional. The first type of prima facie evidence 
for epistemological pluralism comes from representational pluralism. If representational 
pluralism is true, there appears to be no reason to hold that only linguistic representations 
can be constitutive of knowledge.  
 The second type of prima facie evidence comes from semantics. We often make 
knowledge attributions in which it appears the thing known is not a proposition. For 
instance, we say things like, “Jones knows how the New York subway system is laid 
out,” or “Jones knows what “God Only Knows” sounds like. In the first case, the thing 
known appears to be, not a proposition, but the layout of a subway system. In the second 
case the thing known appears to be, not a proposition, but the sound of a song. 
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 Taken together, we can take semantic data to give us an indication as to what sorts 
of things qualify as objects of knowledge. Meanwhile, the psychological evidence 
provides us with insight regarding how these objects are mentally represented. The layout 
of a subway system is naturally represented by a map, while the tune to a song is 
naturally represented in auditory memory or in a score. Hence, it appears, at least prima 
facie, that we have knowledge that is, in part, comprised of non-linguistic mental 
representations.  
 One might, however, employ the doxastification strategy to argue that we can 
understand these cases of apparent non-propositional knowledge in terms of propositional 
knowledge. When one knows, for instance, how the New York subway system is laid out, 
what one knows is a proposition, namely, the proposition that the New York subway 
system is laid out like this, where “this” refers to a map of the subway system.  
 However, the doxastification strategy divorces the content that does the genuine 
evidential work, and behavioral control, from the content of what is known. Certainly 
knowing how the New York subway system is laid out allows one to know that the 
subway system is laid out like this (again, where “this” refers to a map of the subway 
system). But the problem is that one can know this proposition without having any idea 
how the New York subway system is laid out. One can be reliably informed that the map 
in question accurately represents the subway system’s layout without ever taking a look 
at the map and thereby know that the subway system is laid out like that. But in order to 
know how the subway system is laid out, one needs access to an actual representation of 
the system, that is a map (mental or otherwise).  
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 After discussing doxastification, I argue that the problems with epistemology’s 
standards of rationality can be resolved by reconciling the field with the relevant findings 
in cognitive science, that is, findings that support representational pluralism. I argue that 
the current standards of rationality in epistemology apply neither to individuals nor to 
collectives or institutional cognitive systems. These standards cannot be applied to the 
individual because doing so violates the principle that ought implies can. In other words, 
these standards require that individuals exceed their capacities. These standards cannot be 
applied to institutions, such as the institution of science, because they are not equipped to 
evaluate the use of non-linguistic representations that is ubiquitous in scientific 
reasoning. 
 Next, I discuss several problems with traditional methodology in epistemology, 
and motivate an alternative approach. The first problem is that it is not clear what the 
target of a conceptual analysis of knowledge is. If one thinks we need an analysis that is 
correct in all possible worlds, then it is not clear what could possibly constrain such a 
project. Though appealing to intuition is a standard approach, there does not appear to be 
any reason to think that intuitions are equipped to provide any evidential support for a 
theory of knowledge. I argue that, instead of pursuing an analysis of knowledge in the 
traditional manner, we should ask what role knowledge plays in the various domains in 
which it is employed.   
 In chapter 4, I examine the role that knowledge plays in two domains: everyday 
life and the institution of science. In everyday contexts, I argue that knowledge plays a 
warrant-granting role for action. This way of thinking about knowledge has drawn some 
attention in the epistemology literature from Keith DeRose, Jason Stanley, John 
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Hawthorne, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, amongst others. However, I argue 
that none of these “pragmatic encroachment” approaches draw the correct connection 
between knowledge and practical affairs. In particular, many of these accounts are 
designed to be supplements to more traditional, independent accounts of knowledge.  
 Rather, I suggest, that in order to take pragmatic encroachment seriously, 
knowledge needs to be understood as that which plays the role of making an action 
rational under realistic conditions in which time and memory are limited. That which 
makes an action rational is often different than that which makes a belief rational. 
Forming beliefs is generally low risk, that is, there is little cost that comes with being 
wrong. The cost of being wrong comes into play only when we act on beliefs. But when 
we are simply concerned with the formation of beliefs, and not how we ought to act on 
beliefs, the risks we undertake are generally minimal. Because of these differences, the 
formation of beliefs is subject to different standards of rationality than is acting on 
beliefs.   
 When we are genuinely concerned with determining how to act, standards of 
rationality must be sensitive to limits of time, memory, information, and other resources. 
Hence, I argue, drawing on work by Gigerenzer and Goldstein, that what makes an action 
rational in everyday contexts is not a proposition that is known in the traditional 
philosophical sense, but rather the use of an effective algorithm or set of heuristics.  
 If this is correct, then knowledge, as understood in traditional epistemology, 
cannot fill the role that knowledge plays in everyday contexts. Though propositions can 
serve as inputs into a decision-making procedure, it is effective use of the procedure itself 
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that makes an action rational. In other words, it is an algorithm or decision procedure that 
fills the role that knowledge plays in everyday contexts.  
 It is true, of course, that in everyday circumstances, knowledge is often used or 
discussed in a way that is much closer to the way it is understood in standard 
epistemology. It does not seem out place in everyday contexts to say, for instance, that I 
know that Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri. I take this to suggest that wee need to 
understand knowledge in a pluralistic way. While I do think knowledge is often used in 
everyday contexts to justify or criticize action, it is unlikely that this captures all uses. 
Ultimately, the issue of what role knowledge plays in commonsense is an empirical 
question, and so it would be most desirable to accumulate a set of linguistic data to give 
us a clearer sense of the different roles the concept plays in ordinary usage.  
 In scientific contexts, I argue that, because science aims to provide us with an 
understanding of the world, the role that knowledge plays in science is an explanatory 
role. However, it is possible to have an explanation for a phenomenon that is not correct 
or accurate. Such an explanation demonstrates, not how actually a phenomenon occurs, 
but rather how possibly or how plausibly the phenomenon occurs. Since science aims to 
provide theories that are not only explanatory, but also correct or accurate, the role of 
knowledge in science is that of an accurate explanatory role.  
 I begin by noting that Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological account of explanation 
and some subsequent accounts assume explanations are sentence-like in structure. But 
more recently, many philosophers of science have taken a mechanistic approach to 
explanation. Machamer, Darden, and Craver, for instance, hold that representations of 
mechanisms for phenomena explain those phenomena. They note that we use diagrams to 
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represent features of mechanisms, and these diagrams allow us to more easily apprehend 
the phenomena than linguistic descriptions. 
 While some philosophers of science, such as Carl Craver and J.D. Trout, deny 
that explanations have to render their target happenings intelligible, Waskan e al. present 
compelling empirical evidence that this view is not shared by practicing scientists. 
Rather, it appears that both scientists and laypersons have a concept of explanation in 
which intelligibility plays a central role. This supports Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s 
claim that representations of mechanisms render their target happenings intelligible.  
 There is still a good deal of work to be done to determine the psychological nature 
of intelligibility or understanding. However, Stephen Grimm suggests that understanding 
a phenomenon requires having a grasp of the relevant scientific principles and the ability 
to apply these principles to specific cases. If knowing how entails possessing content that 
gives rise to dispositions that enable us to perform various abilities, as I argue in chapter 
2, then Grimm provides some reason for thinking that know-how is a central component 
to understanding.  
 So if scientific knowledge plays the role of explaining the world, and explanations 
must render the world intelligible, then it appears that the role of knowledge in science is 
filled by that which enables us to have a correct or accurate understanding of the world. If 
this is correct, then the role that knowledge plays in science is clearly different than the 
role it plays in everyday contexts. In everyday contexts, knowledge provides warrant for 
action. In science, knowledge explains the world by rendering it intelligible.  This 
difference should be unsurprising given that individuals have different goals, resources, 
and limitations than practicing scientists, or even scientific institutions.  
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 However, one common feature that knowledge in science and everyday life 
appear to have in common is that they are both related to abilities or skills. In some 
everyday contexts, knowledge takes the form of a decision procedure or algorithm.  
Having propositional information that can serve as an input to an algorithm alone does 
not provide sufficient warrant or assurance that a certain course of action is rational. To 
have a sufficient degree of warranty, one also needs an effective procedure for processing 
or utilizing that information. To put it slightly differently, it appears that knowing how to 
put the information at one’s disposal to practical use is essential for making a course of 
action rational. In scientific contexts, knowledge plays the role of enabling us to 
understand the world, and if Grimm is correct, then understanding consists, at least in 
part, of a kind of knowledge-how.  
 There is one final complication that I discuss at the end of the chapter. The 
complication is that science is generally an institutional or collective endeavor. At the 
individual level, it appears that the cognitive state that plays the role of knowledge in 
science will be that of a state of understanding, which Grimm suggests entails having 
certain skills or abilities. But since science is generally a collective enterprise, following 
the present proposal will require developing an account of understanding, ability, and 
skill that makes sense when applied to collective cognitive systems. At present, I am not 
sure what such an account will look like. However, there are at least three obvious 
possibilities.  
 One possibility is that at the collective or institutional level, understanding, skill, 
and ability are to be understood in roughly the same manner as they are understood as the 
individual level. For example, we might understand the utterance, “Science understands 
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how planes fly” as serving as shorthand for the claim that a sufficient number of 
individual scientists, or a sufficient number of members of a subset of scientists, 
understand how planes fly.  
 A second possibility would be that in order for science to understand a 
phenomenon, it could be the case that different scientists, or collections of scientists, 
understand different components of that phenomenon. Perhaps none of the scientists, or 
groups of scientists, understands the phenomenon in full, but if we sum together the 
individual components that they do separately understand, we will arrive at a full 
understanding of the phenomenon under consideration.  
 A third possibility is that scientific knowledge should be understood in a way that 
is wholly distinct from the way in which we understand knowledge or understanding in 
individuals. Rather, we need to take seriously the idea that various scientific institutions 
are themselves epistemic agents. This is similar to the way in which the law treats 
corporations, partnerships, and governments as agents. Agents of this sort have different 
abilities, goals, and resources than the agents of which they are composed. They are also 
subject to different constraints than their component agents. Different temporal, memory, 
and computational constraints will be in effect. 
 If the suggestions offered in this section are correct, then they constitute further 
support for the claim that epistemology stands in need of revision. The traditional 
epistemological framework is not equipped to evaluate knowledge under the role it plays 
in science and this role is distinct from the role that it plays in common sense. Hence, we 
have further need for epistemological specialization and fragmentation.  
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